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Time of India
15 hours ago
- Time of India
EU, Southeast Asia look for ways to protect undersea cables
AI- Generated Image The world's undersea cable network spans roughly 1.4 million kilometres (870,000 miles) and carries over 95% of intercontinental internet traffic, yet it remains vulnerable to accidental damage, such as ship anchors, and deliberate disruption. Recent incidents in the Baltic Sea and Red Sea have underscored the cables' fragility. Policymakers are now staging international initiatives to safeguard the system. "We need to work together to defend the entire network," Singaporean defence Minister Chan Chun Sing said at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia's premier security forum, earlier this month. "There's no point trying to defend the integrity and security of a submarine cable by looking at a point. We need both ends to be secure," he added. Nato nations patrol Baltic Sea as cables fail In February 2024, multiple cables in the Red Sea were severed when anchors from a cargo vessel sunk by Houthi militants dragged along the seabed. The damage caused a sharp reduction in internet capacity between Europe and Asia, disrupting everything from financial transactions to video conferencing. Meanwhile, Europe has struggled with a series of similar faults in the Baltic Sea, with many Western officials hinting those cables were intentionally damaged by ships linked to Russia. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Giao dịch CFD với công nghệ và tốc độ tốt hơn IC Markets Đăng ký Undo Experts have warned, however, that there has been no proof of deliberate damage. Since January, some Nato members have expanded the deployment of frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and naval drones to conduct regular cable-surveillance missions across vital waterways. Beijing using cable projects as leverage in naval disputes In Southeast Asia, subsea infrastructure also faces similar geopolitical friction. In February, Taiwanese officials detained a Chinese-crewed ship after an undersea communications cable was damaged near the self-ruled island, which China sees as a breakaway province. China has also increasingly pressured cable consortia laying new links from Japan through the South China Sea to seek Beijing's "permission," effectively doubling down on its claims in internationally disputed waters. "This is just another way that China is trying to assert its sovereignty over the South China Sea," Zachary Abuza, professor at the National War College in Washington, told DW. China is also reportedly developing "advanced cable-cutting devices capable of targeting armored cables at unprecedented depths," according to a commentary published by Tokyo-based magazine Nikkei Asia this week. Southeast Asian nations are also worried about the cables being threatened by natural disasters and possibly costing them access to new and expanded renewable energy projects, such as offshore wind farms. According to Nikkei Asia, investment in the submarine power cable sector is projected to reach $1.95 billion (€1.70) by 2030. Hanoi 'cautious not to anger China' Vietnam, a nation of 90 million people served by just five undersea cables, lost up to 75% of its data capacity in February 2023 when all five suffered partial or total damage. In June last year, three of the five submarine internet cables failed again. The cause for those disruptions is still unclear, at least officially. Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies in Honolulu, told DW that Hanoi is "cautious not to anger China and tends to dismiss the suspicion that the cables were intentionally damaged." "They argue that the cables are located in one of the world's busiest shipping routes, hence the chance that fishing vessels unintentionally damage them is high," Vuving added. "However, this argument leaves unanswered the question of why the rate of incidents rose sharply in recent years." EU as a way out of US-China clinch Vietnam wants to add up to four new cables in the coming years to significantly boost connectivity speeds and the power supply, as the country looks to progress into higher-end, tech manufacturing. Hanoi has encouraged Vietnamese telecom companies to spearhead this move. However, laying cables across the ocean floor is costly, and Vietnamese firms are looking for outside investment, mainly from China and the US. "Many in Vietnam see this as a no-win situation as they do not want to be dependent on either China or the US and certainly do not want to get entangled in the US-China competition," said Vuving. "European companies can help Vietnam escape this catch-22 situation. The same can be said regarding other countries in Southeast Asia." Brussels working on 'cable diplomacy' France's Alcatel Submarine Networks is often regarded as the global leader in subsea cable installation, and several European firms operate sizable fleets of cable repair ships. In February, the EU published its Cable Security Action plan, which called on Brussels to "develop and deploy an advanced cable diplomacy." "When it comes to addressing incidents," the plan reads, "the [EU] should enhance the exchange of information with, for instance, Indo Pacific partners who are facing similar incidents in relation to critical submarine infrastructures." Soon thereafter, Henna Virkkunen, the European Commission's executive vice president in charge of tech sovereignty and security, announced that almost €1 billion would be redirected in the EU's budget to boost surveillance of undersea cables and establish a fleet of emergency repair vessels. Does US want Europeans in Asia? Whether Europe is actually capable of supporting Asia is another matter. "While Europeans could help build more undersea cable architecture for Southeast Asia, China already dominates the undersea cable network in the region," Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, told DW. "It would take a massive and very costly effort by Europe to come anywhere near supplanting China's cable network, and I don't think Europe can afford that," he added. Moreover, there could be pushback from the US, which appears to increasingly believe that Europeans should disengage from the Indo-Pacific region. Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue summit, US defence Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that European states should limit their engagement and investments in regions like Southeast Asia to focus entirely on safeguarding Europe. Kaja Kallas, the EU's foreign policy chief, pushed back a day later, arguing that "it's an illusion that these security theatres of Indo-Pacific and Europe are not interlinked." She called for Europe and Asia to collaborate against covert "shadow fleets" and review maritime security laws to protect submarine cable networks.
