Latest news with #UkrainianArmedForces
Yahoo
3 hours ago
- Business
- Yahoo
Western hesitation continues to undermine Ukraine
On May 28, President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Germany and met with the country's new Chancellor, Friedrich Merz. There were high expectations that Berlin would finally authorize the delivery of Taurus long-range missiles — a long-standing request from Kyiv since the beginning of the Russian invasion. However, this demand had been systematically rejected by former Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who feared dragging Germany into a direct confrontation with Moscow. Instead of Taurus missiles, Merz announced a new 5 billion euro aid package and a commitment that Germany would support the production of long-range weapons on Ukrainian territory. Although these systems are not as sophisticated as the Taurus — whose operation would require months of training — the models to be co-produced by Berlin and Kyiv have the advantage of being easier to use, which could accelerate their integration into the Ukrainian Armed Forces. While investing in Ukraine's defense industry is necessary — something President Zelensky himself has emphasized in urging allies to strengthen the country's defensive capabilities — the fact that he returned from Germany without a Taurus delivery promise reveals a deeper issue. These missiles represent not only a powerful symbolic gesture, demonstrating that the West is truly committed to Ukraine's defense, but also an immediate and tangible impact on the battlefield. As recently highlighted by the Kyiv Independent, the Taurus missile can be programmed to detonate only after penetrating multiple layers of protection, making it especially effective against strategic targets like the Crimean Bridge. Beyond being an important symbol for Russian President Vladimir Putin, that bridge is a crucial logistical link between mainland Russia and the occupied peninsula — a target of both symbolic and operational significance. The absence of the Taurus in this package highlights a familiar blind spot: many Western governments still underestimate how much timing matters. In a war, it's not just about how much support is given, but how quickly it comes. Delays in key decisions don't just slow progress — they quietly erode Ukraine's position on the ground. Has the West become so focused on the latest headlines, diplomatic theater, and talks in Istanbul that it has forgotten to reflect on its own recent history and the decisions made over the past three years? Read also: If Germany sends Taurus missiles to Ukraine, Russia has a major Crimean Bridge problem The truth is that the West sabotages itself by delaying the release of essential resources — a hesitation systematically exploited by Russia. That was the case with the F-16 fighter jets: the U.S. and European countries, initially fearful of escalation, delayed their delivery by more than a year — only relenting after intense Ukrainian pressure and decisive support from countries like the Netherlands and Denmark. The same pattern occurred with the Leopard 2 tanks, delivered only in early 2023; with the UK's Challenger 2 tanks, which arrived in March 2023; and with the U.S. M1 Abrams, delivered only in September that year — a year and a half after the invasion. Even Patriot air defense systems, vital for intercepting Russian missiles, faced initial resistance due to escalation fears and were only delivered in early 2023. Storm Shadow cruise missiles likewise only began arriving in May 2023. Given all this, the inevitable question is: why so much hesitation, if in the end they give in anyway? Russia, unlike its Western counterparts, has shown no hesitation when it comes to speed — whether in advancing troops or manipulating diplomacy. Every so-called negotiation is just another stalling tactic, with the Kremlin expertly layering new steps, new demands, and new distractions to stretch the clock. After the first Istanbul round, came the promise of a 'memorandum', only to be followed by yet another 'new phase.' It's a script they've used repeatedly: feign interest, pretend flexibility, and use the time gained to recalibrate offensives. U.S. President Donald Trump, for his part, appears to have started losing patience with Putin — but that frustration hasn't translated into any concrete action. Instead, he ends up playing straight into Moscow's hands, a convenient figure in a Kremlin-scripted performance designed to drain Western resolve and dress delay up as diplomacy. The race faced by Ukraine and its European allies is, above all, a race against time — and many still don't seem to realize it. For Europeans, this race involves rebuilding strategic autonomy in defense — a process that should have begun over a decade ago, with the annexation of Crimea. At the very latest, the alarm bells should have rung in 2017, when Trump, then president, openly threatened to pull the U.S. out of NATO and, on one occasion when asked about Russian election interference, said he trusted Putin over his own intelligence agencies. The signs were there, flashing red — but Europe chose to look away. Now, the cost of that complacency is becoming impossible to ignore. For Ukrainians, this race against time is even more literal: every day counts, and every delay can mean a new Russian offensive. At this very moment, Russia is mobilizing around 50,000 troops near the border with Sumy — potentially signaling not just an attempt to create the 'buffer zone' Putin has