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Forbes
01-07-2025
- Politics
- Forbes
Book Review: Shadi Hamid's Excellent ‘The Problem Of Democracy'
WASHINGTON, USA - AUGUST 17: (L-R) Professor Halil Berktay, Burhanettin Duran, Kilic Kanat, Shadi ... More Hamid, and Kadir Ustun attend in a panel called "The July 15 Failed Coup Attempt: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations" hosted by SETA in Washington, USA on August 17, 2016. (Photo by Samuel Corum/) Cato Institute co-founder Ed Crane has always been of the view that 'democracy' must be narrowly limited in scope. Basically it should be a device for removing highly objectionable people from national offices like that of the President, but not much more. As Crane explained it long ago in Forbes, Americans should go to bed early on election night. That's because the less they care about or know about who occupies the White House, the much better off we all are. Legislation should be local. State and city local so that individuals can choose their policy bliss, including taxes and spending. Crane's insights into democracy's myriad demerits, along with those of longtime Cato senior fellow Roger Pilon, came to mind early and often while reading Washington Post editorial page columnist Shadi Hamid's 2022 book The Problem of Democracy: America, the Middle East, and the Rise and Fall of an Idea. Hamid's thorough, and multipartisan look at the merits and demerits of democracy was an informative and at times fascinating read despite occasional disagreements with the author. About the good or bad of democracy, Hamid is clear about his mixed, and constantly evolving feelings. The bet here is that in 2025 he's of a different mind than he was upon publication in 2022. That's how it should be if people are constantly learning. For now, what Hamid is sure of is that for the typical citizen of a small d democratic country, or for the promoter of same elsewhere, a country in which the leaders and policy are an effect of the counting of heads 'tends to deliver profound disappointment in voters' 'lived experience.'' Which isn't surprising. It arguably helps explain discontent in the U.S. right now. There's quite simply way too much democracy. That's why people are up so late on election night. Whether or not Hamid agrees even partially, it's hard to say. Again, his views are clearly evolving. Which is a compliment. Hamid writes that the 'ability or willingness to be unhappy but still obliging when one's adversary wins an election is the precondition of democracy as we know it.' It might make sense at first glance, but the crucial reply is that not all democracies are equal. If readers are doubtful, they need only name the president of Switzerland versus naming the President of the United States. Which is the point libertarians frequently made after 2016's election, and to this day: no doubt many people disliked Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton or both in 2016, but what they unwittingly despised was and is the excessive power installed in a presidency that was never supposed to be this strong or consequential. Presidents shouldn't matter so much. Hamid sees democracy in its more ideal form as a situation in which 'the other party is still merely an opponent, not an enemy.' He asserts based on the previous metric that 'today, the United States no longer meets this prerequisite of democracy.' There's no major argument with Hamid's pessimism, but there is some puzzlement as to why Hamid thinks things are as they are. The expressed view in my 2019 book They're Both Wrong was a variation of the libertarian view expressed about Trump vs. Clinton in 2016. While Hamid would likely admit in a sheepish moment that hatred in U.S. politics is as old as the United States, and that the memories of collegiality among U.S. politicians mask enormous amounts of vitriol, the not-discussed-enough explanation for the political divide can be found in too much policy being made in Washington, the latter an effect of too much democracy. Opposite Crane's vision of early-to-bed election nights, people are once again staying up late. And they're staying up late because presidents, senators and congressmen have too much power to create too much policy. Which brings up the first quibble with Hamid. Channeling the partisan divide that he deems magnified in the present, Hamid laments how 'a growing number of Americans do not seem willing to respect democratic outcomes that go against their wishes. While this tendency is most pronounced among Republicans [emphasis mine], it goes further and deeper.' Which is the author overstating things a bit. Without defending a Republican voter, pundit and political class that is increasingly unrecognizable, the mere suggestion that it's generally Republicans unwilling to respect democratic outcomes isn't serious. Just look at the 21st century alone. Was it George W. Bush (the worst president in my lifetime, by far) who waited over a month to accept the election results in 2000, was Stacey Abrams a closet Republican all along, and what about Hillary Clinton's unwillingness to not just accept defeat on election night in 2016, but in the years that followed as Democratic pundits and politicians alike promoted a stolen-by-Russians narrative that insulted stupid so at odds was it with reality. When a lost laptop threatened Joe Biden's electoral chances in 2020, the Democrats went the Russian route again, not to mention their total trampling on the so-called 'will of the people' when the powers-that-be shuffled Biden aside in 2024 so that they could foist Kamala Harris on voters… And that's just a few of the many examples of the sad truth that too much democracy has Republicans and Democrats too invested in national elections that theoretically shouldn't matter a whole lot. The main thing is that the unwillingness of Republicans and Democrats to accept electoral outcomes speaks to the problem of democracy when democracy gets out of hand. Alas, Hamid's book isn't so much about democracy as practiced in the U.S. as it's about the willingness of Americans to accept democratic outcomes outside the U.S., the Middle East in particular. In his words, The Problem of Democracy is about 'the cost of democracy producing 'bad' outcomes, and whether it is a cost Americans should be willing to bear.' Thought of another way, American political types like democracy in other countries when the voters get it right, but only then. In Hamid's words, 'democracy might be nice,' but historically 'it simply wasn't worth the trouble when its results were so uncertain and its participants so unreliable.' All of which brings up the oddity of what George W. Bush tried to bring about after 9/11. The tragedy correctly or incorrectly confirmed in many ways the crazed nature of the people in Islamic countries not just in the eyes of U.S. voters, but also politicians on both sides of the aisle. Yet despite this consensus, the expressed reason for the subsequent warring was to bring 'democracy' to the Middle East. The Founders had to be spinning. Going to the other side of the world to waste precious blood and treasure on democracy? Forget about what we had to learn the hard way once again about the best laid battle plans and all that, and just stop and think about the democracy angle. Hamid did then, and is now. Though he's clear early on that 'the fear of a democracy undone by Islamists has been as persistent as it is speculative,' he describes as 'emphatic' his desire to not live under a democratically elected Islamist government. He indicates that the U.S. foreign policy establishment has similar fear then and now 'of a democracy undone by Islamists.' As in, 'we want democracy in theory but not necessarily want its outcomes in practice.' Which is seemingly Hamid's way of pointing out that Americans are situational about democracy. They want both so