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Scoop
20-05-2025
- Politics
- Scoop
Pacific News In Brief For 20 May
Article – RNZ A round-up of news from around the region, including Solomon Islands' prime minister warning government workers off Taiwan. An army officer overseeing plans for a 360-degree missile system for Guam says it will cost approximately US$8 billion. Lieutenant General Robert Rasch, the executive director of the Guam Defense System Joint Program Office, spoke to a US Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last week. Lieutenant General Rasch told members of the Senate committee that the price tag is 'really the cost of the systems that the services were building already that will now be located at Guam, approximately $8 billion across all the service'. He said the effort on Guam was to 'get as much capability as soon as possible'. One senator asked how long until the system will be operational. Lieutenant General Rasch said they will be improving this capability forever, and defense never rests. Tonga – dengue Dengue cases in Tonga have now reached 756. In an update released on Monday night, Tonga's Ministry of Health reported there were six people in hospital with the disease. It said 381 cases are from Tongatapu, 309 from Vava'u, 62 from 'Eua, and four from Ha'apai. The health ministry said case investigations and vector control are ongoing. Solomon Islands – One-China Policy The Solomon Islands' prime minister has warned government workers against engaging with 'Taiwan'. In a statement, Jeremiah Manele reaffirmed his government's commitment to the One-China Policy. Earlier this month Manele survived a motion of no confidence, the second such challenge he's had to face during his first year in government. It's given rise to talks of new legislation aimed at curbing political instability in the country. Last week, the ABC reported a newly appointed government minister was pressured by China to quit an international group critical of its policies. Beijing's Embassy in Honiara said the allegations are baseless. It said China will never interfere in Solomon Islands internal affairs and also firmly oppose any other countries' interference in Solomon Islands' internal affairs. Fiji – methamphetamine Three men, including an officer of the Counter Narcotics Bureau, have been charged in Fiji in relation to importing methamphetamine. The Fiji Revenue and Customs Service said the intercept took place last week after Customs Officers identified irregularities during screening of an airfreight consignment from a Southeast African nation. The Fiji Times reported the three men each face a charge of unlawful importation of illicit drugs, while two of them also face a charge of possession of properties suspected of being proceeds of crime. Police prosecutor, Inspector Pramesh Chand, told the court a fourth suspect had also been arrested. Australia – visit Australia's foreign minister Penny Wong is travelling to the Pacific with a delegation this week. In a joint statement the ministers said they will travel to Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu. They will meet with each nation's prime ministers, including discussing the strengthening of the Vuvale Partnership with Sitiveni Rabuka in Fiji. The ministers said this early visit to the region, soon after the Australian election, demonstrates how deeply they value being part of the Pacific family. Niue – fisheries The 138th Annual Officials Meeting of the Forum Fisheries Committee has wrapped up in Alofi. The Forum Fisheries Agency said officials from across the Pacific focused on advancing the sustainable management of the region's tuna fisheries. It said officials addressed a wide range of strategic priorities including climate resilience and strengthened international engagement. The outcomes from this meeting will be presented to ministers at the Forum Fisheries Committee Ministerial Meeting in July.