demanded, but preparations for a new large-scale military advance. None of this is to downplay the support Europe has already provided — it's been essential. But that doesn't mean it's been enough, or delivered with the urgency the moment demands. While Putin takes advantage of U.S. ambiguity, Europe often falls into the trap of responding with long-term commitments that, although important, have little immediate effect on the battlefield. Trump, despite his recent tough rhetoric, continues to offer Moscow concessions before they're even requested. In February 2025, he stated, 'I'd love to have them back. I think it was a mistake to throw them out,' referring to Russia's expulsion from the G8 after the annexation of Crimea. It's exactly the kind of signal that undermines Western unity and hands the Kremlin an unearned diplomatic win — no pressure needed. Meanwhile, Europe's delayed promises may look good on paper, but they don't change the reality on the ground, where time and resolve are the most decisive weapons. Gestures like promising Ukraine EU membership by 2030 are certainly meaningful. They send the right message — that Ukraine belongs in the European family and that a future of integration and reconstruction lies ahead. But these are not messages that deter the Kremlin. Because 2030 is five years away — and in a war where every month can redraw the front lines, that's a long time. Ukraine has stunned the world with its resilience, determination, and ability to adapt under extraordinary pressure. But even under U.S. President Joe Biden — a president who, despite his caution and delays, remained firmly committed to Kyiv — 20% of Ukraine's territory remains under illegal Russian occupation. The question now is: what will Ukraine's map look like in five years? Europe, out of fear of escalation, has too often treated Ukraine as a burden. But the truth is that Ukraine should be seen as an opportunity — for integration, for strengthening collective security, and for renewing the European project. Its Armed Forces, forged in the most demanding conditions, have accumulated real combat experience, developed homegrown technologies, created new drone models, and demonstrated a level of adaptability that many European militaries lack. More than that: Ukraine has kept its institutions functioning and its government operating under the pressure of war — something most European countries would struggle to do. Read also: Russia 'testing' Europe's capacity to help Ukraine by intensifying air attacks Ukraine is not just a country in need of help; it's a partner with valuable capabilities to offer. Europe must also understand that not every show of strength leads to escalation. The recent use of the Russian Oreshnik missile against Ukrainian territory — following the U.S. decision in November 2024, under Biden, to authorize Ukraine's use of ATACMS inside Russia — was a calculated, demonstrative move, not the start of a broader escalation. In contrast, the unprecedented attacks on Kyiv and other regions in recent days were deliberate Russian actions that didn't follow any 'Ukrainian provocation.' They were likely triggered by something else entirely: the West's visible hesitation to act more decisively. When deterrence is delayed or watered down, it doesn't prevent escalation — it invites it. The message Moscow will understand is not the one about promises for 2030 — but the one about deliveries tomorrow. Submit an Opinion Editor's Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent. We've been working hard to bring you independent, locally-sourced news from Ukraine. Consider supporting the Kyiv Independent.
Yahoo
2 days ago
- General
- Yahoo
Russia loses 1,140 soldiers and 35 artillery systems over past day
Russia has lost 1,140 soldiers killed and wounded as well as 185 weapons and pieces of military equipment over the past day. Source: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Facebook Details: The total combat losses of the Russian forces between 24 February 2022 and 30 May 2025 are estimated to be as follows [figures in parentheses represent the latest losses – ed.]: approximately 986,080 (+1,140) military personnel; 10,865 (+1) tanks; 22,647 (+2) armoured combat vehicles; 28,421 (+35) artillery systems; 1,398 (+1) multiple-launch rocket systems; 1,172 (+1) air defence systems; 372 (+0) fixed-wing aircraft; 336 (+0) helicopters; 38,070 (+71) tactical and strategic UAVs; 3,265 (+0) cruise missiles; 28 (+0) ships/boats; 1 (+0) submarine; 50,089 (+74) vehicles and fuel tankers; 3,902 (+0) special vehicles and other equipment. The information is being confirmed. Support Ukrainska Pravda on Patreon!
Yahoo
2 days ago
- General
- Yahoo
General Staff: Russia has lost 986,080 troops in Ukraine since Feb. 24, 2022
Russia has lost around 986,080 troops in Ukraine since the beginning of its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces reported on May 30. The number includes 1,140 casualties Russian forces suffered just over the past day. According to the report, Russia has also lost 10,865 tanks, 22,647 armored fighting vehicles, 50,089 vehicles and fuel tanks, 28,421 artillery systems, 1,398 multiple launch rocket systems, 1,172 air defense systems, 372 airplanes, 336 helicopters, 38,070 drones, 28 ships and boats, and one submarine. Read also: Infighting around EU rearmament undermines grand ambitions for European defense We've been working hard to bring you independent, locally-sourced news from Ukraine. Consider supporting the Kyiv Independent.
