Latest news with #foreignpolicy
The National
15 hours ago
- Business
- The National
Can the US use its Ukraine tactics to get Middle East minerals?
The US deal granting it future revenue and access to Ukraine's mineral sector raises a broader question: is this the beginning of a model for American foreign policy, one that links strategic resource access to long-term diplomatic and financial commitments? Shaped by the exceptional circumstances of war, the Ukraine deal may appear to be a one-off. Yet US President Donald Trump's recent Middle East visit, in which the White House claimed more than a trillion dollars in investment deals were signed, points to a broader trend: Washington's increasing willingness to align foreign policy with long-term economic interests, particularly in critical minerals. It is tempting to imagine the US might apply the Ukraine model in the Middle East, particularly with countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, where mining has become a growing policy focus. Riyadh especially is pursuing large-scale development of critical minerals as part of its economic diversification strategy to lessen dependence on oil. Riyadh has also overhauled its mining laws to attract foreign investment and accelerate exploration. Its state-owned mining giant, Ma'aden, has already entered partnerships with global firms like Barrick Gold and Ivanhoe Electric, signalling serious intent to build a world-class mining sector. But unlike Ukraine, neither is in a position of acute geopolitical distress. Saudi Arabia is wealthy, and critically, not short on suitors. It boasts a huge sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund, that finances domestic megaprojects. While Jordan's aid dependent economy is struggling, especially after the sudden suspension of US aid in February, it fairs better than Ukraine's dire straits of enduring a more than three-year war. Therefore, neither country is under pressure to pledge away its resources at a loss. That may not preclude Mr Trump from exploring similar proposals, however unlikely their acceptance. The American president has long preferred diplomacy with a balance sheet. His latest Gulf tour was no exception, with discussions focused on investment deals and economic co-operation, including energy sales. Administration officials have indicated a growing interest in financing structures that expand US access to critical minerals without increasing federal spending. Minerals race Minerals are no longer just commodities. Lithium, copper, and other rare earth metals are national security assets. From electric vehicles to semiconductors, the green transition is mineral-intensive, and China controls much of the supply chain. China processes more than 80 per cent of rare earths, dominates refining of lithium and cobalt, and plays a major role in battery and solar manufacturing. For Washington, ensuring access is becoming as vital as defending shipping lanes. Still, any notion of Saudi Arabia or Jordan signing over future profits or access to the US is, at best, aspirational. Riyadh has no intention of sharing control, or upside, of its mineral development. It might accept a US partner in a technical capacity, especially to access mining expertise or green tech. But anything more is unlikely. This does not mean deals will not be struck. Rather, the model would be likely to differ from used in Ukraine's. In Jordan's case, Washington might offer technology transfer or enhanced security guarantees, particularly in light of regional tensions with Iran, in exchange for priority access to minerals or a stake in local mining projects. Jordan, while more modest in scale, has significant reserves of phosphates and is exploring its potential in rare earth elements. The country's established mining infrastructure and close ties to Washington could make it a more flexible partner for future mineral agreements. With Saudi Arabia, it's harder. Saudi Arabia doesn't need a deal; the US does. That's leverage, and Riyadh knows it. Diplomatic capital Even if formal resource-sharing deals are unlikely, Washington's economic footprint in the Gulf is not insignificant. Access can take less visible forms. One route is through US companies that attract investment from Gulf sovereign wealth funds, like Abu Dhabi's ADQ, the Qatar Investment Authority and Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund. Capital often travels with a diplomatic agenda. In 2021, for instance, Saudi Arabia's PIF gave $2 billion to Jared Kushner, Mr Trump's son-in-law and former senior adviser, for his newly launched private equity firm, Affinity Partners. Many in the region regard the move as a gesture aimed at maintaining ties with Mr Trump's inner circle. However, if the US is indeed pivoting to a resource-driven foreign policy, it is doing so late in the day. China has spent two decades building state-backed mineral partnerships across Africa, Latin America, and increasingly the Middle East, often under its flagship Belt and Road Initiative. The US, by contrast, is just now scrambling to catch up. In this context, resource-sharing arrangements, however opaque, may become a new diplomatic currency. But even within Washington, the path forward is uneven. The push to secure minerals is tied closely to the green transition, a central concern for US tech giants, who need stable supplies for electric vehicles, batteries and data infrastructure. Yet on Capitol Hill, the political will is fragmented. While some Republicans support domestic mining as part of a broader push for energy independence and competition with China, many in the Make America Great Again wing of the party remain sceptical of the green agenda itself. Still, lithium, cobalt, rare earths are vital to American interests. Electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced batteries all depend on them. But securing reliable access to these materials will take more than high-profile deals in Riyadh. It will require sustained investment in mining and processing capacity, long-term contracts with trusted partners, and clear policy signals that outlast election cycles. Ukraine's resource-for-support deal may remain an outlier: born of war, scarcity and political imbalance. The Middle East, by contrast, is rich and assertive. Mr Trump may hope to carve out a mineral foothold, but the region is unlikely to surrender its resources without extracting something far more valuable in return. And in the transactional world of today's geopolitics, the price of access is always going up.
