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Russia Today
19-07-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
This militant group fought for 40 years. Now they're surrendering on camera.
At the foot of a mountain in northern Iraq, thirty fighters from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê – PKK) toss their rifles into a fire. Half of them are women. The scene unfolds at the entrance of a cave near the town of Dukan, about 60 kilometers from Sulaymaniyah. Nearby stand representatives from Kurdish, Iraqi, and Turkish authorities. One of the PKK commanders reads a statement aloud in Turkish, then another repeats it in Kurdish. 'We are voluntarily destroying our weapons in your presence, as a sign of goodwill and resolve,' the commander says, looking toward the assembled observers. Cameras capture the moment: flames leap against the stone backdrop, devouring the weapons that once symbolized armed struggle. With that, the PKK began implementing its plan to disarm – a radical shift for a group that, for over four decades, had waged a violent campaign for Kurdish independence and came to be regarded as one of the most unyielding terrorist organizations in the eyes of both Türkiye and the West. The formal momentum toward ending the armed struggle began in late February. A statement from PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, read aloud from prison on İmralı Island, called on supporters to abandon the 'military phase' and assumed 'historic responsibility' for launching a peace process. On February 27, Öcalan proposed that the PKK disband as a militant structure, urging all armed units to lay down their weapons and convene a congress to chart a new path of integration into Turkish society and political life. Just days later, on March 1, the PKK formally announced the end of its armed struggle. For a movement long defined by its resistance, this marked a watershed. For the first time, PKK leaders acknowledged that armed resistance had become not only futile, but damaging to broader Kurdish aspirations. For the first time, the organization's political wing signaled its readiness to undergo institutional transformation. Implementation began on July 11, 2025 – the day of the cave-side ceremony near Dukan. But the fiery gesture was just the surface of a broader process spanning multiple territories and dozens of combat units. Disarmament began simultaneously in southeastern Türkiye, the mountainous regions of northern Iraq, and parts of northeastern Syria, where PKK-affiliated formations operate. According to CNN Türk, about 200 fighters on Turkish soil took part in the initial phase. Their arsenal mostly included mortars and munitions previously supplied by Western allies during the anti-ISIS campaign. No heavy weapons – tanks, rocket systems, or air defense – were recorded during inspections. Turkish authorities estimate that around 2,000 fighters will ultimately be involved in the demilitarization. Groups are disarming in batches of 40 to 50 to facilitate logistics and oversight. Designated handover points have been set up across Türkiye, Iraqi Kurdistan, and the border zones between Syria's Hasakah province and Türkiye's Şırnak province. The process is being coordinated by Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MIT), which, according to the newspaper Yeni Şafak, is monitoring the operation around the clock. Future phases will not be publicized. Weapons will be surrendered in closed zones under the supervision of security services and local authorities. Senior PKK leaders – about 250 individuals – will not be allowed to remain near the Turkish, Iraqi, or Syrian borders. They'll be relocated to third countries under strict dispersal rules to prevent the formation of new command centers. Turkish officials expect the process to be completed no later than September. Meanwhile, key Syrian-based factions like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the YPG remain outside the current disarmament framework. Their status in the broader process is unresolved – a reflection of both geography and geopolitical complexity surrounding the Syrian conflict. The Kurds are one of the largest stateless ethnic groups in the world, numbering between 30 and 35 million people. They speak languages belonging to the Kurdish branch of the Iranian language family, and their historical homeland spans the mountainous borderlands of Türkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This culturally and geographically distinct region is often referred to as Kurdistan, though it lacks any formal international recognition. Türkiye is home to the largest Kurdish population – an estimated 15 to 20 million people, or about 18 to 20 percent of the country's total population. That makes the Kurdish question a strategic factor in both Turkish domestic politics and regional security. The unofficial capital of Turkish Kurdistan is Diyarbakır, a major city in southeastern Anatolia that serves as a cultural and political hub. Significant Kurdish communities also exist in: Northern Iraq, where an internationally recognized autonomous Kurdish region operates; Iran's western provinces, particularly in Kurdistan province; Northeastern Syria, where Kurds play a central role in local governance; Europe (especially Germany) and the South Caucasus. For decades, outside powers – from the US to Israel – have sought to use the Kurdish question as leverage against central governments in Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran. But such instrumentalization faces a major constraint: Kurds are not a unified political force. Kurdish