Yahoo
2 days ago
- Business
- Yahoo
Opinion - Time is not on Russia's side in Ukraine
Who is winning, Ukraine or Russia? And whose prospects are better in the long run? In other words, whose side is time on? The Quincy Institute's Anatol Lieven states matter-of-factly that, 'as everyone now seems to agree, time is on Russia's side.' But is it? At one time, everyone also agreed that the Ukraine War would be over in a few weeks — an alert to the perils of groupthink. And now, as then, the reality is rather more complicated. As with everything, there are two opposing schools of thought: the optimists who think Ukraine will prevail and the pessimists who bet on Russia. The bottom-line pessimist case is based on numbers. Russia's population, economy and military-industrial complex are much bigger than Ukraine's. The numbers will therefore decide ultimate outcomes, even though Russian battlefield losses are exceptionally high and its economy has been battered by sanctions and Vladimir Putin's anti-consumerist economic policies. Expert analysts Collin Meisel and Mathew Burrows explicitly adopt this approach in a piece titled, 'Russia Can Afford to Take a Beating in Ukraine.' 'Whether Russia can maintain its ability to reconstitute and even grow its forces as its war in Ukraine progresses remains uncertain,' they write. 'More certain is its advantage over Ukraine in terms of total population, with nearly four times as many people and roughly 18.9 million males aged 20–39 relative to Ukraine's fewer than five million males of that age. Russia can lose three times as many troops as Ukraine and still suffer less in relative terms.' It is hard to argue with numbers. It is easy to argue with what they do or do not imply. After all, numbers alone are a poor predictor of victory. The U.S. should have prevailed in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, but it didn't. France should have won in Algeria and Vietnam, but it didn't. Imperial Russia should have won the Crimean War and the Russo-Japanese War, but it didn't. And the ancient Greeks and, later, Alexander of Macedon should never have defeated the Persian Empire, but they did. Clearly, there's more to the story than numbers of men, money and materiel. Leadership, morale, tactics, strategy, quality of weapons and other unquantifiable factors play an important — perhaps even decisive — role. Germany under both Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler stupidly violated Otto von Bismarck's guiding foreign-policy principle of avoiding a two-front war. Both suffered defeat as a result. Seen in this light, a Russian victory is anything but a sure bet. And the fact that the war has dragged on for so long is perhaps evidence of the futility of relying exclusively on numbers. But can the numerically challenged Ukrainians possibly prevail? Many, especially front-line soldiers, think they can. Stefan Korshak, senior defense correspondent at the Kyiv Post, recently summarized the argument made by one such officer, Robert Brovdi. 'Russia is mobilizing about 30–32,000 soldiers a month, and [the Ukrainian Armed Forces] is killing about 20,000 soldiers a month,' he writes. 'This makes the [Ukrainians'] task easy to grasp in very clear terms: Kill or wound 10,000 to 12,000 more Russian soldiers a month. Do that, all Russian offensives collapse in short order. Keep it up, the Russian army global morale cracks. Keep it up some more, you can bring down the Russian government.' Can Ukraine pull this off? Brovdi, thinks so. He points to the Ukrainians' four drone brigades. 'The solution is mathematically simple,' he writes. 'More drone pilots, more drone brigades … Absent more drones and more operators, the alternative is to make the existing ones more efficient. By Brovdi's calculation, if the drone units in the field now increase kill rates by 15 percent across the board, by whatever means, then in four months a critical mass of Russian casualties would be reached.' Brovdi estimates that Ukraine could reach 35,000 monthly Russian casualties by August. Brovdi agrees that it's ultimately about numbers — Ukraine needs to kill more Russians than Russia can mobilize. But getting to that point isn't just about the number of soldiers or weapons Ukraine can produce. It is about the quality of the drones and the ability of Ukrainian soldiers to use them efficiently. So, who is right, the optimists or the pessimists? Assuming that Meisel, Burrows and Brovdi are correct in their analysis, we may conclude that, at a minimum, it's a tie — which, given the disparity of resources and Putin's hopeless hope of destroying Ukraine, actually translates to a minor Ukrainian victory. At a maximum, Brovdi's calculations nullify Meisel and Burrows' conclusions and portend a possible Russian collapse — or a major Ukrainian victory. Time may just be on Ukraine's side. Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as 'Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires' and 'Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.' Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