Scoop
20-05-2025
- Politics
- Scoop
Pacific News In Brief For 20 May
Guam - defence An army officer overseeing plans for a 360-degree missile system for Guam says it will cost approximately US$8 billion. Lieutenant General Robert Rasch, the executive director of the Guam Defense System Joint Program Office, spoke to a US Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last week. Lieutenant General Rasch told members of the Senate committee that the price tag is "really the cost of the systems that the services were building already that will now be located at Guam, approximately $8 billion across all the service". He said the effort on Guam was to "get as much capability as soon as possible". One senator asked how long until the system will be operational. Lieutenant General Rasch said they will be improving this capability forever, and defense never rests. Tonga - dengue Dengue cases in Tonga have now reached 756. In an update released on Monday night, Tonga's Ministry of Health reported there were six people in hospital with the disease. It said 381 cases are from Tongatapu, 309 from Vava'u, 62 from 'Eua, and four from Ha'apai. The health ministry said case investigations and vector control are ongoing. Solomon Islands - One-China Policy The Solomon Islands' prime minister has warned government workers against engaging with "Taiwan". In a statement, Jeremiah Manele reaffirmed his government's commitment to the One-China Policy. Earlier this month Manele survived a motion of no confidence, the second such challenge he's had to face during his first year in government. It's given rise to talks of new legislation aimed at curbing political instability in the country. Last week, the ABC reported a newly appointed government minister was pressured by China to quit an international group critical of its policies. Beijing's Embassy in Honiara said the allegations are baseless. It said China will never interfere in Solomon Islands internal affairs and also firmly oppose any other countries' interference in Solomon Islands' internal affairs. Fiji - methamphetamine Three men, including an officer of the Counter Narcotics Bureau, have been charged in Fiji in relation to importing methamphetamine. The Fiji Revenue and Customs Service said the intercept took place last week after Customs Officers identified irregularities during screening of an airfreight consignment from a Southeast African nation. The Fiji Times reported the three men each face a charge of unlawful importation of illicit drugs, while two of them also face a charge of possession of properties suspected of being proceeds of crime. Police prosecutor, Inspector Pramesh Chand, told the court a fourth suspect had also been arrested. Australia - visit Australia's foreign minister Penny Wong is travelling to the Pacific with a delegation this week. In a joint statement the ministers said they will travel to Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu. They will meet with each nation's prime ministers, including discussing the strengthening of the Vuvale Partnership with Sitiveni Rabuka in Fiji. The ministers said this early visit to the region, soon after the Australian election, demonstrates how deeply they value being part of the Pacific family. Niue - fisheries The 138th Annual Officials Meeting of the Forum Fisheries Committee has wrapped up in Alofi. The Forum Fisheries Agency said officials from across the Pacific focused on advancing the sustainable management of the region's tuna fisheries. It said officials addressed a wide range of strategic priorities including climate resilience and strengthened international engagement. The outcomes from this meeting will be presented to ministers at the Forum Fisheries Committee Ministerial Meeting in July.
BBC News
04-05-2025
- Politics
- BBC News
Why Captain Ibrahim Traore dey popular wit young Africans?
Thousands of pipo gada for di Place de la Révolution for Ouagadougou on Wednesday 30 April to show dia support for di President of di transition, Captain Ibrahim Traoré. Di demonstration happun afta di US commander of AFRICOM, General Michael Langley, tell di US Senate Armed Services Committee for early April say di military regime wey dey power for Burkina Faso dey take advantage of di resources for di kontri, particularly di gold reserves, for im own protection instead of di population. Wetin General Langley tell di US Senate provoke pipo to react for Burkina Faso and throughout di ESA kontris and even beyond di region. Di goment of Burkina Faso bin condemn di statement wey di US military command, make wit di 'aim to spoil di kontri image. Hundreds of messages and publications to support Captain Traore don full social networks in recently. For X platform, artists, activists, young African leaders and even African-Americans bin dey para sake of di statements wey di US General Langley make. Dis massive support for Burkina Faso military leader, Captain Ibrahim Traore, dey come at a time of growing tensions wit Western powers. Di accusations of corruption wey General Langley make against di President of di transition, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, instead of am to weaken di regime for Burkina Faso, e reinforce di status and aura of di young military leader, wey im popularity extend beyond national borders. For several years, Burkina Faso bin dey suffer from jihadist violence wey bin don claim thousands of lives and displace more dan two million pipo. Wen im bin take power for September 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traoré bin promise to make di fight against terrorism im priority. Im bin launch massive recruitment