long as voters get things 'right.' He makes a fair point, but seemingly implies with it a racial, anti-Islamic religion angle to American skepticism about democracy that leaves out the much more practical, centuries old way of looking askance at democracy. What it somewhat errantly implies speaks to a way in which Hamid arguably erred in writing his book. Since he wrote it with evident openness to ideas from both sides, it's too bad he didn't open the discussion a little bit more to people like Crane, Pilon, and other small l libertarians from organizations like Cato. See the previous paragraph to get the meaning of the previous sentence. What Crane and Pilon could have articulated to Hamid is that fear of democracy is not fear of how people who don't look like us will vote, or how people allegedly radicalized by Islamism will vote, it's a fear of people in general. In the case of the Founders, their worry was about the passions of people from Europe who frequently shared their religion and who looked like them. Without presuming to speak for Pilon, that's at least apparently why they wrote the Constitution as they did. Aware of the dangers inherent in majoritarianism, they would write a document that didn't limit the rights of the people, but that instead would limit the rights of a national government elected by people. This way most of the taxing and governing would be local. Yes, keep the fights local, but even then, the individuals making and voting for policy locally would enjoy enormously broad freedoms because they were born – yes – free, but also because tyranny and mob rule don't gain nobility just because they're practiced locally. Quoting Pilon directly from a piece written at National Review in 2003: 'The Founders didn't throw off a king only to enable a majority to do what no king would ever dare. No, they instituted a plan whereby in 'wide areas,' individuals would be entitled to be free simply because they were born so entitled — while in 'some' areas, majorities would be entitled to rule not because they were inherently so entitled, but because they were constitutionally authorized to rule. That gets the order right: individual liberty first; and self‐government second, as a means toward securing that liberty.' Hamid doesn't ignore thinking like Pilon's in total in the book, but voices like Pilon's aren't as evident. To read Hamid is to feel that the debate in the book and that continues to run through his own head would have been improved by these thinkers. That's because at least as far as democratic outcomes go, the son of well-born Egyptian immigrants in Hamid seems to share the skepticism of his fellow Americans in the foreign policy establishment who unfortunately do see democracy as good for some, but bad for the wrong kind of people and religions. He's asking, 'Is democracy worth it when it increasingly produces what seem to be destructive outcomes that put lives and livelihoods at risk?' The view here is that Hamid is in some ways asking the wrong question by making it a question. To see why, consider a point he makes deeper into the book, that there's no such thing as a 'benevolent dictator.' No there isn't, because as Hamid himself explains it, 'domination is intrinsic to dictatorial rule.' From the individual who arrogates to himself dictatorial power it's easier to see the problems inherent in small d democratic power. The same domination is at work. As Hamid writes later in the book, he has 'no knowledge' of a democracy even on a small island where the people 'agree on all the big questions and most of the small ones.' Well, of course they don't. And the manifestation of the truth that we're all different while seeing things differently is that Americans once again stay up late on election night. The desire among winners, or the mob, to dictate, is intoxicating. And it's happening. Bringing it back to U.S. and its desire to project democracy globally, part of the problem as Hamid sees it is the hypocrisy at work. He notes that George W. Bush and his crowd loved democracy, the will of the people, and all that until they didn't. Subsequently, they backtracked on democracy in the Middle East after Islamist parties made significant inroads in Egypt, Lebanon and Bahrain. But to be fair, Hamid wasn't taking sides here. He quotes Barack Obama as saying, 'All I need in the Middle East is a few smart autocrats.' Hamid read this as Obama giving up on the Muslims to be peaceful. Whatever the answer, a lack of trust about the ability of Middle Eastern countries to govern themselves isn't a Democrat or Republican thing. Hamid goes on to write that 'My argument in this book is that the entire American paradigm, and not simply part of it, has been faulty in its starting premises, and so the resulting policies are built on a broken edifice.' True, but has Hamid happened upon why the premises are wrong? The view here is that he hasn't. The problem with the so-called 'American paradigm' isn't hypocrisy, it's the paradigm itself. Put more bluntly, government intervention that never works stateside hardly becomes brilliant overseas. Which means the problem is in the conceit that the United States can improve the world. It can't. See the myriad of government initiatives here over the decades. To name but one, how did 'The War on Poverty' work out? Medicare began as a $3 billion program, it's on the verge of $1 trillion in annual expenditures, so this must mean all Americans have abundant healthcare? The problem is that Hamid has an interventionist side. He writes that 'doing nothing' is 'not a neutral posture,' or it's not a non-policy since when 'we do less,' they 'do more.' It's true, but that's the point. We need the people in cities, states and countries to do more for themselves, wholly free from those who want to bring 'democracy' or 'smart autocrats' to their countries. Intervention is invariably fatal, and a conceit. Hamid quotes General James Mattis as wondering, 'Is political Islam in the best interest of the United States?' Mattis goes on to 'suggest that the answer is no,' but as with Hamid asking if democracy is worth it, Mattis is asking the wrong question when he muses about whether 'political Islam' is in the U.S.'s best interests. There's no way of knowing. If there were, newspapers could be written months and years in advance, and markets would be fully priced. Rather than engaging in the obnoxious, nation-enervating conceit that we can fix other nations, the better approach would be to simply allow countries to succeed and fail. Yes, the above is a recession metaphor. Why did the Great Depression last so long? It did because the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations routinely intervened in the healthy corrections that markets were trying to bring about. The problem was that in fighting markets in the way that foreign policy types fight democracy, strongmen, and in between, the U.S. foreign policy establishment robs countries of the essential cleansing and recovery that can only be preceded by allotment of failure. Hamid asserts that while 'emphatic' about not wanting to be ruled by a democratically elected Islamist government, he's also of the mind that 'Islam itself is not the problem.' There's no disagreeing with him there. Sorry, but the people are the marketplace, including their arrival at or embrace of religion. What holds countries back is the endless intervention that fails everywhere it's tried. Yes, countries need less policy including less foreign policy. Interesting here is Hamid reporting that in Iraq, Lebanon, and Tunisia, 'significant parts of the population long for strongmen as an antidote to ineffectiveness, gridlock, and endemic corruption.' Hamid's retort is that bad as democratic governments can be, authoritarian regimes 'are only good at responding to crises when they're good,' but when they're not, 'which is most of the time – there is no obvious way to correct course.' That's true, but it's also true about democracies. That's why freedom works so well. There's no good or bad authoritarian, just as there's no good or bad powerful democracy, there's just government error in each interspersed with the policy edition of the truth about stopped clocks being correct twice a day. Hamid points to Singapore's authoritarian in Lee Kuan Yew as evidence of a 'benevolent autocrat,' but the more likely truth was that Yew could be an authoritarian precisely because he didn't need to be. As John Stuart Mill made plain, the most corrupt societies have the most rules. Which brings to a brief detour into our own authoritarianism stateside, as in what happened in the spring of 2020. This was where it seemed Hamid really stumbled. A fifth of the way through the book he wrote that 'The largest Western democracies, as well as some of the smallest like Belgium, were among the world's leaders in per-capita deaths from COVID-19.' A comment like that, one pregnant with insinuation, naturally caught my eye as an author of a book about the tragic global response to the coronavirus, When Politicians Panicked. I'll lead with what should be obvious: the more lethal the presumed virus, the less necessary the governmental response, if any. Really, who among us needs to be forced to avoid sickness or death? It rates asking given Hamid's evident insinuation that too much freedom resulted in excess deaths; that authoritarian regimes are able to force compassionate outcomes are their people in the way that nominally free countries cannot. Nonsense. It had me wanting to ask Hamid if he was close to anyone who died directly from the virus. I kept asking it while writing When Politicians Panicked, a book that footnoted the New York Times more often than any other source. You see, underlying all the alarmism on the front page of the Times was honesty about who was really getting sick from, and on the rarest of rare occasions dying with as opposed to from the virus. Eventually the Times just acknowledged on the front page what could always be found deeper in the newspaper: that the virus's lethality was almost totally confined to a tiny percentage of very old Americans; nursing homes the routine locale of deaths once again with the virus. Ultimately the Times brought the truth to its front page in December of 2021, 'COVID HAS KILLED ONE OF EVERY 100 OLDER AMERICANS.' About the headline, it's not meant to minimize death, but it is to ask who Hamid was reading during the lockdowns and beyond? More important, how did he conclude from what transpired that it was the dying that caused 'a growing number of Americans and Europeans to doubt not only their politicians but their own political systems.' More realistically, the doubt that continues to this day is an effect of how badly politicians panicked in ways that were not just bad for well-to-do Americans and Europeans, but monstrously so for the world's poorest. It raises another question: in addition to wondering how many people Hamid knew who died from the virus, how many politicians can he list who still brag about imposing lockdowns in 2020? As for 'democracies' being where most of the deaths occurred, let's be serious. This wasn't an effect of too much freedom, rather it was an effect of a virus so meek that it infected everyone (the mass infection a certain sign of its meek qualities), and since everyone dies eventually, lots of people were going to die with the virus. With each discussion and example in Hamid's book, it was hard not to return as the reader to a belief that Hamid himself seemed reluctant to embrace or accept: democracy is authoritarianism. Say it repeatedly. That's why it was so puzzling when he wrote that 'democracy allows for the peaceful transfer of power.' That's true in theory, but not nearly as true in practice precisely because majoritarianism logically can't be about the peaceful transfer of power when so many important decisions are being made by majorities. Quoting Henry Kissinger about the U.S. removing Allende from power in Chile, 'I don't see why we have to stand by and watch a country go communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people.' Kissinger was mistaking the problem. It was too much democracy, with Allende the symptom of it. That's once again why the Founders wrote the Constitution as they did. It was all about restraining majorities, though as evidenced by every four-year refrain that 'this is the most important election in our lifetime,' the Founders surely failed in making their founding document airtight. In other words, liberty yielded to governments of men and women elected by men and women, and here we are. Great for sure, but Oh My what could be! Hamid seeks some form of 'democratic minimalism' where voters 'have a say in the laws and decisions that shape your own life.' He might agree in a light moment that the 'minimalism' part is a platitude. What's not is his expressed preference for 'majorities or pluralities' over 'liberalism, which prioritizes individual freedom.' Ok, but for the problem that there's no getting a little pregnant with democracy. What's limited must be kept limited lest we get to where we are in the U.S. today. No doubt we're still spectacular as just alluded to, no doubt we're in many ways the envy of the world, but the 'unseen' with the United States is staggering. Again, what could we be if we'd not allowed democracy to get out of hand? Notable about the U.S. trying to bring democracy to the Middle East is what the Israelis thought. Hamid quotes long-time Republican foreign policy eminence Eliot Abrams as saying that 'it was mockery behind our backs' when Bush and his team explained their plans for the Middle East through the prism of democracy. Along these lines, another source for Hamid's book indicates that after the 2013 military coup in Egypt, 'AIPAC was the best lobbyist for the Egyptian government you could ever imagine.' They all like strongmen. More on that later. For now, it's arguably useful to address the elephant in the room: would Hamid have written The Problem of Democracy with an accent on the Middle East if the region were bereft of oil? Hopefully the question answers itself. What's frustrating, however, about contemplating the question is how economically clueless the whole foreign policy establishment is. The simple, economic truth is that the United States could be 100% bereft of oil, at war with or embargoed by every oil-producing nation on earth, yet it would still consume abundant Middle Eastern oil as though it had bubbled up in West Texas. That's because there's no getting around the economic fact of life that there's no accounting for the final destination of any good. Short of Middle Eastern countries literally sitting on their oil, something they're not going to do, they'll be trading with us. Always and everywhere. This requires mention as a plea for the U.S. to once again get out of the Middle East so that its countries can succeed or fail on their own, the failure in any country the source of rebirth so long as allegedly 'benevolent' governments don't intervene in the failure. It's a long way of saying that speculation stateside on the right form of government for other countries, and even more foolhardy, the right form of government for other countries vis-à-vis the U.S., is bad for us AND the countries whose futures we're intervening in. Since people are different, so are governments different. Let people choose. Realistically the only foreign policy stance the U.S. should have is not just openness to foreign production, but also openness to the people in countries who want to get out. Immigration isn't a popular word now, but it's the purest market signal of all exactly because it signals the movement of the world's foremost capital (human) to its highest use. What a deal to offer the