DW
2 days ago
- Politics
- DW
EU, Southeast Asia look for ways to protect undersea cables – DW – 06/09/2025
Both telecommunications and international trade largely rely on cables connecting continents across the ocean floor. In a changing world, Asian and European powers are looking for ways to protect them from sabotage. The world's undersea cable network spans roughly 1.4 million kilometers (870,000 miles) and carries over 95% of intercontinental internet traffic, yet it remains vulnerable to accidental damage, such as ship anchors, and deliberate disruption. Recent incidents in the Baltic and Red Seas have underscored the cables' fragility as policymakers staged international initiatives to safeguard the system. "We need to work together to defend the entire network," Singaporean Minister of Defense Chan Chun Sing said at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia's premier security forum, earlier this month. "There's no point trying to defend the integrity and security of a submarine cable by looking at a point. We need both ends to be secure," he added. NATO nations patrol Baltic Sea as cables fail In February 2024, multiple cables in the Red Sea were severed when anchors from a cargo vessel sunk by Houthi militants dragged along the seabed. The damage caused a sharp reduction in internet capacity between Europe and Asia, disrupting everything from financial transactions to video conferencing. Meanwhile, Europe has struggled with a series of similar faults in the Baltic Sea, with many Western officials hinting those cables were intentionally damaged by Russia-linked ships. Experts warn, however, that there is no proof of deliberate damage. Estonia steps up patrols after undersea cable attack To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Since January, some NATO members have expanded deployments of frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and naval drones to conduct regular cable-surveillance missions across vital waterways. Beijing using cable projects as leverage in naval disputes In Southeast Asia, subsea infrastructure also faces similar geopolitical friction. In February, Taiwanese officials detained a Chinese-crewed ship after an undersea communications cable was damaged near the self-ruled island, which China sees as a breakaway province. China has also increasingly pressured cable consortia laying new links from Japan through the South China Sea to seek Beijing's "permission," effectively doubling down on its claims in internationally disputed waters. Telecommunication cables are also a linchpin of global trade Image: "This is just another way that China is trying to assert its sovereignty over the South China Sea," Zachary Abuza, professor at the National War College in Washington, told DW. China is also reportedly developing "advanced cable-cutting devices capable of targeting armored cables at unprecedented depths," according to a commentary published by Tokyo-based magazine Nikkei Asia this week. Southeast Asian nations are also worried about the cables being threatened by natural disasters, and possibly costing them access to new and expanded renewable energy projects, such as offshore wind farms. According to Nikkei Asia, investment in the submarine power cable sector is projected to reach $1.95 billion (€1.70) by 2030. Hanoi 'cautious not to anger China' Vietnam, a nation of 90 million people served by just five undersea cables, lost up to 75% of its data capacity in February 2023 when all five suffered partial or total damage. In June last year, three of the five submarine internet cables failed again. Europe's undersea cables under attack? To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video The cause for those disruptions is still unclear, at least officially. Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, told DW that Hanoi is "cautious not to anger China and tend to dismiss the suspicion that the cables were intentionally damaged." "They argue that the cables are located in one of the world's busiest shipping routes, hence the chance that fishing vessels unintentionally damage them is high," Vuving added. "However, this argument leaves unanswered the question of why the rate of incidents rose sharply in recent years." EU as a way out of US-China clinch Vietnam wants to add up to four new cables in the coming years to significantly boost connectivity speeds and the power supply as the country looks to progress into higher-end, tech manufacturing. Hanoi has encouraged Vietnamese telecom companies to spearhead this move. However, laying cables across the ocean floor is costly, and Vietnamese firms are looking for outside investment, mainly from China and the US. "Many in Vietnam see this as a no-win situation as they do not want to be dependent on either China or the US and certainly do not want to get entangled in the US-China competition," Vuving told DW. "European companies can help Vietnam escape this Catch-22 situation. The same can be said regarding other countries in Southeast Asia." Brussels working on 'cable diplomacy' France's Alcatel Submarine Networks is often regarded as the global leader in subsea cable installation, and several European firms operate sizeable fleets of cable repair ships. In February, the