Latest news with #THAAD
Memri
3 days ago
- Politics
- Memri
S. Korea's Crucial June 3 Election And Its Implications For The United States: S. Korea May Become China's Satellite State
In 2009, South Korean novelist Bok Geo-il wrote one of the earliest perceptive books on the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) subversive influence within the Republic of Korea (ROK). This book was expanded and re-published in an English edition, with the title Under The Shadow Of China – Possible Finlandization Of The Korean Peninsula, in early 2017. In May of that year, due to the results of a snap election dictated by the impeachment of then conservative President Park Geun-hye, the leftist Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) candidate Moon Jae-in, an appeaser of N. Korea and China, was elected president. As Bok pointed out, China's influence on ROK policies had been going on for years, since the 1992 normalization of diplomatic ties between the two countries.[1] However, it was with the advent of the China-friendly administration of Moon Jae-in that China's influence on the ROK reached unprecedented levels. What transpired during the left-leaning administration of President Moon is important in understanding the pro-China policy preferences of the current DPK presidential candidate, Lee Jae-myung, who hopes to win the June 3 snap election in Korea, which is the result of the impeachment and removal from office of former pro-U.S. conservative President Yoon Seok-yeol.[2] Under the Shadow of China – Possible Finlandization of the Korean Peninsula, by Bok Geo-il South China Morning Post: "China Wins Its War Against South Korea's U.S. THAAD Missile Shield — Without Firing A Shot" With the Moon administration came a veritable flood of China-friendly, and in some cases downright pro-China policies and proposals. Perhaps the most important of these various policies centered about the dispute between China and the ROK over the deployment in the ROK of a battery of the U.S. THAAD (terminal high-altitude area defense) anti-missile system, meant to deter and defend against the ever-increasing missile threat posed by N. Korea. The decision to deploy THAAD was announced in 2016 by the previous administration of conservative President Park and the system was in place by early May of 2017, days prior to Moon's election. It had been strongly opposed by Park's political opponents Moon Jae-in, Lee Jae-myung, and others of the leftist DPK, who issued statements and participated in rallies opposing THAAD. As part of the pressure campaign against the deployment, which China perceived would force concessions from the Moon administration, certain Korean businesses in China were subjected to shut down, Korean cultural content in China was drastically restricted, Chinese group tours to the ROK nearly disappeared, and other de jure and de facto forms of retaliation were brought to bear. In late 2017, the Moon administration announced its infamous "Three No's" policy that was well-received in China. Moon declared that there would be no deployment of additional THAAD batteries in the ROK, that the ROK would not participate in any regional anti-missile defense system, and that the ROK would not enter into any trilateral defense alliance with both the U.S. and Japan. While Moon's fans in the ROK and the U.S. attempted to portray this decision as some kind of useful compromise, with China, many conservative South Korean observers widely regarded the "Three No's" policy as a national humiliation. After Moon's concessions to China, Hong Kong's South China Morning Post featured the November 2017 headline "China Wins Its War Against South Korea's U.S. THAAD Missile Shield — Without Firing A shot." (Source: South China Morning Post, November 18, 2017) Moon Jae-in: China Is A "High Mountain Peak" The appeasement regarding THAAD was not the only humiliation which Moon, who served as president from May 2017 to May 2022, caused the ROK to suffer with regard to China. A slew of further national indignities occurred, when Moon visited China for a summit with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping in December 2017. He likened China to a "high mountain peak," in contradistinction to the ROK, which he defined as a "small nation."[3] Moon added that he deeply agreed with "many parts of governing philosophy put forward by president Xi Jinping in the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China." He then stated that that "the Chinese Dream" was not only the dream of China but also the dream of Asia and even the world.[4] Moon further said that China and the ROK were "destined as one community," and even went so far as to praise what he absurdly termed the "democratic leadership" of Xi.[5] Overlooking the several Chinese invasions of Korea throughout history, including China's attack on the ROK (to save North Korea) in 1950, Moon said "the Chinese and Koreans are comrades who suffered and overcame the hardships of modern history together."