world: we won't meddle in your affairs, but we'll provide asylum for people eager to escape what is dangerous, dysfunctional, or both. The cost savings would be enormous. Alas, it's not happening. Hamid is clear that something else of importance is similarly not happening, the end of religion in the Middle East. As he puts it, 'religion isn't going anywhere in the Middle East.' Which means there's nothing much the United States can do other than at long last removing its burdensome self from a situation that it can't fix, but that in trying to fix, is yet again delaying the necessary failures and economic corrections that will position countries in the region to start over based on getting real in the first place. What's interesting is that some in the Middle East, and probably many more than Americans are aware of, grasp the above assertion about what not only the Middle East needs, but every country reliant on American money, military protection, advice, or all three needs. Hamid quotes a Muslim Brotherhood type asking Hamid 'why would the West help Egypt become a powerful country, so that Egypt becomes independent and not needing the U.S.?' The right question, and one that bears asking repeatedly. Public choice theory at work. We all want to perpetuate our employment and foreign policy figures are no different. Since billions annually flow from the U.S. to the Middle East, jobs aplenty spring from this. That won't be the case if Egypt and others are allowed to experience the failure without which there won't be success. Of interest to readers who would expect lots of negativity about Donald Trump coming from a Brookings Institution, Washington Post columnist, they might be surprised. Without assuming Hamid a fan of Trump, he's not critical while frequently laudatory. Eager for a rethinking of U.S. foreign policy, Hamid indicates that 'the Trump administration helped make this rethinking of U.S. policy possible.' He adds that 'For the first time, at least in my adult life, there is real room for ideas that would have previously been dismissed as 'radical,' or wishful thinking, or both.' Mostly it seemed that he found appealing Trump's honesty. Holman Jenkins at the Wall Street Journal has said the same before. In some ways Trump is the most honest president we've had in a long time. In Hamid's words, 'Under Trump, the U.S. was less hypocritical than it was under previous administrations.' He writes that latter without while saying the lack of hypocrisy 'does not necessarily produce better outcomes,' but that overall 'there was something refreshing, for instance, about Trump's complete disinterest in American support for human rights and democracy abroad.' Hamid is not as laudatory of Obama, though it's easy to conclude that his disappointment was rooted in high expectations for #44, and bottomless expectations for #45? Whatever the answer, he writes that 'the Obama years proved devastating - in a way they weren't with Trump or George W. Bush – for anyone holding out hope for a different approach to the Middle East.' Which in some ways made Trump and Obama the foreign policy heroes of the book. Whether it's indifference or impressive rationality hidden behind the bluster, Trump's instinct has largely been to avoid trying to fix the world. In Obama's case, his foreign policy was 'don't do stupid shit.' Precisely. Intervention in foreign countries, along with muscular military responses meant to not give the impression of weakness, are invariably stupid. Hamid is disappointed that Obama didn't embrace his lofty campaign rhetoric of the kind which said 'If history is to bend, someone must bend it.' Good for Obama. The best foreign policy of all, other than fully open trade no matter what other countries do, is not doing anything. Because when governments do, it's invariably stupid shit. Neither is Hamid's book stupid. It's quite good and interesting, and it will make people of all stripes think.
Egypt Independent
29-06-2025
- Politics
- Egypt Independent
Former Foreign Minister Mohamed al-Oraby in exclusive interview discusses Iran/Israel war and path to peace
Amid a world in upheaval — politically, economically, and regionally — the Middle East stands at a crossroads. More than a year has passed since the genocidal war in Gaza erupted, with no conceivable end in sight. The conflict has spread: to southern Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and even Iran. In our 'Future of the Middle East' series, we convene dialogues with leading current and former politicians, thinkers, and diplomats from across the region and beyond. Their insights, shaped by past experiences and the urgency of today, help us envision tomorrow. From the origins of the Arab–Israeli conflict, through regional interventions, the rise of non‑state actors, and the deepening complexity of the Arab world, we seek informed discussion. We're drawing historical lessons to chart a visionary, stabilizing path that empowers Arab nations to rekindle regional ties, achieve economic integration, and serve their interests. Our discussion framework consists of two parts: First, seven key questions formulated in response to reader demand, centered around the region's outlook. Second, customized questions tailored to each guest's background, offering deeper perspective on how the region might pursue an independent trajectory, free from external agendas. In this exclusive interview, we sat down with Egypt's Former Foreign Minister Mohamed al-Oraby. He discussed how the recent war between Israel and Iran is a dangerous escalation, with the only way out being the formation of a strong unified Arab front, utilizing an economic integration project that can later foster political consensus. Interview: ■ The term 'Middle East' is a colonial geographic designation — it hasn't worked for people here, beyond being a convenient label for policymakers. What's the region's reality, and how has history shaped it? – I won't dwell on the name, as it emerged during colonial times, yet it continues to be used in political discourse. Alternative terms like 'Near East' are used within European ministries, including Turkey, Iran, even Afghanistan. Terms aside, the real issue is the centuries-long instability. The region's geography and resources inevitably draw external interference, not only from global powers but also from local states driven by political ambitions. Israel's establishment in 1948 further intensified these tensions. Colonial powers left us artificial borders and tensions — look at Gulf states or between Egypt, Sudan, and Libya — deliberately sowing discord to justify future intervention or their covert influence. ■ The phrase 'Great Middle East' dates back to Alfred Thayer Mahan (1902), later echoed by Condoleezza Rice amid the Israeli–Iran war. How do you view this vision under Trump? – A populist like Trump has influenced the world, not just our region. He floated ideas like annexing Canada, seizing the Suez Canal, or creating a 'Riviera' in Gaza. He speaks as a global leader, not merely a US president—pushing the 'law of force' over the 'force of law.' The 'Greater Middle East' plan was devised long ago as a power play, possibly involving Islamist proxies — but it falters here. Iran's resiliency proves external blueprints often fail. Netanyahu's 'New Middle East' is merely image-making for Israel; it collapsed at the UN and has no basis in reality – Israel's actions in Iran will backfire. ■ What roles can regional powers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia play amid these strategic blueprints? – Each has its sphere. Strategic integration between Egypt and Saudi Arabia is essential — they are the wings of the Arab world. Their daily coordination on issues like displacement and re-calibrating ties with Iran is vital. While they may not always move in lockstep, they share an outlook, as shown by a recent joint statement