Russia Today
a day ago
- Business
- Russia Today
What is Trump's game in Syria?
US President Donald Trump's recent announcement that he intends to lift all sanctions on Syria stands as one of the most unexpected and controversial foreign policy moves Washington has made in the past decade. Declared during Trump's Middle East tour at the US-Saudi Investment Forum in Riyadh, the decision marks a dramatic shift in America's approach to the region – one that could reshape the strategic landscape for both allies and adversaries. The sanctions on Syria, first imposed in 1979, were progressively tightened over decades in response to accusations of sponsoring terrorism, human rights abuses, and close ties with Iran. Their full repeal is an unprecedented gesture, especially considering that Syria's current president, Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, was until recently regarded by the US as a senior figure in Al-Qaeda – with a $10 million bounty once placed on his capture. In return, Damascus has made a series of strategic commitments. According to Trump, al-Sharaa has pledged to prevent the resurgence of Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS), bring all jihadist detention camps under state control, and expel all foreign terrorist formations from Syrian soil. This latter promise is particularly significant, as these militant units – many of them composed of fighters from Central Asia – played a pivotal role in the collapse of Bashar Assad's regime and the rise of the current leadership. Many of these same groups are also responsible for large-scale ethnic purges, including the massacres of Alawites and other religious minorities earlier this year. Thus, Trump's proposal does more than legitimize al-Sharaa's regime – it places on it the mantle of a regional stabilizer, albeit one whose legitimacy remains heavily disputed. The decision to lift sanctions cannot be divorced from Washington's broader economic and strategic interests. That the announcement came in Saudi Arabia is no coincidence – it signals a broader understanding with Riyadh, which is eager to deepen its footprint in post-conflict Syria. From the US perspective, the Syria deal is a building block in a new Middle Eastern architecture – one dominated by pro-Western governments and designed to neutralize Iranian influence. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have long viewed Syria's reconstruction as an opportunity to entrench themselves politically and economically. US sanctions had previously prevented them from acting overtly, and the lifting of restrictions may now be part of a grander bargain: Riyadh receives a green light to invest in Syria, while Washington secures massive financial commitments. On May 14 – the day of Trump's announcement – Saudi Arabia signed a $142 billion arms deal with the US and pledged an additional $600 billion in American investments. At first glance, Trump's move might appear as a betrayal of Israeli interests – an accusation made in several media commentaries. Yet in practice, Israel gains a neighbor that, while unpredictable, is now positioned to suppress Islamist radicals within its borders. This allows it to refocus on countering Iran and Hezbollah without the added distraction of threats emanating from Syria. The lifting of sanctions also aligns with Türkiye's strategic goals. President Erdogan, just prior to the Trump-al-Sharaa meeting, personally urged the US president to dismantle the sanctions. Türkiye is a key partner of Syria's new leadership but has been constrained by its own economic crisis. Moreover, the sanctions hindered Ankara's allies – particularly Qatar – from taking part in Syria's postwar reconstruction. In sum, Trump's Syrian deal represents more than just a diplomatic maneuver; it is a bold attempt to reengineer the regional balance of power. Whether it brings long-term stability or fuels new fault lines remains to be seen – but its impact on the Middle East is already unmistakable. The developments unfolding in Syria following the rise to power of Ahmed al-Sharaa increasingly evoke the atmosphere of 2011 – the era of the Arab Spring, when the Middle East fractured into two ideological and geopolitical camps. At the time, Türkiye and Qatar actively championed the cause of 'political Islam', seeking to expand their influence through the emergence of Islamist-oriented governments. In contrast, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates perceived Islamist forces as a direct threat to regional stability and the survival of their monarchical order. Today, under al-Sharaa's leadership, Syria once again reflects that same fault line. A sense of déjà vu looms: The region's main players find themselves navigating renewed tensions, caught between the desire to preserve influence and the necessity of adapting to a rapidly evolving reality. Ankara and