campaigns for Volunteers for di Defence of di Fatherland (VDP), im step up military operations and strengthen di capabilities of di armed forces. Dis offensive stance against armed groups win di support of a large part of di population. However, Traoré popularity go beyond civilian acceptance of di military regime. Im don make radical reforms wey dey sweet large sections of di population. A sovereignist and outspoken voice Traoré quickly adopt anti-imperialist stance, wia im bin strongly criticise di interference of Western powers, particularly France. Dem see im decision to draw closer to new partners like Russia and Iran, and to leave certain regional cooperation frameworks (G5 Sahel, ECOWAS) as stamping of im sovereignty. Dis geopolitical shift dey make young pipo wey dey seek political and economic independence happy. President Ibrahim Traoré popularity wit young pipo na mainly due to im anti-imperialist stance and im sovereigntist discourse, according to journalist and writer Seidik Abba, associate researcher and President of di Centre international d'études et de réflexions sur le Sahel (CIRES). 'First of all, im his anti-imperialist stance dey. Di fact say im dey position imsef as pesin wey no want any foreign interference for im kontri affairs dey go well wit young Africans, wey don tire of di old system whereby African kontris dey take orders or dem dey go seek orders from dia former colonial powers or di international order. Dis nationalist, anti-imperialist stance don make am dey veri popular wit young pipo', Abba tok Di new Sankara? Captain Traoré don becom a symbol of resistance to Western influence, particularly French influence, and dis dey go positively wit di predominantly young population. Im revolutionary stance and commitment to African unity dey appeal to many Burkinabè, especially young pipo. 'A third element dey for me: di fact say Ibrahim Traoré youth, im outspokenness and his imperialist stance dey inline wit anoda Burkinabe president, Captain Thomas Sankara, wey im popularity for almost 40 years afta im death no dey in doubt' Seidik Abba, President of di Centre international d'études et de réflexions sur le Sahel (CIRES) tok Di military regime in power for Burkina Faso dey multiply symbolic and even populist acts to boost im image. Di decision to forgo di presidential salary and opt for di modest income im dey receive as army leader also make am popular wit di public. For Daniel Eizenga, a researcher for di Centre for Strategic Studies for Africa based in Washington D.C. di United States, even if di comparison dey based on certain points, na more on dia feelings. 'Na true say both captains enta power at di age of 34. But comparisons stop for dia rank and age. Sankara enta power for di 1980s, against a backdrop of di end of di Cold War and ideological divisions inside di army. Officers sympathetic to Sankara bin lead coup d'état for 1983. Dem regard am as a Marxist revolutionary, Sankara bin try to implement political reforms: increase political participation, empowerment of women, di fight against deforestation and di reduction of inequalities. Traoré, on di oda hand, dey govern in a much more dangerous situation wia im dey likely to fall. Im coup, like Damiba own, show say dia army get different factions: most military officers no put hand for part im own or Damiba own coup. By di regime own acceptance, di junta don face plenti attempts to destabilise am. Dis highlight di mago-mago means wey power take change hands and di instability wey dey for di junta regime.' Since im take power for 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traoré don undertaken a series of reforms wey go strengthen di state control over mining resources, particularly gold, for di kontri main export. In October 2024, im bin announce di withdrawal of certain mining licences wey dem bin give foreign companies, as im declare: 'We know how to mine our gold, and I no understand why we dey let multinationals do am for us'. Dis decision na part of a wider drive to bring back di mining sector to pipo for di kontri wit di aim to make sure say di population benefit more from di natural resources wey di kontri get. Di goment don also take ova di management of two gold mines, Boungou and Wahgnion, for around $90 million, wey end di dispute between di mining companies Endeavour Mining and Lilium Mining. Traoré's actions neva improve di security situation, wey don worse since im enta power for October 2022, Daniel Eizenga of di Centre d'études stratégiques pour l'Afrique add. 'Di junta for Burkina Faso dey under serious pressure. Di security situation don worse dramatically since Traoré took power in 2022, and di death toll from militant Islamist violence don almost double during im tenure. Di armed forces don pay a heavy price, wit hundreds of soldiers killed for attacks in 2024. Di number of pipo forcibly displaced by insecurity bin rose to more dan 10% of di population. Thousands of schools dey forced to close due to insecurity, leaving a generation of children witout education. These trends bin occur at a time wen military spending bin rise by almost 70% in di last two years to almost one billion dollars, or almost 18% of public spending. Dis represents an increase of more dan 10% for goment spending since Traoré military coup for 2022. E dey diafore, difficult to understand how di defence budget fit rise without gains wey match wit am for di battlefield or improvements for humanitarian situation. Di simplest explanation na say Traoré bin use dis funds primarily to protect di regime.' Breaking wit di West and geopolitical repositioning Captain Ibrahim Traoré dey express concern about attempts of foreign interference for Burkina Faso affairs evritime. In particular, im bin don accuse certain imperialist powers say dem dey seek to exploit di kontri wealth by using terrorism as a tool for destabilisation, wia im tok say: 'We be victims of our wealth, wealth wey di imperialists want to take back at any cost in order to keep us in slavery. 