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First Post
5 days ago
- Politics
- First Post
Not America's protégé: Rebutting Ashley Tellis' US-India analysis
Ashley Tellis, in his article 'How New Delhi's Grand Strategy Thwarts Its Grand Ambitions,' published on June 17, 2025, in Foreign Affairs, outlines a perspective on US-India relations that is rooted in an outdated and somewhat condescending strategic framework. His argument, though detailed and data-backed, reflects assumptions, predictions, and a tone that portrays India as a subordinate actor rather than an autonomous, civilisational power charting its own course in the international system. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Tellis writes, 'Since the turn of the century, the United States has sought to help India rise as a great power.' He begins by recounting how the US, since the turn of the century, has supported India's rise: from the civil nuclear deal under George W Bush to defence industrial cooperation under Obama to intelligence sharing and advanced technology access under Donald Trump and the jet engine tech transfer under Joe Biden. This chronological account is framed in a way that suggests the US has done India a series of favours. But the reality is that none of these moves were altruistic. The US does not support or arm nations unless it serves its own strategic interests. These engagements were mutually beneficial, and portraying them as one-sided largesse from the US ignores the realist, Kissingerian logic that drives American foreign policy. He criticises India for not aligning fully with the US, especially because it champions a multipolar world rather than endorsing US primacy. But complete alignment is neither possible nor necessary. History offers no example of two sovereign countries—even allies—being perfectly aligned on every issue. Moreover, India's support for multipolarity is not an ideological or anti-US stance; rather, it is a strategic calculation. India sees multipolarity not as an end in itself but as a means to better protect and promote its interests. As the international system transitions—from the unipolarity of the post–Cold War era to a more fluid and fragmented order—India is responding to changes it neither initiated nor can halt. World order was never static: it was multipolar before the First World War, then bipolar during the Cold War, followed by a unipolar moment. The world is once again shifting, and India can neither halt this process nor afford to ignore it. Tellis' observation that India 'obsessively guards its strategic autonomy… maintaining ties with Western adversaries such as Iran and Russia' is presented almost as a flaw. Yet strategic autonomy is a hallmark of every sovereign state's foreign policy. The very structure of the international system, as per realism, is anarchic. If the US guards its freedom to act by engaging with whomever it wants—even adversaries—why should India be expected to surrender that same agency? The notion that India should align with US preferences on Russia or Iran or abandon its membership in forums like Brics or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation smacks of a colonial hangover, where the West reserves the right to moralise and dictate. Ashley Tellis seems stuck in the early 2000s Bush strategic mindset, when the US pursued a balance-of-power approach to Asia and listed India as a strategic partner. The US has changed significantly since then. Under Trump, it became more transactional and less committed to alliances, often showing open disregard for them. It expects allies to shoulder more responsibility, even in Nato. If the US itself is withdrawing from global commitments, why is India being told to 'do more'? The US is not the same strategic anchor it once claimed to be. Tomorrow, Trump could make a deal with China even at the expense of Taiwan, and everything Tellis projects would collapse. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Tellis also overestimates his ability to predict long-term outcomes. He assumes India will rise, but not fast enough to match China or the US, and that multipolarity will remain elusive. These are speculative claims. History is filled with surprises. Karl Marx misjudged the inevitability of communism. No one predicted the First World War or the collapse of the Soviet Union. History is non-linear and unpredictable. India's trajectory, like that of any major power, is contingent and evolutionary. Assuming static futures and prescribing fixed alignments is intellectually limiting. The assumption that by 2050 only the US and China will matter is deterministic and reflects more of Tellis' strategic bias than grounded foresight. Just as Fukuyama's End of History thesis was challenged by resurgent nationalism and conflict, Tellis' vision of a binary future overlooks the inherent unpredictability of global politics. He also claims that because India won't form alliances, it might struggle to secure external support as the US grows more transactional. But if the US becomes transactional, why should India not act the same? Strategic alignment must be mutual, not one-sided compliance. It is unfair to demand India subordinate its policies to US preferences. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Moreover, the US is no longer the same power that once believed in the hub-and-spoke alliance system. Today, it wants its allies to shoulder more responsibility. American society has changed—there is growing resistance to spending taxpayer money on foreign wars or propping up other countries. Trump is not an aberration; he is a clear reflection of this shift in American public sentiment. The US no longer seeks formal alliances—it prefers loose, informal partnerships where others are expected to do more and not be seen as burdens on American taxpayers. Moreover, Ashley argues that India doesn't do enough on China, that it won't support the U.S. in a Taiwan contingency, and that its desire for multipolarity is inconvenient. This has been his central argument across many of his past writings. But what exactly is the US doing to contain China? If Beijing is expanding its influence, the blame doesn't lie solely with India. It is primarily the failure of the US, which hasn't done enough itself. The US has more direct strategic allies in the region—Japan, South Korea, and Australia—yet its own contradictions (like supporting Pakistan for tactical reasons) weaken its position. If Washington wants India to be a balancer, it must itself be consistent in both the Indo-Pacific and South Asia. The recent Trump outreach to Pakistan undermines India's regional standing. That's not India's failure—it's America's strategic incoherence. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD He asserts that India plays other powers against each other—claiming, 'India played the Soviet Union against the United States to benefit itself' during the Cold War—and implies this as a negative trait. But every nation maximises its options. That is the essence of diplomacy. The US engages China, Russia, and even adversaries when it suits its interests. Why deny India the same strategic space? He also says that India's membership in non-Western institutions like Brics and SCO could become liabilities if the US grows less tolerant. This again suggests that India must seek approval from Washington before charting independent global pathways. He warns that 'a more jaundiced government, like Trump's, might penalise India' for its decisions. This tone resembles a colonial master issuing ultimatums. The very idea that India could be 'penalised' for trading in local currencies or preserving ties with Iran and Russia reflects an alarming tendency to see the US as a global disciplinarian. This is not a partnership—it's a hierarchy. He further says the US 'deliberately overlooked' India's behaviour—implying that India must now repay that favour. But the US pursued the civil nuclear deal and other engagements to serve its own interests. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Tellis suggests that India may drift closer to China. He writes, 'India may edge closer to China as circumstances demand.' This ignores the geopolitical and security realities of India's position—its border disputes, strategic rivalry, and civilisational contrast with China. India balances China not because Washington wants it to, but because it must. Its engagement with non-Western forums like Brics and SCO stems from strategic hedging, not ideological alignment. Moreover, he asserts that shared democratic values held the relationship together. But during the Cold War, both were democracies and still adversaries. Values alone never drove US-India ties—strategic interests did. The US has supported numerous non-democracies for decades. Let us not whitewash American foreign policy. His conclusion warns India to be 'wary of multipolarity' because it might have to assume more burdens and lose US-supplied global goods like maritime security. He argues, 'India would benefit less from the collective goods the United States supplies… such as protecting sea-lanes.' But sovereignty comes with responsibility. If India wants to be a leading power, it will bear costs. Yet the suggestion that these burdens are too heavy, or that India is incapable of carrying them, reveals a lack of faith in Indian capacity and vision. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Even in his treatment of Indian democracy, Tellis credits the Constitution but strategically downplays India's civilisational ethos. Democracy thrived in India not only because of institutions but also because of ingrained cultural values: tolerance, pluralism, and civilisational continuity. Other post-colonial states had constitutions too— many failed. India's success lies in its long-standing civilisational political culture, not merely its legal frameworks. Ultimately, Tellis' article is built on selective assumptions and strategic nostalgia. He ignores how the US has transformed under Trump and how the world order itself is shifting. He indirectly praises China while telling India to 'do more.' He frames India's choices as selfish but ignores America's own self-serving behaviour. This is not scholarship—it is strategic sermonising. Conclusion India is a civilisational state—confident, capable, and clear-eyed about its place in the world. It does not take dictation. It will align with the United States when interests converge and stand alone when they don't. That is the essence of strategic autonomy—not a hurdle to partnership, but its most stable foundation. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Ashley Tellis, in his critique, makes too many assumptions, adopts a prescriptive tone, and promotes a worldview in which India is expected to subordinate its priorities to those of the US. He seeks to shape India's trajectory in a particular direction and comes across as authoritarian and dominating in the language of the article. India's independent stance on Ukraine has especially troubled Western thinkers. The geopolitical agenda becomes evident when one reads between the lines—this is a piece marked by an assertive, almost coercive tone. India of today is not a postcolonial appendage. It will engage with the US as a partner, not as a client. A true India-US relationship must rest on mutual respect—not on expectations of alignment or veiled warnings of 'penalties'. As Karl Popper reminded us, all knowledge is provisional. Predictions in international politics often fail. India's choices will be shaped by its national interest, and no amount of moralising can change that fundamental principle. Imran Khurshid is a visiting research fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.