[6] Yet, in spite of several invitations by Moon, Xi never deigned to visit the ROK during Moon's presidency. Nevertheless, when COVID emerged and spread to the ROK, Moon bent over backwards, even at the expense of his own nation's citizens, to cozy up to China. Moon refused the pleas of the Korean Medical Association to suspend flights from China to the ROK and in the face of a serious mask shortage in the ROK allowed masks to be exported to China.[7] "China's difficulties are our difficulties," Moon told Xi in February 2020.[8] As Korean academic Lee Seong-hyon put it, "The South Korean public went up in arms, with some claiming he seemed more like the president of China than South Korea."[9] In June of 2020, Moon's Ambassador to the U.S. Lee Soo-hyuck said: "I feel pride that we are now a country that can choose [between the U.S. and China], not be forced to choose."[10] President Moon Jae-in greets Chinese President Xi Jinping prior to the China-South Korean summit in Berlin that took place in July, 2017. (Source: Yonhap News) The Straits Times: "Pro-China Remarks Haunt S. Korea's Presidential Hopeful Lee Jae-myung" This brings us to the ROK's troubled present, and the current DPK presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung. Based on the statements of Lee Jae-myung, who stands a good chance of winning the June 3 presidential election, it would seem that he is following in the footsteps of Moon. Lee played a key role in the downfall of pro-U.S. conservative President Yoon Seok-yeol. It is worth noting that, in the first impeachment motion against President Yoon, the DPK's leadership, which includes Lee, revealed its worldview by including as one of the grounds for impeachment the accusation that Yoon was "antagonizing" North Korea, China, and Russia. The DPK apparently felt that opposition to China's policies was somehow a crime. The party only removed this language from its second motion after it was criticized within the ROK and by Korea experts and commentators in the U.S.[11] Furthermore, commenting on Lee's legislative election campaign speech of March 22, 2024, Korean media outlet Chosun Ilbo stated: "Lee Jae-myung, the leader of South Korea's main opposition Democratic Party, asked, 'Why keep pestering China?' With a gesture of clasping his hands together, he suggested that a simple 'xièxiè [thank you]' to China and also expressing gratitude to Taiwan should suffice. 'Why bother meddling everywhere?' [Lee] further questioned the relevance of the Taiwan Strait issue to South Korea, asking, 'Whatever happens in the Taiwan Strait, whatever happens with China and Taiwan's domestic issues, what does it matter to us?'"[12] The newspaper characterized Lee's remarks as "kowtowing" to China.[13] The Straits Times newspaper of Singapore described this controversy in an April 2025 dispatch from Seoul under the headline "Pro-China remarks haunt S. Korea's presidential hopeful Lee Jae-myung amid West Sea dispute."[14] (Source: Straits Times, April 26, 2025) On June 8, 2023, while visiting China's embassy in Seoul, Lee enraged conservatives, for backing Chinese ambassador Xing Haiming's criticism of Pro-U.S. conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol's foreign policy.[15] Lee also offered no objections or attempts at rebuttal as China's ambassador issued what were widely viewed as thinly veiled threats against the ROK. "In a situation where the U.S. is pressuring China with all its might, some are betting that the U.S. will win and China will lose. What I can say for sure is that those who bet now on China's defeat will surely regret it later," the Chinese ambassador said.[16] On June 8, 2023, Lee Jae-myung was pictured bowing deeply to Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming. The bow was apparently not reciprocated and was not standard diplomatic protocol for a party leader and legislator greeting a foreign ambassador. (Source: June 8, 2023) China Is Trying To Expand Its Influence In The West Sea And Create A Basis For Future Territorial Claims Concerns about China's aggressive moves, viewed as attempts at territorial expansion in the seas of the Western Pacific, are not limited to the South China Sea. Chinese military aircraft have in recent years been routinely entering the ROK's air defense identification zone, and Chinese military vessels have been regularly entering the ROK's maritime exclusive economic zone, necessitating the scrambling of ROK fighter jets and coast guard ships. China has also in recent years, and especially in recent months, been installing massive steel structures, fixed installations, in the ocean area where each nation's exclusive economic zones overlap in the West Sea (also known as that Yellow Sea) off the coast of the ROK. In an April 21, 2025 editorial, the ROK's Chosun Ilbo newspaper warned that "Beijing appears to be employing the same incremental tactics it used in the South China Sea to assert de facto control over contested maritime areas." As might be expected given their worldview and ideological tendencies, and in particular their troubling positions and statements regarding China, Lee and his DPK refused to join the conservative People Power Party in immediately condemning of these Chinese moves. Lee and his party remained silent even in the immediate aftermath of a tense standoff between Chinese and ROK coast guard vessels in late February of 2025, which resulted when China threatened and blocked an ROK oceanographic research ship from conducting a legitimate investigation in the area of the Chinese structures.