'Di States of di ESA dey engaged in a process to recover dia full sovereignty', na wetin im tok for di summit of ESA kontris for July 2024. Against dis backdrop, Burkina Faso don strengthen ties wit non-Western partners, like Russia, as e dey comot imsef from certain traditional allies. Im start wen im turn im back against France, di former colonial power, im bin tell di sojas wey dem send go di kontri to comot from dia land wen 2023 start and im order di diplomats to comot too. Dis geopolitical reorientation dey reflect a desire to diversify international partnerships and strengthen national sovereignty. For analyst Daniel Eizenga, however, downside to dis diplomatic strategy dey on di part of di transitional military regime, wey dey under increasing pressure. 'Traore don end di security cooperation and partnerships wey Burkina Faso dey get wit many Western kontris. Dis security cooperation partnerships no get any financial costs for Burkina Faso citizens. Dis is no be di case wit Russia. Mr Traoré efforts to strengthen ties wit Russia don make am give mining concessions to Russian companies. Similarly, plenti tok-tok dey about how a stronger Russian partnership fit help solve di security and humanitarian situation wey dey worsen for di kontri. Yet for 2024, Burkina Faso bin suffer some of di worst attacks by violent extremists on military and civilians for dia history, wen dem kill more dan 100 sojas for one attack on dia military base for Mansila for June 2024. Dem bin kill hundreds of civilians for one attack just outside di town of Barsalogho for August 2024. Since Traoré enta power and strengthened ties wit Russia, we don also see how security forces dey target civilians.
Asia Times
01-05-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
US missiles fall short in long-range game with China
The US is arming up for a Pacific missile race but China may already be playing on a larger board. Last month, the US Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) unveiled legislation stating that the US Army will receive significant funding boosts for medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) programs under a new appropriations bill for fiscal year 2025. The legislation allocates US$175 million to expand production capacity for next-generation US Army MRBMs, aiming to enhance output and strengthen supplier bases. An additional $114 million is directed toward producing these next-generation systems, complementing the $300 million earmarked for the production of current Army MRBM platforms. Separately, $50 million has been set aside for the accelerated development of the US Army's next-generation medium-range anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM). The investments reflect a broad strategy to bolster the US Army's medium-range strike capabilities amid growing global missile threats. Funding for these programs is part of a broader munitions and supply chain resiliency initiative. The targeted outlays underscore the US Department of Defense's (DOD) increasing prioritization of flexible, survivable missile systems capable of addressing emerging threats across multiple theaters. Putting MRBM capabilities into perspective, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation describes the range of such weapons as falling between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers, noting that these are 'theater-level' weapons. Fielded in the Pacific, such a weapon would represent a significant leap in capability over existing US systems such as the Typhon and Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), which have ranges of about 500 to 2,000 kilometers for the former firing Standard Missile-6 and Tomahawk cruise missiles, and 185 kilometers for the latter tactical anti-ship system. Further, ballistic missiles may be much more effective against hardened targets, such as aircraft shelters and missile silos, as they travel at hypersonic speeds during their terminal phase, giving them tremendous kinetic energy that allows them to damage such targets or cause them to collapse. Timothy Walton and Tom Shugart III mention in a January 2025 Hudson Institute report that since the early 2010s, China has doubled the number of its hardened aircraft shelters (HAS), of which it now has 3,000. Walton and Shugart say that China maintains 134 airbases within 1,800 kilometers of the Taiwan Strait, with 650 HAS and 2,000 non-hardened individual aircraft shelters (IAS). Meanwhile, Newsweek reported in December 2024 that China has 368 known missile silos, with 30 silos in its central region, 18 in the south, 90 in the north and 230 in the west. According to Ryan Snyder in a December 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Science & Global Security journal, those silos are estimated to be hardened to 1,500 pounds per square inch (psi), with older ones rated at 450 psi. Snyder says Chinese missile silos feature sophisticated shock isolation systems designed to attenuate horizontal missile movement within. As for the advantages of ASBMs over other types of anti-ship missiles, Andrew Erickson mentions in the 2013 book 'Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications' that such weapons can bypass traditional carrier defenses by striking from