Doha, both instrumental in al-Sharaa's ascent, view his leadership as an opportunity to reclaim their diminished standing in the Levant. Despite its internal economic turmoil, Türkiye continues to position itself as a regional arbiter, relying on a network of loyal political and military actors within Syria. Qatar, for its part, is providing financial and diplomatic support, effectively replicating the strategy it previously deployed in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia. Yet the current landscape differs markedly from that of 2011. Al-Sharaa, though buoyed by Turkish support, has signaled a desire for greater autonomy from the outset. His first official foreign visit was not to Ankara, but to Riyadh – a symbolic gesture toward Saudi Arabia and the UAE, whose economic power is now essential for Syria's reconstruction. It was also a clear signal that Damascus is open to dialogue, even with those who once backed the opposing side in the civil war. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the resurgence of politically motivated Islamist forces is a source of deep concern, though their response has remained deliberately muted. Rather than overt confrontation, these Gulf monarchies have opted for economic engagement, believing that financial leverage will grant them influence while curbing radicalization. They also see the new Syrian leadership as a potential partner in shaping a new Middle Eastern order – provided that Damascus does not become an instrument of Turkish expansionism. This explains al-Sharaa's active display of 'independent maneuvering', as he skillfully balances between centers of power – from the Gulf to Ankara, from Washington to Moscow. Amid this geopolitical mosaic, the US has crafted a new strategic vision. Under Trump's leadership, US policy increasingly focuses on economic leverage and security cooperation while moving away from direct military engagement in the Middle East. Trump proposes a new model: 'Regional self-sufficiency' under an American umbrella. The essence of this model is to arm and equip regional actors, enabling them to maintain stability independently, with the US acting as a supplier of advanced technology and a guarantor of balance. In return, Washington demands loyalty, political restraint, and – crucially – substantial financial contributions. This underpins the strategic alignment with Gulf monarchies, who possess the means and motivation to counterbalance Iran. At the same time, Trump is attempting to bridge the divide between Türkiye and Israel, laying the groundwork for an economic partnership despite ideological differences. The goal is to prevent friction among US allies and to forge a unified front against Iran and other hostile forces. Syria, in this context, becomes a testing ground for America's new security architecture – a controlled regional equilibrium maintained without the Pentagon's direct footprint. If successful, this model could be replicated in other crisis zones. A potential next step is the normalization of relations between Syria and Israel – a previously unimaginable prospect, now discussed as part of a broader settlement. In parallel, Trump plans to introduce a new Middle East peace framework that includes recognition of Palestine in exchange for diplomatic and economic incentives from Arab states. This scenario may also presage political change in Israel: If Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu resists the plan, centrist alternatives like Yair Lapid or Benny Gantz – more amenable to compromise – could come to the fore. All of this unfolds against the backdrop of a fundamental reordering of US global priorities. Washington is increasingly pivoting toward the containment of China, its primary strategic rival in the 21st century. The Middle East is no longer seen as a vital sphere; the new approach favors balance over expansion, mediation over presence, partnership over intervention. Thus, US regional strategy is evolving from rigid control to a more adaptive configuration – one in which local actors are granted greater autonomy, though still within an overarching framework engineered in Washington. Syria may well serve as the first case study of this new era – an era in which the return to the logic of 2011 unexpectedly becomes the launchpad for a very different Middle East. The US decision to lift sanctions on Syria following the rise of al-Sharaa to power marks a pivotal moment for a country that has endured over a decade of devastating war, international isolation, and socioeconomic collapse. This move not only removes one of the most significant external constraints on the Syrian leadership, but also opens a window of opportunity to construct a new model of governance – one grounded in pragmatism, economic rationality, and cautious multilateralism. Al-Sharaa now faces a critical choice: To use