[17] In light of the initial silence from Lee and his Party, a March 24, 2025 Chosun Ilbo editorial lamented: "It is hard to understand how a party that has shown an allergic reaction to discussing ways to protect us from North Korea's nuclear threat is [also] silent about China's West Sea threat."[18] "In January, China installed a large steel structure within the South Korea–China Provisional Measures Zone in the West Sea (also known as the Yellow Sea). The structure measures 70 meters in diameter and 71 meters in height. China claims the structure is a fish farm, but experts say its appearance closely resembles that of an oil drilling platform. Concerns that China may use these structures in the future to assert territorial claims in the West Sea are growing." (Source: Yonhap; March 24, 2025) CCP Espionage in S. Korea Mirroring what appears to be an upsurge in Chinese surveillance and espionage activities in the U.S. in recent years, the ROK has been experiencing a major increase in acts of surveillance and espionage by Chinese nationals. In the past few months alone, there have been several incidents of Chinese visitors to the ROK apprehended while taking photos and videos of U.S. and ROK air force and naval facilities, including U.S. fighter jets based in the ROK and U.S. warships docked in ROK ports. One pair of Chinese nationals was even caught engaging in such intelligence-gathering activities twice within a few days. "We believe they may be systematically recording the movements of South Korean and U.S. military aircraft to build a database," according to a military official.[19] It was disclosed in May that a Chinese intelligence agent was recently arrested for seeking to obtain military secrets from a Korean soldier. The spy was attempting to gather information on the THAAD system, U.S.-ROK military drills, contingency plans of U.S. forces in Korea, and other classified ROK military documents.[20] A 10-member Chinese spy ring was tasked with obtaining information on anti-China groups in the ROK.[21] A Chinese national was also caught using a drone to film the headquarters of the ROK's National Intelligence Service.[22] In November 2024, according to media reports, the ROK's Board of Audit and Inspection disclosed the results of an investigation, which alleged that some of the highest officials of the former Moon administration, including Moon's National Security Advisor, were sharing classified information regarding the U.S. THAAD system, and details of its deployment in the ROK, not only with pro-North Korean and other far-left radicals who were staging violent protests at the deployment site, but also with officials of China's embassy in Seoul.[23] As the Korea Herald reported on November 19, 2024, Moon's National Security Advisor and three other top-raking officials of his administration were "accused of informing activists opposed to South Korea's hosting of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system beforehand of plans by U.S. and South Korean forces to replace a THAAD battery missile," and were "also accused of giving an advance briefing to a defense attaché at the Chinese Embassy in Seoul on the details of the missile replacement operation."[24] Moon's National Security Advisor was formally indicted in April, and his trial commenced in May.[25] To date, the instances of illegal surveillance and espionage by Chinese nationals in the ROK cannot be prosecuted as acts of espionage. As the Chosun Ilbo notes, "most of the individuals involved have faced little to no punishment. Many are let off with warnings due to legal limitations."[26] This is due to the fact that under current ROK law, the specific crime of espionage is defined as an act which is conducted for the benefit of an "enemy state," and such an enemy state is interpreted to mean only North Korea. Therefore, such acts are not punishable as espionage if they were conducted on behalf of China or any other state (except North Korea). The solution to this dilemma would seem easy enough. The legislature would simply have to expand coverage of the law in question to include other nations. The conservative People Power Party has been attempting to do precisely that, by proposing that the term "enemy state" (i.e., exclusively North Korea) be changed to "foreign countries or equivalent organizations." Although a few individual members of the DPK had originally indicated support for this change, a matter of basic national security, the DPK (which has a strong majority in the legislature) reversed its stance, and has since been using every opportunity to delay a change in the law. One of the top leaders of the People Power Party asserts that the DPK is using delaying tactics because "candidate Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party of Korea are consistently bowing to China, which is why China views South Korea lightly."