EU published its Action Plan on Cable Security, which called on Brussels to "develop and deploy an advanced cable diplomacy." "When it comes to addressing incidents," the plan reads, "the [EU] should enhance the exchange of information with, for instance, Indo Pacific partners who are facing similar incidents in relation to critical submarine infrastructures." Undersea cable damage leads to internet blackouts in Africa To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Soon thereafter, Henna Virkkunen, the European Commission's executive vice president in charge of security, announced that almost €1 billion is being redirected in the EU's budget to boost surveillance of undersea cables and establish a fleet of emergency repair vessels. Does US want Europeans in Asia? Whether Europe is actually capable of supporting Asia is another matter. "While Europeans could help build more undersea cable architecture for Southeast Asia, China already dominates the undersea cable network in the region," Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, told DW. "It would take a massive and very costly effort by Europe to come anywhere near supplanting China's cable network, and I don't think Europe can afford that," he added. German frigate completes passage through South China Sea To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Moreover, there could be pushback from the US, which appears to increasingly believe that Europeans should disengage from the Indo-Pacific region. Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue summit earlier this month, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth argued that European states should limit their engagement and investments in regions like Southeast Asia to focus entirely on safeguarding Europe. Kaja Kallas, the EU's foreign policy chief, pushed back a day later, arguing that "it's an illusion that these security theaters of Indo-Pacific and Europe are not interlinked." She called for Europe and Asia to collaborate against covert "shadow fleets" and review maritime security laws to protect submarine cable networks. Edited by: Darko Janjevic
Japan Times
27-05-2025
- Politics
- Japan Times
As ASEAN touts unity, Philippines seeks consensus on South China Sea
The Philippines has called on ASEAN nations to wrap up negotiations on a code of conduct in the disputed South China Sea, a move experts say reflects Manila's growing frustration with Beijing's attempts to exploit the Southeast Asian bloc's diverging priorities as well its consensus-based model for decision-making. Speaking at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations' summit in Kuala Lumpur that touted bloc unity, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. on Monday underscored the 'urgent need' to accelerate the adoption of a 'legally binding' code to safeguard maritime rights and prevent 'miscalculations at sea.' Manila's call on the 10-member bloc comes as the situation between China and the Philippines has turned particularly tense, with the resource-rich waters now being the scene of regular ship collisions and rammings, and as the Chinese side repeatedly deploys flares and water cannons. 'Manila has every reason to feel frustrated with ASEAN,' said Zachary Abuza, a Southeast Asia expert and professor at the U.S. National War College. China, he said, tends to pick on one country at a time for fear of making the South China Sea a multilateral ASEAN issue. 'Over the past few years, the Philippines has borne the brunt of Chinese aggression, while most other countries have been sitting back, breathing a sigh of relief that they are not being targeted by China,' Abuza added. ASEAN and Beijing have been working for two decades to conclude a substantive code of conduct based on the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea to help lower the risk of confrontation. But the two sides have been at loggerheads mainly due to differences over which maritime areas the code should cover, who should be regarded as an extraregional player and whether the code would be legally binding. A China Coast Guard ship (left) fires a water cannon at a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources ship (center) near Sandy Cay reef in the disputed South China Sea in this screen shot from video taken on May 21. | Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and Philippine Coast Guard / VIA AFP-JIJI Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo said that Manila is targeting 2026 for the code's completion, when it takes over the rotating ASEAN chairmanship from Malaysia. The top Philippine diplomat, who is set to visit Tokyo on Wednesday, also said that Manila is open to more arrangements with Beijing to help maintain peace in the strategic waterway. But concerns remain. There have already been calls in the past for an expedited conclusion, none of which have panned out. Experts say that, given the diverging interests within ASEAN — as well as the close ties of Cambodia and Laos to China — the 2026 deadline may not be feasible. 'Outstanding issues appear to be insurmountable at this point,' said Ian Chong, an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore. 