India Today
5 days ago
- Business
- India Today
Who's the Nato chief to warn India on trade?
In today's geopolitics, where warnings and threats have become routine, such statements rarely shock any more. But when a warning comes from a place where it shouldn't originate, ears naturally perk up. Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte on Wednesday (Indian time) issued a warning to India, China, and Brazil. He threatened "100% secondary sanctions" if they continue trading with Russia, particularly in oil and after meetings with US senators, Rutte asked these nations to pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin into peace talks with Ukraine within 50 days. He echoed US President Donald Trump's threat of "biting tariffs" on Russian export buyers."If you live now in Beijing, or in Delhi, or you are the president of Brazil, you might want to take a look into this, because this might hit you very hard," Rutte said. This provocative statement directed at sovereign nations, including India, coming from the head of a military alliance, instantly raises questions about diplomatic overreach and to top it all, the sheer threat looms over countries like India, but strangely, the hammer never seems to fall on European nations, even though they're still buying Russian oil themselves. In the third year of the Russia-Ukraine War, Europe's fossil fuel imports from Moscow dropped by just 1% year-on-year. So, who exactly needs the lecture on responsible trading?This is why Rutte's bid to dictate India's trade policies is purely IS NOT A TRADE POLICEMANMark Rutte is the Secretary General of Nato, which is a military alliance focused on collective defence, and not a body governing global warning to India, a sovereign nation with no Nato affiliation, oversteps his comments followed Trump's announcement of new weapons for Ukraine. This hints that there is an alignment of Nato with the US policy, which is not at all has seen Brics as an anti-US bloc that is trying to bring in a currency that would undermine the American to forget, the US is a Nato member, and its biggest fact, Trump has been arm-twisting other Nato members, pushing them to spend more on defence Rutte's warning actually reveal his abject surrender to Trump's threats?Trade disputes and their resolution belong in fora like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which, although, face their share of criticisms of bias, has the jurisdiction to address such issues. Nato's role is security, not economic coercion, and Rutte's foray into trade threats, parroting US President Donald Trump, confirms the NEEDS NO LECTURE ON PEACE, NON-ALIGNMENTadvertisementRutte's call for India to "make the phone call to Vladimir Putin" to push for peace is patronising and dismissive of India's diplomatic efforts. India has consistently advocated for peace, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi stating, "This is not the era of war", during global should India, China, or Brazil be the ones calling Putin? Did Trump's battering of Zelenskyy not work last time, or is the "daddy's" desperation to grab a Nobel Peace Prize getting more intense?India has balanced its strategic autonomy by abstaining from UN resolutions condemning Russia while engaging in dialogue with all parties. Rutte's allegation that India is not doing enough is not only unfounded but also insults New Delhi's proactive role in trying to foster dialogue between Russia and August 2024, Modi called up Russia's Putin, a day after he spoke to US President Joe Biden. The calls come close on the heels of his trip to a tone towards a strategic partner doesn't foster cooperation. It only alienates them. Though frankly, it's no surprise. The US and its administrations, including Trump's, have used this kind of language, or even harsher, for their own so-called "closest allies" CAN'T SANCTION. AND SHOULDN'T TRYThreatening India with sanctions for buying Russian oil, described as "slamming back in a massive way", is coercive, not diplomatic messaging. It aligns with Trump's aggressive tariff threats, but Nato certainly lacks the authority to impose increased imports of discounted Russian oil since 2022 is a pragmatic move driven by energy security, not an alarming alignment. Threatening a sovereign nation for prioritising its economic interests, especially when Western countries have historically done the same, frankly reeks of warning comes suspiciously close to the Brics summit, hosted by Brazil last week. The Brics' growing influence, expanding footprint, with discussions on alternatives to the petrodollar system gaining statement, following Trump's frustration with the Brics' "anti-American policies", appears less about Ukraine and more about countering the bloc's rising clout. This timing of the warning suggests it is also looking to tame the Brics' success, rather than a genuine call for IS STRAYING FROM ITS MANDATEThe use of Nato, a security alliance, to meddle in India's bilateral trade policies blurs critical lines between diplomacy and senators are pushing a bill for 500% tariffs on countries trading with Russia. It also hints towards a broader Western involvement in economic threats risks tarnishing its credibility as a security-focused entity, and casts