this opportunity to consolidate centralized authority and restore effective governance – or, through missteps or weakness, to allow Syria to fragment further into a collection of ethno-regional entities devoid of a unifying national project. The World Bank has cleared over $15 million of Syrian debt, once again making the country eligible for participation in international financing programs. This development was made possible through targeted financial contributions from the Gulf states – particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar – signaling their intention to take the lead in Syria's reconstruction. Following this, the IMF expressed its readiness to provide technical assistance, while the Syrian authorities issued a series of statements inviting investment in agriculture, energy, transportation infrastructure, and tourism. These actions indicate the new regime's ambition to craft an economic model that not only addresses the war's legacy but also generates employment, stabilizes the currency, boosts public revenues, and – most importantly – restores public trust in the institution of the state. However, economic recovery is only feasible if accompanied by the genuine restoration of governance. Syria remains deeply fragmented. Kurdish regions in the northeast are governed by a de facto autonomous administration with its own armed forces and international channels. In the south, the Druze community in Suwayda exhibits growing political and organizational independence, alongside protest movements and local defense initiatives. Along the coastal regions – home to significant Alawite and Christian minorities – distrust toward centralized power continues to grow, especially amid persistent ethno-sectarian tensions. These communities, should the center weaken, may gravitate toward political separatism or at least self-organization into autonomous administrative structures. If the al-Sharaa government fails to propose a coherent model of political integration – one that includes power-sharing, resource distribution, and the participation of regional elites in governance – Syria could enter a new phase of 'soft disintegration': A de facto federalization where unity is maintained in name only. In this context, foreign policy becomes critically important. Fully aware of the dangers of unilateral alignment, Ahmed al-Sharaa is pursuing a balanced external strategy. Unlike the previous era, which was defined by dependence on a narrow circle of allies, Syria's new president is embracing a diversified diplomatic approach. He seeks to build relations with the West and the US – especially in the context of economic recovery and Syria's international rehabilitation – without abandoning existing strategic ties. It is within this framework that Russia remains a key partner to Syria across several strategic domains. Russia continues to play a central role in Syria's security architecture and diplomatic positioning, including defending Syrian interests at the UN Security Council and engaging in technical, military, and energy cooperation. Its presence in Tartus and Khmeimim, involvement in humanitarian initiatives, and potential contributions to infrastructure reconstruction ensure its continued relevance in any long-term settlement scenario. At the same time, Damascus under al-Sharaa is also looking to build stronger ties with other non-Western power centers – including China, India, and Brazil – while deepening economic engagement with the Arab world. This will help Syria avoid overdependence on any single actor and enhance its strategic flexibility amid global uncertainty. This approach reflects a clear-eyed understanding of Syria's geopolitical reality: The country can no longer afford to be part of rigid geopolitical axes. Its survival now depends on its ability to navigate between competing powers – leveraging their rivalry for national benefit without becoming anyone's pawn. Maintaining cooperative relations with Russia and expanding dialogue with non-Western powers is not just a matter of foreign policy – it is a means of preserving autonomy in a context of limited sovereignty. The lifting of sanctions and al-Sharaa's ascent have opened a potential path toward stabilization. But the durability of this trajectory depends on the regime's ability not only to harness economic resources but also to execute a complex, multi-layered political and diplomatic agenda. Domestically, this means launching mechanisms of integration and decentralization; externally, it requires deft maneuvering between Western and non-Western actors. In this evolving environment, Russia remains an important partner for Syria – not as an exclusive ally, but as a key component in the multifaceted diplomacy that al-Sharaa will seek to construct in order to reinforce not just his own authority, but the very foundations of the Syrian state.