above at high speeds, effectively removing the carrier's air group—the primary line of defense—from the defensive equation. Erickson says this capability creates a severe targeting and interception challenge, as defending against missiles is inherently more difficult than defending against submarines or aircraft. He also notes that ASBMs exploit adversary naval vulnerabilities without requiring a direct match to those capabilities, offering potentially devastating, precise and hard-to-defend 'multi-axis' strikes. Tying up these developments into a larger operational picture, Thomas Mahnken and others mention in a 2019 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) report that the US maritime pressure strategy aims to dissuade Chinese leaders from aggression in the Pacific. The writers note the strategy entails establishing highly-survivable precision-strike networks in the First Island Chain spanning Japan's southern island of Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines, backed by naval, air, electronic warfare and other capabilities. Mahnken and others say that these decentralized networks would function as an 'inside force' optimized to attack People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces from inside its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) bubble, while supported by 'outside forces' able to join the fight from further afield. They note that land-based anti-ship, anti-air and electronic warfare units along the First Island Chain would serve as the backbone of the inside-out operational concept—both anchoring frontline defense and freeing up US ships and aircraft for higher-priority missions such as striking surveillance nodes, reinforcing gaps and exploiting opportunities created by ground-based strikes. However, Grant Georgulis argues in a 2022 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article that the First Island Chain is neither a survivable nor a viable operating area due to Chinese military capabilities such as long-range bombers, cruise missiles and theater ballistic missiles. Underscoring that threat, the US DOD 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) shows that the First and Second Island Chain spanning the Bonin Islands, Mariana Islands, Caroline Islands and Western New Guinea are entirely within the range of the PLA's long-range strike capabilities. While Georgulis recommends strengthening the Second Island Chain, China has steadily expanded its regional influence, aiming to deny US access to potential island bases and emplace dual-use infrastructure to support power projection beyond the First Island Chain. In line with that, Shijie Wang mentions in a March 2025 Jamestown Foundation article that China aims to overcome US-imposed containment in the Pacific, deepening ties with Pacific Island countries such as Nauru, Micronesia, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and Samoa. Wang says China's recently signed 'Deepening Blue Economy Cooperation' memorandum with the Cook Islands has raised concerns about the potential dual-use infrastructure that could offer logistical support for the PLA Navy (PLAN) and expand its presence in the Third Island Chain, which spans the Aleutian Islands, American Samoa, Fiji, Hawaii and New Zealand. Underscoring China's increasing influence in the region, the Lowy Institute 2024 Pacific Aid Map mentions that while Australia remains the largest donor to Pacific Island countries, China has become the second-largest one, narrowly edging out the US while increasing its project commitments. While the US's development of MRBMs signifies it is doubling down on military containment of China in the First Island Chain, considering China's long-range strike capabilities and increasing influence among Pacific Island nations, such military-centric views risk underestimating the broader geopolitical landscape and China's rising regional entrenchment.
Asia Times
25-04-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
Jet by jet, US losing Pacific air superiority over China
China is racing to shatter US air dominance in the Pacific—one stealth jet, long-range missile and cratered runway at a time. This month, a top US official stated that China is rapidly building its capacity to challenge US air superiority in the Pacific, particularly within the strategically vital First Island Chain. Testifying before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), warned that the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), with an order of battle of 2,100 fighters and over 200 H-6 bombers, is outproducing the US in fighter aircraft at a ratio of 1.2 to 1. Paparo credited China with 'high marks' for its ability to deny US air superiority along the First Island Chain, citing its fast-growing fighter fleet, advanced long-range air-to-air missiles and sweeping modernization across all warfighting domains. Holding air superiority along the First Island Chain, which stretches from Japan to the Philippines, is essential for the US to operate and support allies like Taiwan. Paparo stressed that air supremacy—total control of the air—will not be enjoyed by either side, but warned that without credible investment in long-range fires, integrated air and missile defenses, and advanced command and control systems, the US risks falling behind. 