[27] The Chosun Ilbo assessed that "the [Democratic] party's hesitation may stem from its ties to China, given the longstanding connections between DPK figures and the Chinese Communist Party."[28] DPK Flag Displayed At 100th Anniversary CCP Founding The various ROK political parties (of all ideological stripes) and many of the politicians who belong to them have ties to China to varying degrees, and some government officials and legislators have therefore been reluctant to significantly (or at least publicly) condemn CCP influence in the ROK. In late 2022, the 100 founding members of the "Korea-China Parliamentary Federation" included politicians from both major ROK parties. However, the connections between the DPK (and its key leaders) and China have certainly been far friendlier in tone, far more substantial in scope, and even more political in nature than those of other parties. This was demonstrated several years ago, when the ROK's Yonhap News reported in July 2019 that the DPK's think tank, "The Institute for Democracy," signed an exchange and cooperation agreement with the "Central Party School" of the CCP. Yang Jeong-cheol, director of the Democratic Research Institute, shakes hands with Li Zhi, vice president of the Chinese Party School, after signing an exchange agreement in Beijing in 2029. (Source: The reported: 'Nine months before the April 2020 National Election in Korea, the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) (or Deobureo Minjoo Dang in Korean, 더불어민주당) also signed an agreement with the CCP on July 10, 2019. Yang Jung-chul (양정철), then-Director of the Institute for Democracy, an arm of the DPK responsible for election strategy, visited Beijing in July 2019 and signed an agreement with the CCP Central Committee's Party School (Central Party School), which produces the party elites. Initially, it was established as Marx School of Communism under the CCP Central Committee in 1933. The CCP Central Party School superintendents include Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, and Mao Zedong." (Source: November 5, 2023) As documented in 2025 by the ROK's Maeil Shinmun news website, when the CCP held an event in 2021 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of its founding, the venue included a display of the flags of political parties from across world which were supportive of or friendly to their party, and tellingly, one of the flags featured was that of the DPK. At the CCP's 100th anniversary of its founding, the venue included a display of the flags of political parties. One of the flags featured was that of the DPK. (Source: The ROK Would Be Compelled To Adopt A Formally Neutral Yet Essentially Pro-China Foreign Policy The Korean author Bok Geo-il warned about the risk of a potential "Finlandization" of the ROK. That is a scenario under which China would not directly control the ROK, and the nation would not lose its de jure independence but would slowly yet inexorably be transformed into a de facto satellite state, with China exercising the type of suzerain role that it had over Korea in ancient history. The ROK would thereby be compelled to adopt a formally neutral yet essentially pro-China foreign policy, just as Finland was forced to do by the Soviet Union during the decades of the Cold War. There are pro-North Korea and other far-left groups and activists, in both the ROK and the U.S., who have been advocating precisely such a "neutralization" of the ROK. Since such a massive geopolitical shift would clearly necessitate the end of the U.S.-ROK alliance, a longstanding goal of China, North Korea, and their sympathizers in the ROK and the U.S., that scenario would not only prove to be a disaster for the people of the ROK and their sovereign rights, but also an extremely grave blow to the U.S. strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region and to American interests more broadly. To the extent that the DPK and its presidential candidate Lee would move the ROK incrementally closer to China, both Koreans and Americans will have reason for deep concern if he is elected on June 3. *Lawrence Peck is a freelance writer and researcher based in Los Angeles and Seoul. Having intensively researched and closely monitored the activities of pro-North Korea and other extremist groups and activists in the U.S. for over 25 years, he has been recognized in the U.S. and Korea as one of the leading American authorities on such topics, and has lectured, written extensively and been interviewed on such topics in the U.S. and Korea. He has a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and a Juris Doctor degree from Loyola Law School of Los Angeles. He previously worked in Korea for several of the largest Korean business groups in the fields of intellectual property licensing and international business development. He has also served as an advisor to the North Korea Freedom Coalition of the U.S.