'If there is an acceleration of negotiations to a conclusion, that end agreement is likely to leave key issues insufficiently addressed.' At the same time, the rising number of flare-ups has drawn growing regional and global attention, making it more difficult for Beijing to follow its preferred approach of solving these disputes bilaterally. This means that China's preference of dealing with these issues one-on-one makes an ASEAN-led solution seem increasingly unlikely. Frustrated with the slow progress on the code of conduct, the Philippines has begun turning to individual claimants to push for bilateral or minilateral engagements. This push has prompted questions about ASEAN's effectiveness in addressing regional flash points, particularly when one of the parties isn't a bloc member. Philippine coast guard and military personnel hold the country's flag during an inter-agency maritime operation on Sandy Cay in the disputed South China Sea on April 27. | National Task Force on West Philippine Sea / VIA AFP-JIJI The latter is important as individual Southeast Asian governments have a strong record of handling disputes on a bilateral basis, albeit not through ASEAN. Vietnam and Indonesia, for instance, recently moved forward on a maritime delimitation agreement. It's a different story at the ASEAN level. Experts warn that the organization's dialogue mechanisms may not be sufficient to prevent or manage a broader regional crisis involving major powers. They say that except for some basic principles or issues where agreement is relatively easy — such as promoting economic cooperation — the bloc has difficulty finding formal common cause. With the exception of Vietnam, most mainland ASEAN members largely avoided the code of conduct issue. Maritime countries, either as claimants or states that use the waterway, have been reluctant to publicly back the Philippines, despite a 2016 international arbitral tribunal ruling invalidating Beijing's claims to most of the disputed waters. 'Not all ASEAN claimant states face the same kind of pressure from China, or have as many of their claimed features occupied,' said Thomas Daniel, of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia, noting that this influences national positions and appetites for risk. Even more of an impediment to cooperation is ASEAN claimant states' history of distrust — many are also involved in disputes with each other, not just with China. Southeast Asian claimant states 'once believed that using the collective heft of ASEAN to negotiate with Beijing on the South China Sea might yield more favorable outcomes, but that has clearly not played out as intended,' Daniel said. Instead, China has managed to successfully exploit 'both diverging priorities within ASEAN and the group's consensus-based decision-making to its own advantage,' he added. Manila's frustration with the latter was voiced earlier this month by Philippine national security adviser Eduardo Ano, who urged ASEAN to be the 'strongest defender' of the concept that 'might does not make right.' In the region, the demand for consensus has sometimes become an 'instrument for inaction and inertia,' Ano said, warning that the search for an agreement by all has become 'an obstacle to arrive at important and unified mechanisms.' Over the past few decades, ASEAN has grown diverse in terms of interests, government types and levels of economic development, creating more decision-making challenges, given that any member state also has veto power. 'The Philippines has long recognized that some ASEAN member states are unlikely to offer outright support due to their close economic ties with China,' said Dindo Manhit, president of the Stratbase ADR Institute, one of the Philippines' leading research consultancies. Manila's growing frustration lies in the 'lack of recognition' that China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea waters closest to the Philippines are not solely its concern, but rather a regional threat that undermines stability and the broader rules-based order, he added. Still, it's important to note that ASEAN was never intended to be a security-focused bloc. 'ASEAN's inherent limitations must be acknowledged as it was not primarily established to address political and sociocultural issues,' Manhit said, adding that the grouping's core focus remains economic cooperation. Given these limitations, he added, the Philippines' best course of action would be to pursue partnerships with maritime ASEAN states and like-minded countries — including Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam — to ensure freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as economic rights within their exclusive economic zones. Aware of the limitations, Manila has in recent years begun taking matters into its own hands. It has boosted military spending, deepened defense partnerships with countries like Japan, while also expanding security ties with outside partners such as New Zealand, Canada, India, France and Germany — moves that suggest Manila is not pinning all its hopes on the elusive code-of-conduct agreement. These actions 'should not be seen as a reaction against any particular nation,' Manhit said, but 'rather as part of its broader strategy to strengthen its security posture and contribute to regional stability.'