Zawya
a day ago
- Business
- Zawya
Inside new Kenya and Tanzania foreign policies
Kenya and Tanzania have, separately, launched foreign policies looking to cement trading and integration ties, suggesting that the recent public spats between their peoples has no impact on their plans. Last week, Tanzania launched its revised edition of the foreign policy amid push back against Kenyan and Ugandan activists bashing it over the trial of opposition leader Tundu Lissu. The new edition of the Tanzanian foreign policy has labelled this strategy a 'dual-track' management of international relations. It places neighbours such as Kenya, Uganda and other partners in the East African Community (EAC), and Africa, on one side, and partners beyond the continent on the other. Tanzania, President Suluhu said, will enhance and reset trade ties, revitalise cross-border trade under the EAC harmonised regional business protocols, and attract multinational business companies to the region.'This is a journey of new thinking in building our diplomatic presence and positioning our country and government on the international stage,' the Tanzanian leader said on May 19. Kenya's foreign policyMeanwhile in Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 1 of 2025, the parliamentary document that adopted the new foreign policy, states that the country will strengthen ties within the region while adjusting to a changing world order, adopting new measures and seeking new partners. According to an appended note from President William Ruto, Kenya has a 'steadfast trajectory towards prioritising regional integration, deepening of intra-African ties and elevating new pan-Africanism, even as we continue to strengthen and expand our country's global footprints'. Nairobi sees the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as crucial. Anthony Mwangi: How AfCFTA can insulate Africa against trade warsThe policy states that Kenya will also endeavour 'to maintain an independent and pragmatic foreign policy, which basically requires that the country elevates partnerships with traditional allies, while diversifying into building new relationships with the rising powers and formations like the Brics.'Kenya and Tanzania have prioritised tourism through shared cross-border resources, mostly the wildlife, geographic attractive areas, including mountains, lakes and the Indian Ocean beaches, cultural and historical heritages. Change of stanceBut they are also upending some of their traditions. For example, the Kenyan document suggests a case-by-case analysis of entities on self-determination. While Kenya recognises the One China policy with regard to Taiwan and the federal government in Mogadishu as the entity in charge of Somalia as a whole, it is changing its stance on supporting the secession of Western Sahara. The Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Intelligence and Foreign Relations recommended this change, citing 'the evolving nature of geopolitics.'Kenya, which had stayed out of the Brics+ race, now says it will consider joining the bloc in the future.'As it continues to monitor the strategic significance of this bloc, Kenya has meanwhile, signalled its intent to consider joining the Brics, which has emerged as a major economic and trading bloc, which by early 2024 represented 46 percent of the world's population, 35 percent of the world's GDP when measured at purchasing power parity, and 23.3 percent share of the global merchandise exports,' the policy says. Tanzania's foreign policyTanzania's ruling CCM party supported the political liberation of like-minded countries across the continent. For example, it backed the African National Congress in their fight against apartheid in South Africa and supported decolonisation in Namibia and Zimbabwe. Tanzania now seeks stronger economic ties with these partners, and is looking to forge new partnerships beyond the continent — a lesson learnt from the past.'The emergence of trade wars has led to monopolies and protectionism, eroding the principles of global commerce and shaking the foundations of our promised globalisation,' President Suluhu said. The new policy shows that Dodoma will strengthen its role in regional blocs, contrary to public perception of aloofness to regional integration. In fact, it says it will improve infrastructure connecting to all its neighbours to ease trade and raise cooperation on security and other common challenges. With a population of about 320 million people, the EAC creates a large, single market worth about $254 billion, making it a powerful regional bloc with greater influence to global economic platforms, the Tanzanian policy says. One project seen as crucial is $10 billion East African Crude Oil Pipeline (Eacop) with Uganda, which Dodoma sees as a pillar to cement regional cooperation. Even in the face of mounting anti-crude oil campaigners, both countries have stuck to the project, seeing it as crucial to the export of the oil from Uganda's Albertine Basin. Kenya's Foreign and Diaspora Ministry said this week that Tanzania is still one of its most important regional trading a partners, with about 250,000 Kenyans living and doing business in Tanzania.'Tanzania ranks sixth among Kenya's export destinations, accounting for 23 percent of our exports to the East African Community market,' said Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi.
Bloomberg
2 days ago
- Business
- Bloomberg
Obscure Tax Item in Trump's Big Bill Alarms Wall Street
Buried deep in the more than 1,000-page tax-and-spending bill that President Donald Trump is muscling through Congress is an obscure tax measure that's setting off alarms on Wall Street and beyond. The item — introduced in legislation that passed the House last week as Section 899 and titled 'Enforcement of Remedies Against Unfair Foreign Taxes' — calls for, among other things, increasing tax rates for individuals and companies from countries whose tax policies the US deems 'discriminatory.' This includes raising tax rates on passive income, such as interest and dividends, earned by investors who are potentially sitting on trillions in American assets.
Al Jazeera
2 days ago
- Business
- Al Jazeera
Jeremy Corbyn on Gaza and Britain's Imperial Legacy
In this episode of Centre Stage, our guest is Jeremy Corbyn, an Independent MP in the UK Parliament. Corbyn has long fought for economic justice, peace and a British foreign policy that tries to atone for its imperial legacy. In this episode, he talks about the cost of standing with Palestine, and why Europe may need to unite against a US-led trade war.