Time of India
3 days ago
- Politics
- Time of India
Guam missile defense system under pressure: $8 billion U.S. plan struggles with delays, leadership gaps, and China threat
Guam missile defense system is facing serious problems despite an $8 billion investment by the U.S. military. A new GAO report reveals delays, unclear leadership, and poor infrastructure planning that threaten the Pentagon's ability to defend Guam from potential Chinese missile attacks. With missing timelines, unapproved facilities, and troops relying on bottled water, the situation paints a worrying picture. The system, critical to counter China's growing missile threat, lacks a clear strategy for long-term operation. These gaps raise urgent questions about the island's readiness in case of conflict. Here's what's really going wrong behind the scenes. Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads Why is the Guam missile Defense system facing delays despite billions in funding? How is the army struggling to maintain current Defenses on Guam? Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads What are the logistics and housing gaps delaying deployment? Who is supposed to run the Guam missile Defense system? Is Guam ready for a potential missile conflict with China? FAQs: Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads The $8 billion US missile defense plan for Guam—aimed at protecting the island from potential Chinese missile attacks—is facing serious challenges, according to a recent report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO). Despite being one of the Pentagon's top defense priorities, the report reveals troubling gaps in planning, infrastructure, and long-term Pentagon's Guam Defense System (GDS) is supposed to offer a 360-degree missile shield around the island. It's a response to China's expanding missile force, especially weapons like the DF-26 "Guam Express"—a missile that can strike Guam from over 2,500 miles away. However, the GAO report, released last week, reveals the Department of Defense (DoD) still lacks a clear strategy for who will operate and sustain the system once no finalized timeline or leadership plan between the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the military services. The system is supposed to be managed across 16 sites on Guam, with installation running from 2027 to 2032, but many critical operational questions remain US Army has had trouble even with its current responsibilities on the island. For more than 10 years, Guam has hosted a THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) battery, but basic support and maintenance are lacking. Army vehicles are being repaired under tarps, and there is still no permanent facility for the THAAD system. When a typhoon hit Guam in 2023, Army units had to rely on the Marine Corps for hangar inspectors found that soldiers stationed there were drinking bottled water due to a lack of clean water access. These issues have created what the report described as 'morale challenges' for Army personnel and military operations, the Pentagon hasn't figured out how many service members will be needed, where they'll live, or how schools, medical services, and grocery stores will support them. This makes it nearly impossible to plan for training, housing, or deployment some branches have tried to estimate their needs, the lack of an overarching plan has left critical infrastructure and personnel decisions in limbo. The Army is currently waiting for clarity before it can move forward with essential logistics.A major issue is the unclear chain of command. The GAO report says the Pentagon hasn't defined which military branch or agency will lead the Guam Defense System. Some responsibilities are shared between services, while others might fall to the Missile Defense confusion could lead to duplication, delays, or gaps in operations when the system goes live. Lt. Gen. Robert Rasch, who oversees the GDS project, told the Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee earlier this month that the project will cost around $8 People's Liberation Army Rocket Force has thousands of missiles, many aimed at deterring or disabling US bases in the Indo-Pacific region. Guam—home to key US airfields and submarines—would likely be one of the first targets in a conflict. Experts warn that the US could face an unprecedented missile threat if war were to break out with the Guam Defense System is meant to address this risk, the lack of a clear operating plan, insufficient infrastructure, and poor conditions for current troops suggest that Guam is far from US military's efforts to build a strong missile defense for Guam are urgent, especially as threats from China grow. But without answers on who's in charge, how many troops are needed, and where they'll live and work, the system is far from battle-ready. If the Pentagon doesn't address these gaps soon, Guam may remain a vulnerable target—despite the billions already being system lacks leadership, planning, and support despite $8 billion hosts key US bases and is within range of China's DF-26 missiles.
Yahoo
4 days ago
- Business
- Yahoo
The $8 billion US scramble to defend Guam from China has glaring problems
A new GAO report highlights challenges facing the defense of Guam. The watchdog said DoD hadn't determined personnel, deployment, or other requirements. The Army, in particular, has had installation and maintenance issues. The US military's plans for missile defenses on Guam are hitting major snags, per a new government watchdog report. The problems range from a lack of strategy or timeline for sustaining the defense systems, Army logistics and maintenance issues, and unknowns over the housing and base services they'll need. Last week, the US Government Accountability Office released a report documenting the challenges facing the Department of Defense in its plan to develop an enhanced missile defense capability for Guam, or the Guam Defense System. It's been a top priority as China has built up its missile forces, putting US submarines and airfields there on the frontlines of a conflict. The plan is to network interceptors, missiles, radars, and sensors to provide a 360-degree defense of the island, but the GAO said there are some holes. "DoD does not have a strategy that includes a timeline and a plan for determining when and how the lead organization — the military services or [Missile Defense Agency] — will assume responsibility for operating and sustaining those systems," the report said. DoD, GAO said, has suggested multiple military services could manage the GDS, further muddying a plan about who will take lead on what is one of the department's larger and more complicated integrated air defense networks. The GDS will involve 16 sites around Guam and is set for full installation between 2027 and 2032. It'll cost around $8 billion, Lt. Gen. Robert Rasch, the joint executive officer