'Ceding air superiority is not an option,' he cautioned. Seth Jones and Alexander Palmer mention in a March 2024 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that while China's fighter production capacity is impressive, it is still behind the US in aircraft numbers, with the US maintaining an advantage in fifth-generation aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35 in particular. However, Jones and Palmer point out that China is closing the production gap with the US. They note China is reportedly producing 100 fifth-generation J-20 fighters annually and tripling the production of other aircraft types, such as the J-10C and J-16, suggesting a high production rate. Jones and Palmer attribute China's high fighter output to its centralized, whole-of-government approach to defense production. In terms of long-range air-to-air missiles, Tyler Rogoway mentions in a December 2023 article for The War Zone (TWZ) that China's new PL-17 is most likely a very long-range air-to-air missile with an estimated 300-kilometer range. Rogoway notes that the PL-17 may be intended against airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, other aircraft close to the target, ground-based radar or satellites. He mentions that the size of the PL-17 may restrict it to being carried externally by China's J-16 or J-20 fighters. As for China's rapid airpower growth, the US Department of Defense's (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) states that the PLAAF and PLA Naval Aviation comprise the Indo-Pacific's largest air force, with 3,150 aircraft—1,900 of them fighters—an increase of 400 in the last three years, per Aquilino. Aquilino warns that if trends persist, China could soon overtake the US in total airpower, complementing its dominance on land and sea. Given China's looming quantitative fighter advantage, Matthew Revels mentions in an April 2023 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article that in an invasion of Taiwan, the PLA would likely mass air assets over the self-governing island to achieve localized, tactical air superiority instead of fighting to achieve strategic air dominance. Beyond sheer fighter numbers, China's missile capabilities pose an even greater threat to US air operations in the region. Eamon Passey mentions in a December 2024 article for the American Foreign Policy Council that when it comes to conventional missiles, the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has a significant hardware advantage over the US. Passey notes China has developed an extensive array of ballistic and cruise missiles that are oftentimes more numerous and sophisticated than their US counterparts. He says that while the US invests in hypersonic weapons technology, it lags behind China in development and deployment due to high costs and the complexity of integrating those weapons into its military framework. Passey observes that China can make substantial investments in its missile capabilities mainly due to the absence of constraining arms control treaties. He also points out that the PLARF manages an autonomous, intensely focused and extensive missile program that has quickly developed to unite nuclear and conventional capabilities under a single command structure. The PLARF is critical in China's counter-intervention strategy in regional conflicts. Christopher Mihal mentions in a 2021 Military Review article that China, as of that year, has 2,200 conventional ballistic missiles and enough anti-ship missiles to attack every US surface combatant in the South China Sea, with sufficient firepower to overcome each ship's missile defenses. Further, Kelly Grieco and other writers mention in a December 2024 Stimson Center report that the PLARF is expected to play a leading role in neutralizing US airbases in Japan, Guam, and other Pacific locations, launching coordinated missile attacks to destroy US aircraft on the ground and cratering runways to make them unusable. These missile capabilities threaten the US's forward-deployed airpower, which remains highly vulnerable due to inadequate base fortifications, Greico writes. Thomas Shugart III and Timothy Walton mention in a January 2025 Hudson Institute report that in a worst-case scenario, most US aircraft losses will occur on the ground, as its Pacific airbases lack hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) and individual aircraft shelters (IAS). They mention that US operational concepts have assumed mainly that its aircraft would operate from forward airfields uncontested and that minor threats to those facilities would abate with the cessation of hostilities. They say that thinking disregards China's growing ability to strike those vulnerable facilities with missiles, aircraft and special forces. Shugart and Walton say China has enough firepower to make dispersal alone an ineffective countermeasure. These shortcomings could prove catastrophic in the event of a Chinese assault on Taiwan, where a rapid US response would be critical to deterrence and defense. Timothy Heath and other writers mention in a June 2023 RAND report that Taiwan is vulnerable to defeat in the first 90 days after an invasion, with that time being the minimum required for the US to marshal enough forces for military intervention. In contrast, Bonny Lin and other writers mention in an August 2024 CSIS report that China can sustain major combat operations against Taiwan for six months as part of a larger blockade, with PLAAF and PLARF strikes aiming to neutralize the latter's naval bases, coastal and air defense batteries and command and control with the option of unleashing more missile and air attacks should Taiwan continue to resist. Lin and others say those intensified attacks also aim to prevent Taiwan from reconstituting damaged equipment and deploying additional weapons systems. If the US doesn't act fast, the next battle for air superiority could be over before its aircraft even get off the ground.