2 days ago
- Business
- The Hill
Time is not on Russia's side in Ukraine
Who is winning, Ukraine or Russia? And whose prospects are better in the long run? In other words, whose side is time on? The Quincy Institute's Anatol Lieven states matter-of-factly that, 'as everyone now seems to agree, time is on Russia's side.' But is it? At one time, everyone also agreed that the Ukraine War would be over in a few weeks — an alert to the perils of groupthink. And now, as then, the reality is rather more complicated. As with everything, there are two opposing schools of thought: the optimists who think Ukraine will prevail and the pessimists who bet on Russia. The bottom-line pessimist case is based on numbers. Russia's population, economy and military-industrial complex are much bigger than Ukraine's. The numbers will therefore decide ultimate outcomes, even though Russian battlefield losses are exceptionally high and its economy has been battered by sanctions and Vladimir Putin's anti-consumerist economic policies. Expert analysts Collin Meisel and Mathew Burrows explicitly adopt this approach in a piece titled, 'Russia Can Afford to Take a Beating in Ukraine.' 'Whether Russia can maintain its ability to reconstitute and even grow its forces as its war in Ukraine progresses remains uncertain,' they write. 'More certain is its advantage over Ukraine in terms of total population, with nearly four times as many people and roughly 18.9 million males aged 20–39 relative to Ukraine's fewer than five million males of that age. Russia can lose three times as many troops as Ukraine and still suffer less in relative terms.' It is hard to argue with numbers. It is easy to argue with what they do or do not imply. After all, numbers alone are a poor predictor of victory. The U.S. should have prevailed in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, but it didn't. France should have won in Algeria and Vietnam, but it didn't. Imperial Russia should have won the Crimean War and the Russo-Japanese War, but it didn't. And the ancient Greeks and, later, Alexander of Macedon should never have defeated the Persian Empire, but they did. Clearly, there's more to the story than numbers of men, money and materiel. Leadership, morale, tactics, strategy, quality of weapons and other unquantifiable factors play an important — perhaps even decisive — role. Germany under both Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler stupidly violated Otto von Bismarck's guiding foreign-policy principle of avoiding a two-front war. Both suffered defeat as a result. Seen in this light, a Russian victory is anything but a sure bet. And the fact that the war has dragged on for so long is perhaps evidence of the futility of relying exclusively on numbers. But can the numerically challenged Ukrainians possibly prevail? Many, especially front-line soldiers, think they can. Stefan Korshak, senior defense correspondent at the Kyiv Post, recently summarized the argument made by one such officer, Robert Brovdi. 'Russia is mobilizing about 30–32,000 soldiers a month, and [the Ukrainian Armed Forces] is killing about 20,000 soldiers a month,' he writes. 'This makes the [Ukrainians'] task easy to grasp in very clear terms: Kill or wound 10,000 to 12,000 more Russian soldiers a month. Do that, all Russian offensives collapse in short order. Keep it up, the Russian army global morale cracks. Keep it up some more, you can bring down the Russian government.' Can Ukraine pull this off? Brovdi, thinks so. He points to the Ukrainians' four drone brigades. 'The solution is mathematically simple,' he writes. 'More drone pilots, more drone brigades … Absent more drones and more operators, the alternative is to make the existing ones more efficient. By Brovdi's calculation, if the drone units in the field now increase kill rates by 15 percent across the board, by whatever means, then in four months a critical mass of Russian casualties would be reached.' Brovdi estimates that Ukraine could reach 35,000 monthly Russian casualties by August. Brovdi agrees that it's ultimately about numbers — Ukraine needs to kill more Russians than Russia can mobilize. But getting to that point isn't just about the number of soldiers or weapons Ukraine can produce. It is about the quality of the drones and the ability of Ukrainian soldiers to use them efficiently. So, who is right, the optimists or the pessimists? Assuming that Meisel, Burrows and Brovdi are correct in their analysis, we may conclude that, at a minimum, it's a tie — which, given the disparity of resources and Putin's hopeless hope of destroying Ukraine, actually translates to a minor Ukrainian victory. At a maximum, Brovdi's calculations nullify Meisel and Burrows' conclusions and portend a possible Russian collapse — or a major Ukrainian victory. Time may just be on Ukraine's side. Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as 'Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires' and 'Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.'