communities vary in their level of integration into state institutions and in their views on separatism. In Iraq, Iran, and Türkiye, many Kurdish elites hold prominent positions in government, business, and public life – and often oppose radical ethno-nationalism. In short, betting on militant actors like the PKK and its affiliates offers only a partial view of Kurdish society. The Kurds have long played a critical role in the political and sectarian mosaic of the Middle East. Their aspirations for autonomy or independence, and their involvement in armed conflicts, have made them a focus of foreign powers – especially in the West. While both the US and EU officially designate the PKK as a terrorist organization, Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria have served as key allies in the West's regional strategy, particularly during the fight against ISIS. Kurdish nationalism has often been used as a lever against Ankara, Baghdad, and Damascus – and more recently, Tehran. Through Israeli channels, Washington has floated the idea that rising separatist sentiment among Iranian Kurds could be used to destabilize the Islamic Republic from within. But Western policy has been riddled with contradictions. Democrats in the US have typically favored backing Kurdish movements as a way to pressure Türkiye. Republicans, on the other hand, have taken a more pragmatic approach, prioritizing ties with Ankara. That political context helps explain why Türkiye ramped up its Kurdish diplomacy in 2025 – as US interest in radical Kurdish factions declined, and strategic cooperation with Turkey deepened. One key figure in the current peace push is Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan – a former intelligence chief, seasoned diplomat, and an ethnic Kurd himself. His appointment signaled Turkey's institutional readiness for engagement. The initiative also has the backing of President Erdoğan's nationalist coalition partner, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) – a notable shift given the MHP's historically hardline stance. The peace initiative with the Kurds cannot be fully understood without a domestic backdrop. Türkiye is in the throes of economic turmoil: inflation remains high, unemployment is stubborn, and public discontent is growing. The opposition is calling for early elections and the release of popular figures like Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. Against this backdrop, President Erdoğan needs to demonstrate strategic leadership – and the capacity for compromise. This is the context in which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has begun working on constitutional amendments. Officially, the peace process and the constitutional reform are unrelated. But in public discourse, a connection is increasingly drawn. The thinking is this: if the AKP can strike a deal with the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), it might secure enough parliamentary support to push through the changes – changes that could potentially allow Erdoğan to run for another presidential term after 2028. Still, the process is fragile. The decision by the PKK to lay down arms, even with the blessing of its jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan, does not mean that Türkiye's Kurdish population – estimated at 20 to 25 million – is united behind the peace effort. Öcalan may be revered by some, but he is not a universally accepted voice among Kurds in Türkiye. Kurdish society is fragmented. Some favor integration and full participation in Turkish civic life. Others continue to push for cultural autonomy. A third group remains sympathetic to the idea of armed resistance – especially in light of continued military operations by Turkish forces in southeastern provinces and cross-border campaigns in Iraq and Syria. Even if the PKK ceases to exist as an armed organization, the Kurdish political question will not disappear. The divides – and the contesting visions for Kurdish identity – will remain. Even a step as monumental as the PKK's disarmament does not guarantee long-term stability. As history shows, the Kurdish question can be reactivated at any moment – depending not just on events inside Türkiye, but on the shifting priorities of its allies. The United States, in particular, has long viewed the Kurdish issue as a lever of influence in the region. If relations with Ankara sour, Washington could again highlight Kurdish grievances as a pressure point. Cross-border separatism – especially in Syria and northern Iraq – remains a potential tool of destabilization, ready to be revived should the geopolitical calculus demand it. That's why some observers ask: is Erdoğan overplaying his hand? His political capital now hinges on several high-stakes bets – economic recovery, constitutional change, political control at home, and strategic balancing abroad. If too much rides on the peace process, any misstep could carry real costs: not just electoral setbacks, but diminished leverage on the international stage. Time is ticking. Erdoğan's final term, as it currently stands, ends in 2028 – three years away. Between now and then, Türkiye's political and economic terrain could shift dramatically. So could the broader architecture of global security. In such a volatile environment, today's peace agreement could easily lose its value – or even be turned against its architects. That's why this moment, for all its historical weight, is not a resolution. It's a phase. The ultimate goal – a stable, institutionalized, and broadly supported framework for Kurdish coexistence within Türkiye – is still far from guaranteed.