for GDS, told the US Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee earlier this month. Per the GAO report, unanswered questions within DoD on who will operate and sustain GDS elements, and more broadly the number of personnel needed or a deployment schedule, has put the Army in a waiting position as they determine training, personnel, and facilities. Some other DoD organizations have done their own estimates for some of these areas, but there are broader limitations facing housing, schools, medical facilities, and supermarkets as well that can't be figured out until the Pentagon identifies how many service members it'll need, the report noted. The Army is also struggling to take care of its Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile battery that's been deployed to the island for over a decade because the service lacks infrastructure. Army officials from Task Force Talon and the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade told the GAO they've had difficulties getting approval from the Navy for building facilities on the island; after a typhoon hit the island in 2023, the Army relied on the Marine Corps for hangars to protect THAAD launchers and radars. The THAAD battery doesn't have a dedicated maintenance facility, and Army vehicles undergoing maintenance were spotted by the GAO under temporary tarps, not a permanent facility. And Task Force Talon told the GAO their soldiers rely on bottled water due to the lack of clean drinking water in the area. All of this contributed to, the report said, "morale challenges" facing soldiers and Army civilians. The Army's plans to improve these issues have included establishing an office for managing the service's presence on Guam, signing an agreement for negotiating installation support of facilities, and having Army planners present in Guam for further discussions. Pentagon officials, experts, and lawmakers in Washington have continued raising the alarm about the threat of China's massive missile arsenal to Guam. There has been a call from the Army for more air defenses with deeper magazines and concerns among US lawmakers about the vulnerability of US bases in the Indo-Pacific. China's People's Liberation Army Rocket Force boasts thousands of missiles, including the DF-26, a solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile nicknamed the "Guam Express" because it can reach the island that's some 2,500 miles from Beijing. While Chinese ballistic missiles haven't been tested in combat, conflict experts have said the US could face a threat unlike anything it's seen before if it were to go to war with China. Read the original article on Business Insider
Business Insider
4 days ago
- Business
- Business Insider
The $8 billion US scramble to defend Guam from China has glaring problems
The US military's plans for missile defenses on Guam are hitting major snags, per a new government watchdog report. The problems range from a lack of strategy or timeline for sustaining the defense systems, Army logistics and maintenance issues, and unknowns over the housing and base services they'll need. Last week, the US Government Accountability Office released a report documenting the challenges facing the Department of Defense in its plan to develop an enhanced missile defense capability for Guam, or the Guam Defense System. It's been a top priority as China has built up its missile forces, putting US submarines and airfields there on the frontlines of a conflict. The plan is to network interceptors, missiles, radars, and sensors to provide a 360-degree defense of the island, but the GAO said there are some holes. "DoD does not have a strategy that includes a timeline and a plan for determining when and how the lead organization — the military services or [Missile Defense Agency] — will assume responsibility for operating and sustaining those systems," the report said. DoD, GAO said, has suggested multiple military services could manage the GDS, further muddying a plan about who will take lead on what is one of the department's larger and more complicated integrated air defense networks. The GDS will involve 16 sites around Guam and is set for full installation between 2027 and 2032. It'll cost around $8 billion, Lt. Gen. Robert Rasch, the joint executive officer for GDS, told the US Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee earlier this month. Per the GAO report, unanswered questions within DoD on who will operate and sustain GDS elements, and more broadly the number of personnel needed or a deployment schedule, has put the Army in a waiting position as they determine training, personnel, and facilities. Some other DoD organizations have done their own estimates for some of these areas, but there are broader limitations facing housing, schools, medical facilities, and supermarkets as well that can't be figured out until the Pentagon identifies how many service members it'll need, the report noted. The Army is also struggling to take care of its Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile battery that's been deployed to the island for over a decade because the service lacks infrastructure. Army officials from Task Force Talon and the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade told the GAO they've had difficulties getting approval from the Navy for building facilities on the island; after a typhoon hit the island in 2023, the Army relied on the Marine Corps for hangars to protect THAAD launchers and radars. The THAAD battery doesn't have a dedicated maintenance facility, and Army vehicles undergoing maintenance were spotted by the GAO under temporary tarps, not a permanent facility. And Task Force Talon told the GAO their soldiers rely on bottled water due to the lack of clean drinking water in the area. All of this contributed to, the report said, "morale challenges" facing soldiers and Army civilians. The Army's plans to improve these issues have included establishing an office for managing the service's presence on Guam, signing an agreement for negotiating installation support of facilities, and having Army planners present in Guam for further discussions. Pentagon officials, experts, and lawmakers in Washington have continued raising the alarm about the threat of China's massive missile arsenal to Guam. There has been a call from the Army for more air defenses with deeper magazines and concerns among US lawmakers about the vulnerability of US bases in the Indo-Pacific. China's People's Liberation Army Rocket Force boasts thousands of missiles, including the DF-26, a solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile nicknamed the "Guam Express" because it can reach the island that's some 2,500 miles from Beijing. While Chinese ballistic missiles haven't been tested in combat, conflict experts have said the US could face a threat unlike anything it's seen before if it were to go to war with China.