Rutte as a mouthpiece for Washington's trade office rather than one of the security ENERGY POLICY IS NOBODY'S TO DICTATERutte's, in the warning, perhaps assumes India's energy policy is overly reliant on Russia. It is misleading. India has diversified its oil imports, sourcing from the Middle East, Africa, and the US. Meanwhile, it leverages discounted Russian oil to stabilise domestic prices. That's India's pragmatic approach of balancing economic interests with global India to abandon this strategy to align with Western demands ignores its energy security needs and the realities of a multipolar world is no longer unipolar, it's not even bipolar any more. We're clearly heading toward a multipolar warning to India is a clear violation of diplomatic boundaries. It is a condescending tone toward a sovereign nation, and a misuse of Nato's authority. It misreads India's independent global posture and its balanced approach to the Russia-Ukraine as it has for decades, acts responsibly. It prioritises its energy security and advocates for peace without succumbing to external pressure. As the External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has, on multiple occasions, pointed out, the world must engage with India as an equal partner, not issue ultimatums through inappropriate channels. He said India did not need preachers, but statement wasn't just disrespectful. It was the wrong message, delivered in the wrong way, by absolutely the wrong person.- Ends
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First Post
11-07-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Permanent solutions elude as China plays the long game on Tibet and India's borders
China's attack on India in 1962, with skirmishes leading up to it, all started in the 1950s after the PLA forcibly occupied Tibet. The parallels between the 1950s and now must be carefully studied by India read more On the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Qingdao, China, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh met his counterpart Admiral Dong Jun and called for a 'permanent solution' to their decades-old Tibet border dispute. The question that immediately emerges here concerns the timing—especially when there have been several narratives about India and China moving toward peaceful disengagement in Depsang and Demchok since last year, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi met President Xi Jinping at Kazan on the sidelines of the BRICS summit and an agreement was drawn up. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD China had stated in October last year that disengagement had been completed at Depsang and Demchok, two of the friction points that emerged post-2020 when China violated India's sovereignty and martyred 20 soldiers of the Indian Army during the Galwan Valley clash. However, a December 2024 Pentagon report noted that the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) had not fully drawn down its forces since 2020 and continued building infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), indicating that despite the agreement, full disengagement was yet to take place. In this context, the use of two terms by Defence Minister Singh during his meeting with Dong in June this year—'permanent' and 'Tibet'—carries significant meanings and signals. The deliberate use of 'permanent' implies that India understands China's actions do not match its words, particularly regarding disengagement at friction points. Second, the temporary nature of so-called agreements for maintaining peace at the disputed borders becomes glaring when the need for a permanent solution is stressed. Despite multiple rounds of talks between India and China at various levels, the fact remains that conflict is used as the first resort by the Chinese PLA. Examples range from 1962 to 1967, 1987, 2018, 2020, 2021, and 2022. Moreover, China's response to Singh's statement on the need for a permanent solution to the decades-old Tibet border question clarified that China does not actually seek a solution to the dispute. Just days after Singh's statement, China remarked that the boundary dispute with India is 'complicated' and will 'take time to settle.' This is reminiscent of the 1950s. In 1954, Zhou Enlai stated that China's India policy should strive for co-existence based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, seeking to make it anti-US aggression and anti-war. He added that India was still under British and American influences, so China wanted to win it over. As for the border issue, Zhou said questions regarding areas such as Tawang and Lhoyul—excluded by the McMahon Line—and issues regarding the 'ownership' of these areas would be resolved in the future at an appropriate time due to 'insufficient documents.' He further noted that the stronger China became, the more India's attitude would change. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In 2025, there are striking similarities with 1954. In April, China urged India to stand with it against U.S. tariffs. Since 2024, China has been actively pushing narratives of how it is trying to stabilise the borders with India. As seen in China's response to Singh's call for a permanent solution, this is reminiscent of Zhou's 1954 view that the future would determine the resolution of the dispute. The timing of Singh's focus on the border with Tibet is also pertinent. In the run-up to the Dalai Lama's 90th birthday, Chinese attempts to Sinicise Buddhism and obliterate everything about Tibet—including replacing its name with the Chinese term 'Xizang'—need to be noted. A few weeks before the Dalai Lama's 90th birthday, Xi met with the China-chosen Panchen Lama, Gyaincain Norbu. Gedhun Choeki Nyima, the Panchen Lama recognised by the Dalai Lama in 1995, has now been missing for 30 years since being taken into custody by Chinese authorities at the age of six. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The Panchen Lama is the second-highest spiritual leader in Tibetan Buddhism after the Dalai Lama. Norbu, while meeting Xi, stated he would keep in mind Xi's earnest teachings and firmly support the leadership of the ruling Chinese Communist Party. A few weeks later, China announced it had started the third phase of work on restoring and preserving Buddhist scriptures, most written in Sanskrit. When the Dalai Lama celebrated his 90th birthday and announced that the Gaden Phodrang Trust—the religious authority managing his affairs—will oversee his succession, stating that the CCP will have no authority, China flared up yet again, as it has in the past, and called for no interference in China's internal matters. Leading up to the Dalai Lama's 90th birthday, China also invited Indian journalists to Tibet. Even the most credible among them, perhaps not fully grasping strategic concerns, referred to Tibet as 'Xizang' in their reports. The continued use of the Chinese term for Tibet not only obliterates Tibetan identity but also normalises China's claims on Arunachal Pradesh. 'Xizang' implies 'Western treasure trove' in Chinese, while China calls India's Arunachal Pradesh 'Zangnan' or 'Southern treasure trove.' Erasing Tibet's identity through manipulation of media narratives also furthers China's claims on Arunachal Pradesh as 'Zangnan.' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The fate of Tibet is closely tied to China's claims on India's sovereignty. The timing of China's renewed attempts to Sinicise Buddhism and appropriate everything about Tibet—from its sovereignty to culture to language—in the lead-up to the Dalai Lama's 90th birthday cannot be missed. Singh's statement on the need for a permanent solution to the Tibet dispute must also be seen as a carefully timed pushback. China's attack on India in 1962, with skirmishes leading up to it, all started in the 1950s after the PLA forcibly occupied Tibet. The parallels between the 1950s and now must be carefully studied by India. China's overtures to push narratives of friendship with India to counter the West, its military onslaught on Tibet then, its attempts to obliterate Tibetan identity now, and the permanent delaying of resolving the border question—back in 1954 and again today—are all ominous signs. India must take cognisance of these realities and understand that China can never be trusted in any sphere of any relationship. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Prof Sriparna Pathak is a Professor of China Studies at O.P. Jindal Global University and serves as a Senior Fellow at the Jindal India Institute. Sagar Naidu is a Doctoral scholar at the University of Basel, Switzerland. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.


Time of India
11-07-2025
- Business
- Time of India
‘Brazil is ours': Protesters burn Trump effigy in fiery anti-tariff rally in São Paulo
Fiery protests erupted in Sao Paulo as Brazilian demonstrators torched a Trump effigy and US flag after President Trump's new tariffs on Brazilian goods. The rally, originally in support of President Lula's economic policies, turned into an anti-US outcry. Chants of 'Brazil is ours' echoed as members of the ruling Workers' Party condemned what they called economic aggression. Protesters demanded Brazil stand firm against US trade pressure and defend national sovereignty. Show more Show less


Saba Yemen
09-07-2025
- Politics
- Saba Yemen
Brazil condemns Trump's announcement of additional tariffs on BRICS countries
Brasilia – Saba: Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva condemned on Tuesday US President Donald Trump's threats to impose tariffs on BRICS member states or those that express support for the group's policies. During a joint press conference with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, broadcast by the Brazilian government on social media, the Brazilian president said, "We do not accept any criticism directed at the BRICS summit, and we completely reject what the President of the United States hinted yesterday about the possibility of imposing tariffs on the bloc." The Brazilian president emphasized that BRICS brings together countries that seek peace, development, and the reduction of inequalities, adding, "We do not want wars, and we do not want confrontation. We want our countries to be able to achieve development and progress." Earlier, US President Donald Trump announced the imposition of an additional 10 percent trade tariff on countries that express support for BRICS policies, deeming them anti-US. Whatsapp Telegram Email Print