LBCI
17-07-2025
- Politics
- LBCI
After 40 years behind bars, Georges Abdallah set to walk free—will politics stand in the way again?
Report by Wissam Nasrallah, English adaptation by Mariella Succar He spent more than half his life behind bars, accused of involvement in the assassinations of American and Israeli diplomats on French soil. But to many, he is seen as a hero who dedicated his youth to a cause he believed in. Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, the longest-held political prisoner in Europe, is set to walk free after more than 40 years behind bars. Abdallah's story begins during Lebanon's civil war, when he was a young leftist with Marxist and nationalist beliefs. He saw the Palestinian resistance as a natural extension of his struggle against occupation and colonialism. He joined the armed struggle as a member of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions (LARF), a group accused of carrying out attacks targeting Western diplomats, most notably the 1982 assassinations of U.S. military attaché Charles Ray and Israeli diplomat Yaakov Bar-Simantov in Paris. Abdallah was arrested in 1984 in the French city of Lyon while carrying a fake Algerian passport. After three years of investigations and trials, he was sentenced to life in prison, beginning a long chapter of legal and political battles. He has been eligible for parole for 25 years, but French authorities—under internal and international political pressure—have rejected 12 previous requests submitted by his lawyers. Each time, the case returned to square one, despite French law allowing the conditional release of life-sentenced prisoners after a set period, especially when the prisoner demonstrates good behavior. Nearly four decades later, a Paris appeals court has broken the stalemate, issuing a ruling to release him starting July 25, on the condition that he be immediately deported to Lebanon and permanently barred from returning to French territory. Will this mark the final chapter in Georges Abdallah's story, or will politics once again intervene to block his release?
Arab News
16-07-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
Hezbollah now a militia without a project
It must have been difficult for Hezbollah to watch the public ceremony last week in which PKK fighters burned their rifles with their own hands. The scene symbolized the termination of a long armed struggle in the region, quietly introducing a new era that compels reassessments of the goals and functions of armed nonstate actors. The group's decision was neither the result of political coercion nor the culmination of a decisive military victory. Rather, it reflected a profound intellectual shift; the PKK has concluded that the age of militancy, whether nationalist or religious, is drawing to a close, demanding a shift in vision, ambition and stance. In Iraq, despite the fragility of its political equilibrium, the government managed to uphold and safeguard its neutrality during last month's Iran-Israel clashes. More importantly, it reaffirmed that it will not allow nonstate actors to maintain arms, resisting both the pressures of the so-called axis of resistance and the allure of the moment. In Baghdad, the call to unify the country's military forces is growing louder, mirroring a growing national conviction that the authority of the state must take precedence over the power of militias. In Gaza, the war will end in a political and military defeat that effectively leaves no place for Hamas in the 'day-after' deliberations on reconstruction and the Strip's political future. The movement has lost control of large parts of the Gaza Strip and found itself exposed before its enemies and, more significantly, before its own people. The neutralization of its arms has become irreversible — a demand shared by all the key stakeholders. Against the backdrop of this regional transition to a post-chaos era, Hezbollah is sticking to an obsolete discourse. It watches on as organizations that had once resembled it collapse. It feels the ground shaking beneath its feet. Yet, it has failed to build a new narrative that legitimizes maintaining the terms to which it had grown accustomed. Against the backdrop of a regional transition to a post-chaos era, Hezbollah is sticking to an obsolete discourse Nadim Koteich The party's emphatic defeat in its 2024 war with Israel did not compel a strategic reassessment. Instead, Hezbollah hardened its resistance rhetoric and sacralization of its arms. Rather than a political dispute, the matter has been sanctified and presented as untouchable. Hezbollah's weapons are no longer framed as mere instruments of resistance. In the party's discourse, they have been rendered an extension of a creed. They are justified by a divine mandate — a necessary component of a distinct identity. This discursive shift is deliberate: it seeks to create a bulwark against critique, oversight and political compromise by elevating the question into a metaphysical and existential matter. However, Hezbollah has not hardened its ideology from a position of confidence, but because of its apprehensions about the shifting regional landscape. Support for the party has diminished, Iran's backing is increasingly constrained by shifting priorities and Syria is taking steps toward sweeping settlements, including with Israel — settlements that will probably engender arrangements that blindside Hezbollah and make militant ideological ventures untenable. This change in rhetoric