opposing regional military escalation against Iran. ■ Why is there no unified Arab project in response to these regional schemes, especially with overt Israeli threats? Where is the Arab alternative? – Sadly, there is no true pan-Arab project. Regional powers like Iran, Turkey, and Israel have clear agendas, while we lack institutional unity. Yes, we share a language and culture, but there is no effective Arab Parliament or political mechanism. The Arab League has lost influence because it depends on the sovereignty of its member states. Yet history shows unity is possible — the unified Arab stance in 1973 and the GCC's success prove this. An economic integration project is essential. Each country has comparative advantage — AI, agriculture, energy, education — and Egypt already hosts thousands of Arab students. Economic integration should be the first step, followed naturally by political unity. ■ How should the Arab world navigate between global power rivals and assert itself without being dominated by a single power that has repeatedly undermined and drained the region? — I agree that ending dependence on Washington is necessary. It's premature to declare a fully multi polar world: perhaps we're entering its early stages, which may last two to 30 years. Russia is currently depleted by its war in Ukraine, while China is ascendant. But we shouldn't underestimate America and the West's resilience. ■ Egypt has historically played central roles in the region — can it continue amid mounting strategic pressures and constant targeting? — For the first time in its history, Egypt is simultaneously squeezed from four strategic directions, none of which it can ignore. Managing this balance is far more complex than what most countries face. Egypt navigates this through a strong military and a diverse, if not powerful, economy — but it's one capable of swift adaptation. ■ If you were to sketch out future scenarios given current challenges and conflicts, what would they look like? — First, the Palestinian people must be empowered politically. Second, Israel must be brought back to its natural size — a state that can coexist without regional dominance. Third, nuclear disarmament is complex now, and regional stability relies on a Palestinian resolution. We must revive the Arab economic summit (2009/2011/2013), which proved more effective than political summits. ■ Let's move to the current scene—the Iran-Israel war. What is the significance of Iran's response by striking US bases following the American attacks on the three Iranian nuclear reactors? Has the Trump administration adopted Nixon's 'Madman Theory,' or was it Tehran that dictated the 'rules of engagement'? – The 'Madman Theory' is a very accurate term when it comes to Tehran and Washington, but the situation differs when discuss Tehran and Tel Aviv. What we saw at the end of this round of conflict indicates that both the US and Iran chose to engage in the Madman Theory. Both sides adopted it, which is reminiscent of the 'rules of engagement' that Hezbollah formulated back in the 1980s. The Iranian and American sides carried out reciprocal strikes, seeking to save face. There are even indications of prior coordination. Trump himself stated that the Iranians informed him of their intention to respond—as if asking for his understanding. This theory still stands, so long as both parties agree on a tit-for-tat formula of equally powerful strikes that bring the conflict back to square one. It's possible both sides reached a point of mutual exhaustion and thus decided that neither a complete defeat nor a complete victory would be in anyone's interest in this 12-day war. This strategy was essentially endorsed by the US, as escalation is not in its favor. As for Israel, Iran is not capable of carrying out precision strikes there, and Israel is likewise unable to paralyze Iran or bring down its regime, despite what it has claimed. There is, however, a clear security breach inside Iran—assassinations of senior figures based on precise intelligence, sometimes said to be through phone tracking or via AI technology. Even though the physical destruction was relatively limited, the psychological impact on the Israeli public is massive—100 percent confirmed. I've lived there and understand the Israeli psyche closely. This scale of destruction will be a heavy burden on Netanyahu when it comes time for accountability. ■ Do you believe that Iran emerging from this round without regime collapse—despite the threats from Netanyahu and Trump—constitutes a victory? Are we witnessing a shift in the region's deterrence rules? – Indeed, Iran surviving this round without a regime collapse is a victory: the streets of Iran are euphoric. Iran has helped redefine the region's deterrence parameters—some of which it imposed. I believe Netanyahu will walk back his talk about 'changing the Middle East,' because the region now has new deterrence equations, and Iran has contributed to that with a degree of political realism. Israel's behavior in the region will undoubtedly change in the next phase. ■ There is Israeli propaganda claiming victory, while Tehran is celebrating in its own streets. From a political perspective, how do you interpret this? Can anyone be considered a true winner in this conflict? – There's no need to dwell too much on propaganda. No one can truthfully claim full victory in this war. Precise calculations will emerge later. Just as Iran suffered leadership losses, Israel also sustained significant damage. The political consequences of this conflict will negatively impact Netanyahu's government in due course. ■ So, we are in a state of open-ended conflict. Will this war bring future surprises? – Iran will not surrender. In modern warfare, there's no such thing as total victory or total defeat. This isn't like World War II, where surrender documents were signed. The situation will remain fluid, and not all confrontations will come through direct military operations. This war will certainly bring many surprises. It is essential to study how the US administration manages such crises, coordinates its steps with public opinion, and uses media as a tool in psychological warfare. ■ What lessons can be drawn from this war—first for the Arabs, and second for Iran in managing its relations with the Arab region? – I expect Iran will become more proactive in improving its relations with the Arab world. We will likely see a push in that direction once this round of fighting concludes. ■ Returning to the Arab side—why do some countries continue to host American bases despite public perception that they pose a threat rather than offering protection? – The main takeaway from this war is that Arabs need to unify around a shared strategic vision. They must rely on a collective internal strength to build a coherent strategy for dealing with both the region and the world. The hardships endured in the Gaza war and now the Iran-Israel conflict should serve as a catalyst for reevaluating our strategy and fostering greater Arab solidarity. As for public perception—yes, many believe US bases are a source of aggression rather than protection, and that sentiment is valid and understandable. But in reality, the US will not withdraw its bases; it may reduce troop numbers, as it did in Syria, but a full withdrawal is unlikely. I also don't see the Gulf states abandoning these bases—it's not that simple. Israel feels emboldened, and Iran feels it has stood its ground and dealt with both Israel and the US as an equal and with force. This new power equilibrium will reinforce the US's desire to remain in the Gulf, particularly since the attacks were coordinated and the US didn't suffer losses. ■ How do you interpret Qatar's response? Will this incident damage Qatari-Iranian relations, or was it coordinated and likely to be resolved? – The Qatari-Iranian relationship is strong. I believe prior