Memri
4 days ago
- Politics
- Memri
Open Sources Indicate Chinese Involvement In South Korea – Support For Pro-China Politicians, Cultural Influence, Sexual Bribery, Espionage, And Online Manipulation
Open sources indicate that China influences politics and society in South Korea through many channels. Much of this influence is connected to the pro-China leftist Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), which dominates the National Assembly. The DPK has weaponized the legislative branch's lawmaking power and impeached pro-US President Yoon Suk-yeol, who pursued economic decoupling from China. The following short list, comprising information taken form open sources, gives some examples of China's influence in South Korea. China's Long-Term Support For Pro-China Politicians In South Korea: Lee Jae-myung, current DPK candidate at the June 3 presidential elections • Lee actively advocates for improving relations with China and criticized the "inequality" of the U.S.-South Korea alliance . • He has claimed that, if elected, he would cancel THAAD deployment. He argues that the U.S. uses THAAD to block China's maritime access and spy on Chinese secrets, solely for U.S. interests. • Lee holds an anti-Japan stance. On November 14, 2016, he criticized the South Korea-Japan Military Intelligence Protection Agreement. • In March 2024, Lee questioned the Yoon administration's stance toward China, asking, "Why provoke China? What does the Taiwan issue have to do with South Korea?" Former President Moon Jae-in (2017-2022) • During his presidency, Moon Jae-in promoted China-South Korea reconciliation. • Yoon accused Moon's administration of leaking THAAD-related intelligence and collaborating with China. See: Exclusive: Audit finds Moon administration leaked THAAD details to China, civic groups, Chosun daily, Nov.19, 2024 Editorial: Moon officials undermined THAAD to appease China, Chosun daily, Apr. 10, 2025 • Moon Jae-in has publicly endorsed the view that South Korea's founding was illegitimate, portraying it as the work of pro-Japanese collaborators under U.S. influence. Cultural Involvement • By the end of 2023, there were 39 Confucius Institutes promoting the CCP in South Korea. • In Seoul National University's (SNU) there is a "Xi Jinping Collection Room," a section of the main library that houses more than 10,000 books and videos donated by the Chinese leader after his visit to the country in 2014. • In 2019, Institute for Democracy, an arm of the Democratic party of Korea responsible for election strategy, signed an agreement with the CCP Central Committee's Party School, which produces the party elites. Sexual Bribery A senior South Korean intelligence official told Epoch Times journalist Joshua Philipp about high-ranking South Korean officials and business elites being under the control of the CCP due to sexual bribes, and secret fund transfers.[1] Spy Activities Chinese Students Caught Using Drones to Spy on U.S. and Korean Military Bases • In June 2024, three Chinese students were caught using drones to film U.S. aircraft carrier. In January 2024, a Chinese national was detained flying a drone near a security-sensitive zone. Chinese nationals had been caught filming South Korean military and key government facilities on 11 occasions since June 2024. • On December 23, 2022, the Korean media reported that a restaurant in Seoul was identified as a CCP 'secret police station' to suppress dissidents. Legal Loopholes: Article 98 of Korea's criminal code defines espionage only in relation to "enemy states" (i.e., N. Korea). China is not classified as an enemy, which limits legal tools to prosecute Chinese spies. Online Manipulation • Troll Army "Wu Mao" active in Korean online platforms like Naver, Daum, to sway opinion on political issues. • Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) investigated hacking by N. Korea and CCP against South Korea's National Election Commission servers and computers, and it discovered serious weaknesses in the system.