also coincides with credible reports of significant internal divisions within Hezbollah amid an ongoing internal reassessment of its role, function, operational capacity and the mounting costs of its entanglement in Iran's military project. Meanwhile, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam continue to take crucial steps, though there is more to be done, to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Most notably, they have dismantled hundreds of Hezbollah positions south of the Litani River following the ceasefire that the party had been compelled to accept. The group's dominance is increasingly intolerable regionally, internationally and even domestically Nadim Koteich That is not to say that state sovereignty has been restored. However, it does signal a crucial development: Hezbollah's exceptionalism is now exposed and its dominance is increasingly intolerable regionally, internationally and even domestically. Waning popular support in its own community and across Lebanese society, which has grown weary after two decades of bearing the social and economic costs of its wars, compounds its difficulties. Moreover, backed by the US and Europe, Israel is not deterred by Hezbollah. Rather, it is now seen as a legitimate target for preemptive strikes, as shown by Israel's ongoing raids and assassinations. Where, then, is Hezbollah taking Lebanon? Can it continue to rely on a disintegrating regional axis to durably legitimize an arsenal that has no support, even among some of the party's closest allies? Can a supernatural discourse mask its glaring decline? Does Hezbollah have the political maturity and autonomy needed to begin disentangling itself from a transnational revolutionary creed to build a national political project? There is no indication that the party has clear answers to these questions. What is certain, however, is that Lebanon cannot afford to wait. More than ever, Hezbollah's weapons now constitute an existential threat to the Lebanese state. This assessment was voiced by US envoy Tom Barrack and is now an almost visceral conclusion that the majority of Lebanese citizens share. More critical than the threat it poses to Lebanon as a political entity are the potential ramifications for Hezbollah's own community. Maintaining arms outside the state's control risks plunging the party's constituency into a perpetual confrontation with the rest of the country, foreclosing any chance of a stable national partnership. If the weapons are not addressed today, the costs may be greater than another war with Israel. Such failure could lead to domestic disintegration, which would rip the Shiite community apart before engulfing the rest of Lebanon.
The National
10-07-2025
- Politics
- The National
Dr Anwar Gargash hails PKK leader's call to move away from violence
, diplomatic adviser to President Sheikh Mohamed, has praised the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) for calling for the group to lay down its weapons. Jailed leader Abdullah Ocalan said the PKK and its 'national liberation war strategy have come to an end', in a video message dated June 19 and released on Wednesday. Ocalan, whose group is designated as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the US and the European Union, has been detained in a prison on Imrali Island in the Sea of Marmara, south of Istanbul, since his capture by Turkish security forces in 1999. 'The announcement by PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to end the 'armed struggle' and shift to constitutional and legal action is a courageous decision that reflects a profound rational review,' said Mr Gargash, in a post on social media platform X. 'Our region is in bad need of such reviews to learn the lessons of the experience, avoid the repetition of mistakes and open new paths that serve the interest of the peoples and the regional stability.' Ocalan founded the PKK in the 1970s. The group waged an armed insurgency against the Turkish state for decades in an attempt to secure greater rights for the country's Kurdish minority. Around one-fifth of Turkey's population is ethnically Kurdish. The conflict has killed more than 40,000 people on both sides and the PKK became Ankara's number one security priority. Ocalan first called on PKK members to disarm and dissolve the group in February, in a move that opened the way to end one of the Middle East's most intractable conflicts. At the time, his message was read out by members of Turkey's main pro-Kurdish political party, the People's Democracy and Equality Party (DEM).
Asharq Al-Awsat
17-05-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Türkiye Says in Talks with Baghdad, Erbil on PKK Weapons Handover
Türkiye is in talks with authorities in Baghdad and in the northern Iraqi city of Erbil on how Kurdish militants of the PKK will hand over their weapons, President Tayyip Erdogan said following the group's decision to disband. "Talks are being held with our neighbouring countries on how the weapons of terrorists outside our borders will be handed over," Erdogan said, according to a transcript of remarks he made to journalists on his return flight from Albania overnight. "There are plans regarding how the Baghdad and Erbil administrations will take part in this process," he added. The PKK , which has been locked in bloody conflict with Türkiye for more than four decades, has decided to disband and end its armed struggle, group members and Turkish leaders said earlier this week on Monday.