coordination took place. Yes, Iran violated Qatari sovereignty, but it did so out of necessity—not as a full-scale breach, but as a face-saving maneuver. I believe Qatar's balanced stance was essential, because escalation is in no one's interest. We are indeed standing at the edge of the abyss—but the point is not to remain cornered, merely absorbing blows. We must allow Iran room to save face. ■ Was the US intent on recreating the Iraq scenario in Tehran in a different form, had it not been for Iran's deterrence balance? – Yes, but it was unable to do so because the tools of conflict have changed, and so have the regional dynamics. Our region has its own unique character that often surprises adversaries, consistently defies expectations, and yields unforeseen developments. ■ Some believe that Israeli threats will eventually extend to Egypt, while others are more reserved about that. What's your comment? – I don't believe Egypt's security is directly threatened—at least not in the foreseeable future. The state has handled the situation with wisdom and precision, managing to maintain its stability without draining its resources. Egypt today faces a volatile border reality, and yet it has successfully contained threats with professionalism. ■ But Israel and other regional actors are attempting to redraw spheres of influence in the Middle East through this war. What's your view? – Certainly. Every major conflict is followed by a reshuffling of influence. Things will not return to how they were. There will be changes on the ground, but for now—and in light of the evolving landscape—we cannot accurately predict the scope or nature of that change. ■ So, do you believe what we are witnessing in the region is part of the broader resistance to the emerging multi-polar world order? – I completely agree with you on this point. Our region is paying the price for the world's shift toward multi-polarity. It has become a theater for competition among the three major powers: the US, Russia, and China. Each is trying to exploit the vacuums created by the current war to serve its own interests—whether that means weakening Israel, weakening Iran, or the opposite. ■ Then how can we, as regional actors, fill these vacuums before other powers do? – Filling these vacuums that are currently being exploited by competing powers requires achieving two fundamental objectives: First, the establishment of a Palestinian state. Second, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the region, including, of course, those possessed by Israel. If these two conditions are met, they would open the door for Arabs to play an active role in filling those strategic voids. Unfortunately, current regional and international conditions make achieving those goals difficult for now. Nevertheless, we must revive the old Egyptian-Iranian initiative that called for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. This requires supportive conditions and genuine political will. ■ Do we need to revive the spirit of the Bandung Conferences and form a new Non-Aligned Movement to counter American and Western bias? – That's true. But if I said that outright, some might mock the idea as a relic of the 1950s. Still, despite changing global circumstances, we continue to need a revival of the concept of the 'Global South.' These countries need joint planning and mutual development. One could say that the BRICS bloc is partially moving in that direction, despite its flaws. What we need is a form of political, economic, and scientific integration among the nations of the South. This will pave the way for the future. Currently, our region is stuck in the present—floundering in it—and regresses each time it takes a step forward. We must start thinking forward. Just look at ASEAN: despite its nations' differing political systems, it has achieved remarkable economic breakthroughs. There's also the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, headquartered in Cairo, established after the 1957 Bandung Conference, which includes around 66 member states. We should activate this body and invest in it as a tool of soft power. ■ Does the West still consider itself the center of the world, treating other regions as subsidiaries and suppliers? And why all this Western arrogance toward the Iranian nuclear file, while ignoring Israel's nuclear arsenal? – The West certainly still sees itself as the center. That's clear. But today, we are also witnessing a form of Arab leadership in various fields—particularly energy and technology. There's noticeable progress in AI technology across countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Let's not forget that our region controls key global trade routes—through the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, and the Suez Canal. Geography remains a source of strength—and also a lure for major powers. What we lack is the strategic use of our strengths. We must also remember that, in 2015, we reached a nuclear agreement which Iran supported and the international community accepted. The first Trump administration withdrew from it, but it could have been reinstated or modified—had there been political will. ■ So you believe that dominance over our region cannot be achieved through force, as Trump and Netanyahu seem to believe—and that normalization with Israel isn't sustainable, since the people reject it? – Absolutely. The real solution lies in Israel returning to its natural size and halting its ambitions beyond its borders. These expansionist aspirations are precisely what bring Israel its crises and prevent its full acceptance in the region or the success of normalization efforts. It would be far better for Israel to scale back, return to its 1967 borders, and live within them. ■ But the United States continues to support Israel's expansionist ambitions, even if they are delusional. – Yes, the US has a distinct vision for Israel. It sees Israel as its forward base in the region and is committed to protecting it by all means. President Sadat said it himself when he remarked that he couldn't fight the US—a reference to its unwavering support for Israel. So, we must understand that Washington will not allow a shift in the balance of power that weakens Israel. However, it may still promote de-escalation by advocating for peace. But domination and control will never lead to peace or stability—nor to the prosperity that's often promised. ■ It pains me to say that Gaza has been overshadowed by the Iran-Israel war. Could this conflict be used to push forward Netanyahu's plan to forcibly displace Palestinians? – There are always those trying to exert pressure on our region from its peripheries. As for the idea of displacing Palestinians to Sinai—we must put an absolute end to even discussing it. Such a proposal is unacceptable. As Arabs and as Egyptians, we should not even entertain the thought. Merely speaking about it provides fuel to those promoting the idea, making it seem viable. There is no such thing as 'relocating Palestinians to Sinai.' ■ Our region is locked in sustained conflict, and peace remains elusive. Are we at a crossroads—either to survive the bottleneck or plunge into deeper conflict? – A very important question. Unfortunately, one of the defining traits of this region is the prolongation of crises. We cannot say that there are any imminent political solutions to the region's major conflicts—whether in Sudan, Yemen, or Syria. It seems our destiny is to remain embroiled in crises and energy-draining confrontations that undermine unity and our capacity for joint action. ■ Why don't we resort to a joint Arab defense mechanism and establish an 'Arab NATO'? – The term 'NATO' carries a controversial—if not negative—connotation in the Arab world. But we already have the Arab Joint Defense Agreement, and we've previously come close to establishing a unified Arab force. Egypt initiated this years ago, and we were on the verge of signing—but the project was shelved at the last minute. There are ready-made documents and executable proposals. What's missing is the political will. ■ Do we Arabs lack faith in our own power—trapped in the role of the acted-upon instead of becoming active agents? – It's not necessary for us to be 'active' in the imperial or expansionist sense. We're not advocates of interference in others' affairs. But we must be proactive within our Arab framework—and that's the priority right now. We are closer to collaboration with neighboring countries, especially in Africa, through various development programs. We have Arab funding institutions like the Kuwaiti Fund, the Saudi Fund, and the Egyptian Fund affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—not to mention institutions under the Arab League. All we need is to activate these mechanisms and maintain regular coordination to produce a unified vision. I believe we used to perform better under pressure—as we did in 1956, 1973, and even after the 1967 defeat. This continuous violence in the region is inevitable—unless a major political or military blunder is committed. I don't believe we've reached that point yet, which makes this a different situation. Do you remember Iraq? American generals used to claim, 'The Iraqi people will greet us with flowers at the tips of our guns.' But Iran is entirely different from Iraq. ■ Israel has publicly declared that it aims to topple the Khamenei regime. Will that remain its objective—or is Iran not Syria or Iraq? – That's no longer realistic—not now, and not in the near future. I believe Iran will remain intact. The people themselves have already sent clear messages in this regard. So yes, toppling Iran is merely a fantasy in Netanyahu's imagination. Of course, there is a degree of internal opposition—evident in the security breaches—but we should not indulge in science-fiction scenarios where the entire population rises up against Khamenei at Netanyahu's prompting. The current phase does not include the possibility of a regime-altering event. ■ Do you believe there is a kind of Western arrogance at play here? – Absolutely. The whole world has fallen victim to this Western arrogance, especially after the Trump administration annulled the agreement reached under Obama. ■ In the first move of its kind since the outbreak of the war between Israel and Iran, Israel launched thermal balloons—allegedly equipped with surveillance devices—over Syria's Daraa province. How do you interpret this use of Syrian airspace to monitor Iran? – This is a clear step toward tightening control and monitoring Iran's regional proxies: Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. The objectives are twofold: to contain these arms and then pivot toward direct pressure on Iran. ■ Some argue that Iran seeks only to expand its influence to protect its national security, while others see it as a regional threat. Where do you think the truth lies? – The 1979 Iranian Revolution and its accompanying sectarian overtones have long been divisive. I don't believe Iran possesses a chemical or nuclear weapons program. There is an international bias against it. Its influence operates primarily through proxies—non-state actors. ■ And what about the ever-expanding Zionist project? – The settler-colonial Zionist project is the real danger. It holds both military power and a strategic intent to expand. Naturally, the deeper and more immediate threat comes from Tel Aviv. ■ During Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's second visit to Egypt, he met with the three most senior Egyptian foreign ministers. Was that a veiled message? And how do you interpret the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar tweeting in Persian to condemn the Israeli assault on Tehran? – Al-Azhar has long studied and recognized Shiism. Politics, however, is not built on sectarian dogmas, and Egypt does not recognize or act upon such sectarian divides. The Egyptian identity is diverse and open. As for the trilateral meeting I attended alongside Amr Moussa and Nabil Fahmy, it certainly conveyed a friendly message: that Egypt welcomes rapprochement. ■ There were claims circulating on social media that Cairo and Tehran exchanged significant intelligence during that meeting. Is that accurate? – That is inaccurate. It likely stems from popular interpretations and from the public's schadenfreude toward Israel: which is understandable given the ongoing genocide. But no, we did not exchange intelligence in a public restaurant. The meeting was a gesture of goodwill and diplomatic warmth. ■ Regarding Iran and Turkey's regional roles, how do they differ? And what are the risks of this slipping into a full-scale war? – Iran and Turkey have pursued very different strategies: Iran has engaged in direct conflict via its regional arms, while Turkey has adopted a 'soft infiltration' approach—through culture, tourism, and media. But both imperial ambitions stalled once they realized that returning to such grand visions wasn't viable. The more significant danger now stems from Tel Aviv. Everything else can be corrected and contained. ■ Do you believe there is an opportunity for this region to reach a minimum consensus to safeguard its security—especially given the missile threats against military bases? – Yes, I believe the opportunity is there. But we must correct imbalances and acknowledge mistakes, because even a single miscalculation could trigger catastrophic escalation. ■ Around the world—from East to West to the Global South—people are increasingly critical of Israel's self-portrayal as a perpetual victim. Why doesn't the US seem concerned about this popular momentum or the shift in global public opinion against both itself and Israel? – I think this is well understood in the West, but perhaps not as sharply as we imagine. There are, of course, furious protests in the West against both Israel and Hamas. Yet ultimately, what determines policy is money and political pressure. Weapons manufacturers wield significant influence. Massive defense budgets are largely the result of this lobby's pressure—not to mention the role of AIPAC. We are now seeing many countries—Germany, Australia, Japan—reassessing their defense budgets and facing ammunition shortages. The whole world is moving toward militarization, because America has enshrined the idea of the 'law of force' over the 'force of law.' That is a dangerous development. Now the world faces a serious ethical question: will it be governed by the rule of law, or by the law of force? Of course, the rule of law is better—but unilateral American legal frameworks have dominated for far too long. ■ How do you interpret Egypt's messages to the Iranian president? Isn't that effectively a stance against US and Israeli policies? – Egypt is not neutral. It rejected the use of force and stood firmly against such policies, while offering political support to Iran—without compromising its principles. This stance was a direct response to aggression and the use of military force. Egypt's role is not based on aligning with any side but on promoting peace, stability, and development. It seeks to rally international support for causes grounded in legitimacy and law. ■ Recently, there were widespread allegations that Egypt was part of a campaign against Israel, and even preparing to attack. How do you interpret these claims? – These are simply unfounded accusations aimed at sowing confusion and casting doubt on Egypt's position. The reality is that Egypt cannot be dragged into war against its will. ■ The Arab public has lost faith in peace with Israel. What is your take? – The prevailing sentiment across the region reflects fatigue from endless wars and violence. The solution lies in a regional security framework that guarantees the existence of a Palestinian state—and a safe, secure future for all.
Zawya
25-03-2025
- Business
- Zawya
Global hospitality brands form 60% of Qatar's hotel rooms in 2024: Knight Frank
"As of the end of 2024, Qatar's total supply of quality hotel rooms stood at approximately 40,755 keys, with internationally branded properties accounting for 60% of this inventory," Knight Frank said in its latest report. Leading international hotel brands accounted for 60% of Qatar's total 40,755 hotel rooms during 2024, according to Knight Frank, a global property consultancy. "As of the end of 2024, Qatar's total supply of quality hotel rooms stood at approximately 40,755 keys, with internationally branded properties accounting for 60% of this inventory," Knight Frank said in its latest report. The global brands' growing exposure highlights the international appeal of the country, which according to the UN Tourism, has 'emerged as the dominant force' in the Middle East tourism market. The recently held 51st UN Tourism Regional Commission for the Middle East underscores Qatar's growing status as a regional and global hub in the tourism sector and its leadership role in promoting both regional and international co-operation. The total number of visitors to Qatar reached 5.08mn during 2024, reflecting a 25% increase on an annualised basis. The successful hosting of the FIFA World Cup has positioned Qatar as a key regional and global tourist destination. Highlighting that December alone witnessed as many as 594,079 visitors, marking a 14.6% year-on-year rise; Amar Hussain, Associate Partner (Research, Middle East) said, this surge underscores Qatar's growing appeal as a tourism destination, driven by enhanced infrastructure, global events, and continued investments in hospitality and leisure sectors. As a result of the increased influx of tourists, the hotel performance indicators in Qatar improved steadily in 2024, he added. The average daily rates (ADR) increased by 7.9% to QR441, while average occupancy levels rose by 19.1% to 68.8%. As a result, revenue per available room (RevPAR) shot up 28.5% to QR304. On retail sector, Knight Frank report said luxury and experience-driven retail continue to dominate, with high-end malls maintaining high occupancy levels despite some downward rent adjustments. Secondary malls are facing challenges, as newer lifestyle destinations like Lusail Boulevard and The Pearl attract more tenants. E-commerce growth is also reshaping retail strategies, with Qatar's online sales surpassing QR4.1bn in December 2024, marking an annual 32.2% increase, highlighting the emerging challenge for bricks and mortar stores. Qatar's retail market, otherwise, experienced a 1.5% decline in average annual lease rates, bringing the average rate to QR204 per sq m per month. "This reflects ongoing adjustments in rental pricing mainly due to increased supply," thecreport said. Lifestyle retail developments in prime locations command the highest rents at QR243 per sq m per month, driven by strong demand for premium brands and high consumer footfall. While, lifestyle retail food and beverage follows closely at QR242 per sq m per month, highlighting the steady demand for experiential dining and entertainment-driven retail, the report said. © Gulf Times Newspaper 2022 Provided by SyndiGate Media Inc. ( Santhosh V. Perumal
Al-Ahram Weekly
05-02-2025
- Business
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Egypt CBE hosts FSB Regional Consultative Group meeting for MENA - Economy
The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) co-chaired the Financial Stability Board's (FSB) Regional Consultative Group for the Middle East and North Africa (RCG MENA) meeting, held in Sharm El-Sheikh on 29-30 January, the bank said in a release on Wednesday. The FSB is an international organization that strengthens and monitors the global financial system. In collaboration with financial authorities and international entities, it issues recommendations to promote economic stability worldwide. The RCG for MENA includes 23 members from countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey, Tunisia, Qatar, Oman, Morocco, Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, and Algeria. Hassan Abdalla, governor of the CBE, and Ayman Alsayari, governor of the Saudi Central Bank (SAMA), led the event. Attendees included high-level officials, such as Khaled Mohamed Balama, governor of the Central Bank of the UAE; Bandar bin Mohammed bin Saoud Al-Thani, governor of the Qatar Central Bank; Khalid Ebrahim Humaidan, governor of the Central Bank of Bahrain; and Wassim Manssouri, acting governor of Banque Du Liban, along with senior representatives from member states. Governor Abdalla noted that Egypt's hosting of the FSB meeting aligns with presidential directives aimed at enhancing the country's role in international economic forums and promoting integration with Arab and African nations. He highlighted the RCG's critical role in addressing key issues for achieving financial and monetary stability and enhancing economic collaboration among member states. The meeting covered significant economic topics, including the FSB's recommendations for implementing a global crypto-assets framework, progress on cross-border payment systems among member states, and the board's initiatives and framework for 2025. Members discussed the FSB's 2024 progress report on the G20 roadmap for cross-border payments and the challenges to further improving transaction speed and cost. According to a statement by the FSB, these challenges include frictions that arise from the laws, rules, and regulatory requirements for collecting, storing, and managing data that must accompany a cross-border payment. Meanwhile, members shared experiences of crypto usage in their jurisdictions and progress in the regulatory frameworks for crypto-assets and stablecoins, including challenges in implementing the FSB's recommendations. Members also exchanged views on global and regional market developments, including perspectives on the outlook for financial stability and geopolitical risks. They noted that high levels of sovereign debt could become a source of vulnerabilities. Short link:
