Latest from AllAfrica
AllAfrica
4 hours ago
- Politics
- AllAfrica
China's clumsy sea aggression marks escalation with Philippines
Skip to content Photos show the damage sustained by China Coast Guard vessel 3104 after it was rammed by a Chinese PLA Navy warship during an incident Monday morning, August 11, 2025, near Scarborough Shoal. The collision occurred while the two Chinese ships were harassing the BRP Suluan of the Philippine Coast Guard. Image: YouTube Screengrabs MANILA – China's pincer strategy in the South China Sea appears to have shifted toward more aggressive naval enforcement of its claim to Philippine territory, Philippine armed forces chief General Romeo Brawner said Tuesday (August 12). That move backfired on August 11 after a China People's Liberation Army Navy ship accidentally rammed into a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel while harassing a Filipino coast guard boat near the contested Scarborough Shoal, which is situated within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. While China has been harassing Philippine vessels in the sea for years – even in waters that are clearly within Manila's territorial EEZ – it has never directly involved the PLA Navy in the conflict. This week's harassment indicates that Beijing has raised the level of its aggression, short of signaling an open conflict with the Philippines, the United States' long-time strategic ally in the region. 'We can see here a change in China's tactic,' Brawner told reporters in Manila. 'They are now deploying their PLA Navy. This symbolizes China's aggressiveness.' 'They claim that we are causing trouble in the West Philippine Sea, but we clearly saw yesterday the opposite, because they continue to claim Bajo de Masinloc or Scarborough Shoal as their own territory.' Lying just 125 nautical miles (232 kilometers) from the Philippines' main island of Luzon, the shoal has long been a traditional fishing ground for generations of local fishermen. Beijing, however, claims historical rights to the shoal because it is inside its so-called nine-dash line map, which experts argue is illegal under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The shoal has been under de facto Chinese control since 2012. Manila took Beijing to an international court of arbitration in 2013, and three years later, it ruled in favor of the Philippines, a victory that was cheered by the international community led by the United States and other Western powers. China ignored the ruling, which lacked an enforcement mechanism, and accused Washington of seeking to cause discord in the region. The Philippines is a strategic military ally of Washington, with a mutual defense agreement dating back to 1951 that binds both nations to come to each other's aid in times of foreign aggression. Recently, both countries refined the coverage of the treaty to cover acts of war to include hostilities in the South China Sea, even as Filipino officials have stressed that the time has not yet come for Manila to invoke the treaty. On Tuesday, Brawner was emphatic. The country, he said, cannot agree to China's position because the Philippines 'is backed up by law.' 'The 2016 arbitral ruling states that China's nine-dash line is baseless,' Brawner said. 'So they cannot claim Bajo de Masinloc.' He said it was clear on Monday that the PLA Navy had intended to ram the tiny Philippine Coast Guard boat. 'That is the assessment of our Philippine Coast Guard. It was a good thing that our coast guard was fast and the two Chinese vessels hit each other.' Brawner said China would now be hard-pressed to offer any counter narrative on this week's incident. 'What happed there was their fault, because it was caused by their aggressive maneuvers,' he said. 'We were just there to protect our Filipino fishermen that are there in Scarborough Shoal. That is our only goal, because that is our traditional fishing ground.' BRP Suluan, the Philippine vessel, had outmaneuvered the Chinese Navy ship and a Chinese Coast vessel, with bow number 3104, leading to a collision between the chasing Chinese watercraft. The Chinese Navy ship hit and caused substantial damage on the forward portion of the CCG vessel. Suluan was in the area to distribute fuel and ice to the Filipino fishermen in the area. It was initially harassed with a water cannon, but the 'seamanship skills by PCG crew members allowed the vessel to successfully evade from getting hit,' the coast guard said. 'Fortunately, the (Philippine) Coast Guard was fast and evaded the PLA Navy and Chinese Coast Guard. This lead to the collision between the two Chinese vessels,' said has used its Coast Guard and maritime militia to harass PCG and even Filipino-flagged vessels in the West Philippine Sea in recent said the military was meeting soon with the leadership of the PCG to discuss future actions in dealing with situations similar to Monday's incident.'Of course, we're also going to seek guidance from our President because of what has happened,' said Brawner without saying when the meeting will take place.'We're going to discuss future actions, future tactics to counter what China is doing to prevent us from getting close to Bajo de Masinloc,' said Brawner, referring to the Scarborough Shoal. One of the options, Brawner said, is to send Philippine Navy ships nearer to the shoal to ensure the safety of the PCG when doing humanitarian missions in the area, noting that the Navy has been staying at a far distance from the shoal. Navy spokesman for the West Philippine Sea Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad, meanwhile, said similar mishaps may occur in the future if China does not cease such illegal actions in the contested area.'So long as they will maintain their ICAD (illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive) activities and presence, incidents like this may happen again in the future,' said if they expected China to be more aggressive in preventing a Philippine presence in the vicinity of the shoal following the incident Monday, Trinidad said: 'We do not speculate. We do not anticipate but so long as they have their illegal presence, their coercive and aggressive actions will continue.'Trinidad implied that the harassment against the PCG vessel was not enough for the Navy to step in. He said military units are government by rules of engagement, or 'rules that governs the use of force for mission accomplishment.''The Chief of Staff has been very clear that in all operations in the West Philippine Sea to include Bajo De Masinloc, the use of force for mission accomplishment is not authorized without infringing on the universal right of self-defense, defense of one's unit or defense of others,' said Trinidad. 'The guidance has been very clear in conducting our aerial missions, in conducting our patrols, maritime patrols, air surveillance flights. The use of force is not authorized except for self-defense situations,' added Trinidad. Jason Gutierrez was head of Philippine news at BenarNews, an online news service affiliated with Radio Free Asia (RFA), a Washington-based news organization that covered many under-reported countries in the region. A veteran foreign correspondent, he has also worked with The New York Times and Agence France-Presse (AFP).
AllAfrica
5 hours ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
US tariffs won't stop China's long game in SE Asia
As the United States presses its 'reciprocal tariffs' campaign against ASEAN members, Washington's hard-nosed trade tactics are sending ripples far beyond the negotiating rooms of Singapore, Jakarta and Hanoi. US negotiators may frame this as an effort to win better market access for American goods and chip away at Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia, but Beijing is watching closely and repositioning itself to turn US-ASEAN tensions to its long-term advantage. The Trump administration's strategy has been characteristically direct: levy hefty tariffs first and then issue a laundry list of concessions in return for partial relief. This year, on April 2, the US implemented 'reciprocal tariffs' ranging up to 49% on imports from certain ASEAN nations, including Vietnam and Cambodia, while others, such as Singapore, were subject to 10% duties. Those came down after negotiations but are still in the range of 19-24% for top trading partners like Thailand (19%), the Philippines (19%), Vietnam (20%) and Malaysia (24%). For most ASEAN economies, where the US is a key export market, forfeiting preferential access jeopardizes GDP growth, jobs and even political stability. The US calls for restricting Chinese exports and future compliance with possible future sanctions against Beijing puts ASEAN directly in the middle of a raging competition. This is where China sees both a challenge and an opening. For 15 consecutive years, China has been ASEAN's largest trading partner. In the first quarter of 2025, two-way trade hit $234 billion, with full-year figures projected to surpass $1 trillion, far ahead of US-ASEAN trade volumes. The US push to force ASEAN to cut Chinese goods directly targets the integrated supply chains that underpin this relationship. But rather than counter with public threats, Beijing is moving toward a more subtle, calculated response: embedding itself more deeply in ASEAN's economic fabric in ways that US tariff policy will struggle to unwind. Another important prong is accelerating local production within ASEAN. Chinese enterprises are establishing or setting up factories inside Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, not to lower labor expenses, but to meet 'rules of origin' for more products to contribute in the global supply chain. The policy is not new. It is a rerun of the 'China plus one' diversification strategy popular during the US-China trade war, but its pace is picking up speed. Regional trackers show that Chinese greenfield spending on ASEAN production reached a record US$26.4 billion level during 2023, surpassing US spending, which was around $7 billion. Its logic is straightforward as by having the US specifically target products having as little as 10-20% Chinese content, direct production inside ASEAN makes Washington's market-access blocking increasingly difficult. The move also binds ASEAN economies to Chinese industrial complexes all the more securely via supply deals, shared infrastructure and local employment integration. Another dimension of Beijing's counterplay is to diversify China's outbound investment from its Belt and Road infrastructure construction to ASEAN's production clusters, tech parks and logistic hubs. As such, China ensures that while goods are technically 'ASEAN-made,' financial, technological and logistical pillars thereof remain all strictly aligned with Chinese technology and funds. Such infrastructural presence makes it considerably harder for US trade policy to disrupt China's presence in the region's value chain. At the same time, China is preparing to fill the inevitable gaps left by US-ASEAN trade adjustments. Many ASEAN negotiators have already signaled a willingness to buy more American agricultural products, aircraft and energy, often at higher cost than other suppliers, to placate Washington. But there are sectors where US goods are simply too expensive or fail to meet local requirements. In steel, electronics, textiles, and increasingly in renewable energy equipment, China remains the more competitive supplier. If ASEAN reduces imports of these goods from China to comply with US demands, Beijing can redirect supply to domestic markets or other fast-growing partners, while simultaneously offering ASEAN cooperation in emerging sectors such as electric vehicle (EV) manufacturing and agricultural technology. Such versatility is coming up trumps. During the first half of 2025, China's shipments to Southeast Asia increased 16.6%, while those to the US fell 21.7%. These statistics indicate that although Washington can upset certain flows, it cannot readily compensate for the size and agility China brings to ASEAN's broad economy. Apart from goods, China fills a gap in services and finance. With US tariff policy casting a cloud over ASEAN export planning, Beijing is making financial markets in China accessible, developing renminbi settlement mechanisms and reinforcing measures facilitating trade and decreasing reliance on the US dollar. These measures cushion ASEAN economies against US policy fluctuations and integrate them further into China's financial system. Tone is no less significant than strategy. The warlike tack coming out of Washington, including reports of President Donald Trump boasting about countries 'kissing my ass' to get tariff relief, has backfired on the US across the globe. Such language can generate domestic backlash against leaders who are perceived to be buckling under US pressure. By contrast, Beijing has been careful to refer to its engagement as 'mutually beneficial cooperation' and 'win-win development.' Such gentler, inclusive language works better not only with ASEAN leaders but also resonates well with public opinion and is therefore politically easier for governments to uphold or deepen economic relationships with China. China's signal to ASEAN is already loud and clear: make the best possible deal with the US. Chinese Premier Li Qiang said, 'Facing rising protectionism and unilateralism in some places of the world, we must be committed to expanding opening up and removing barriers.' The implicit message is also loud and clear: China will be waiting to invest, supply and promote. The message makes Beijing the pragmatic counterpart at a time when the US is coming across as unpredictable and crudely transactional. Nevertheless, Beijing needs to be cautious. Push too hard, and it confirms Washington's storyline of ASEAN overdependence on China. Move too gradually, and ASEAN nations might rearrange supply chains in a fashion that actually diminishes Chinese clout. The sweet spot is measured by integration through more joint enterprises, increased domestic employment, vigorous technology diffusion and jointly designed R&D centers. These programs make Chinese engagement not only economically essential but also politically acceptable to a range of different ASEAN governments. Trump's 'reciprocal tariffs' policy is designed to push ASEAN away from China. However, Beijing's counter-steps, from localized production and diverted investment to plugging supply gaps and deepening financial links, underscore China's long-game strategy in the region. For ASEAN, the most sustainable course is still balancing diversified trade with both powers. For China, the key is to make its economic presence in Southeast Asia too deep and too valuable to be uprooted. If Beijing can achieve this balancing act, the very policies designed to weaken its influence in the region could end up bolstering them, not through public posturing, but through low-key, measured integration driving the very heart of ASEAN's economic future. Bilal Habib Qazi is an independent researcher based in Pakistan with a PhD in international relations from Jilin University in China. His research interests span geopolitics and strategic competition, foreign policy analysis, international security and regional order, as well as global governance and international organizations. He may be reached at bhqazi@
AllAfrica
11 hours ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
Vietnam's FDI firms caught in Trump's transshipment crossfire
The US tariff rate officially announced on Vietnam on July 31, 2025, has deepened anxiety among foreign direct-invested (FDI) enterprises regarding penalties for transshipment. Vietnamese exports to the US, as of August 7, are subjected to a 20% tariff, while goods deemed as 'transshipped' will face a 40% tariff. However, no clear criteria for what qualifies as transshipment have been announced by the US. The US Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTSUS) states that if US Customs determines a product shows signs of being 'transshipped to evade duties,' it will face the additional 40% tariff. While there is a grace period—goods clearing customs before October 5, 2025, will not be subject to the new rates—the lack of clear criteria for enforcement is paralyzing long-term decision-making. Faced with rising costs and declining revenues, some FDI enterprises have already begun scaling down production or gradually shifting their supply chains out of the country. These developments have exposed a core structural weakness in Vietnam's economy, namely its vulnerability to fluctuations in global trade policy. This is because Vietnam's export-driven economy depends on FDI for over 70% of its total export value. Moreover, the manufacturing sector is heavily reliant on imported raw materials, with around 80% coming from China. Meanwhile, the proportion of goods that meet true localization standards—produced entirely by Vietnamese-owned businesses with domestic technology—remains low at just 5–10% of total export value. If 'transshipped' goods are interpreted strictly to mean any product not fully controlled by a Vietnamese production process, then nearly all goods exported from Vietnam could be classified as transshipment and face the devastating 40% tariff. At a time when Vietnam is striving to upgrade its position in the global value chain, this ambiguity could become a significant barrier to attracting high-quality FDI. For now, the situation remains fluid. Vietnam may continue negotiations to lower the tariff rates, with General Secretary To Lam expected to visit Washington. Washington may also reopen talks with other countries, with President Donald Trump quoted by NBC News as saying, 'The US is ready to keep the door open for attractive offers.' The new US tariff policy has already triggered significant cost restructuring among FDI enterprises in Vietnam. According to a June 2025 survey by PwC, 86% of businesses in Vietnam expressed concern about the tariffs' impact and a striking 44% of FDI companies have already begun relocating factories or dispersing production to other countries. Cargill, a major US corporation with over 25 years in Vietnam, has already closed several plants and exited the aquaculture sector. Similarly, Intel has postponed a planned US$1 billion investment to expand its chip production and has initiated global layoffs that include its Vietnamese staff. This has created a 'domino effect,' with other tech giants like Samsung and LG also cutting their workforces and scaling back production in Vietnam. From an economic perspective, tariffs inevitably lead to 'cost-push' inflation, as businesses pass the additional costs onto the final product. As Dr Phung Giang told BBC Vietnamese, this could make Vietnamese goods significantly less competitive in the American market, which currently accounts for 30% of Vietnam's total export revenue. The textile and garment industry, which accounts for 35–40% of that export value, illustrates the problem. According to Hoang Manh Cam, deputy chief of the Office of the Vietnam National Textile and Garment Group (Vinatex), a mere 1% price increase can lead to a 1–2% drop in demand. This is compounded by other costs. Le Hang, the deputy secretary-general of the Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP), notes that exporters face multiple surcharges that can total up to 75% of a shipment's value. On top of that, logistics costs have skyrocketed, with the price of shipping a container to the US nearly doubling in recent months from $1,850 to between $2,950-$3,500. As export-oriented businesses face mounting external costs, inflation is spreading across Vietnam's domestic economy. In the first half of the year, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) injected an additional 2.5 quadrillion dong ($95.3 billion) into the economy, causing the Vietnamese currency to depreciate to a record low against the US dollar, while consumer inflation has risen by 3.57%. While the SBV's monetary policy director, Pham Chi Quang, stated this is a deliberate policy to support businesses, other experts disagree. Dr Le Thi Thu Trang of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation argues this is placing dual cost pressures on exporters—higher prices for imported materials and increased domestic operating expenses. Dr Le Hai Ha from the University of Commerce concurs. He says that the core issue remains Vietnam's underdeveloped domestic industries and high rate of localization, which forces companies to rely on expensive imported materials. In addition to rising costs, FDI enterprises now face declining revenues as international orders evaporate. According to the International Trade Centre (ITC), escalating trade tensions have triggered mass order cancellations across global supply chains—a trend that hit Vietnam immediately after the new US tariff policy was announced. In the first half of April, Ha Chi Minh City's customs department reported that 50% of export orders to the US were abruptly canceled. In Binh Duong Province (now part of Ho Chi Minh City), over $700 million worth of export declarations were canceled in just four days. This wave of cancellations has sent a shock through the broader economy. Vietnam's Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) recently dropped to 48.9%, its third consecutive monthly decline. According to S&P Global, surveyed exporters overwhelmingly cited the new US tariff policy as the primary cause for the sharp drop in new orders. Key sectors like textiles, footwear and electronics have been hit particularly hard. Domestic suppliers are also feeling the pain. 'As soon as the US announced tariffs on Vietnam, one of our clients suspended an order worth several million US dollars,' said Nguyen Van Ca of Phuc Can Industrial Co, Ltd. Leaders in the textile and wood-processing industries report similar challenges, with stable, year-long contracts being replaced by precarious short-term agreements, typically for only three months. Ultimately, this disruption is delivering a direct shock to Vietnam's labor market. A recent report from the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) found that more than 637,000 workers have already been affected by these order reductions, with over 53,000 having lost their jobs. Projections from the State Organization and Labor Science Institute suggest this trend will continue, with another 285,000 workers potentially at risk. For years, Vietnam was a primary beneficiary of the US-China trade war, successfully positioning itself as a 'China + 1' destination for investors looking to safeguard their supply chains. The country's low labor costs, geopolitically strategic location and generous incentives made it a top alternative, fueling a wave of foreign investment that peaked as early as 1996, just a decade after the Doi Moi reforms began. But the new US tariff policy is turning that strength into weakness. The tide is turning because, for nearly 40 years, the government has prioritized attracting FDI over developing domestic production capacity. This created a cycle of dependency, leaving the economy highly vulnerable to global economic disruptions. Analysts from Singapore's UOB Bank note that this vulnerability stems from Vietnam's open economy, where exports account for a staggering 83% of GDP—the second-highest ratio in ASEAN, behind only Singapore (182%). The consequences of this vulnerability are already being priced in. Amid the ongoing tariff 'storm,' the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that Vietnam's GDP growth could fall to 5.2%, while Moody's Analytics has revised its 2025 forecast downward from 6.5% to 5.5%, citing the direct impact of the US policy. With these mounting challenges exposing the structural weaknesses of Vietnam's economy, the question now is: what policies will Vietnamese policymakers adopt to provide timely support, retain foreign investors and build a more sustainable and resilient future? This article was published in English by The Vietnamese and originally published in Vietnamese by Luat Khoa Magazine. An edited version is republished here with kind permission.
AllAfrica
12 hours ago
- Science
- AllAfrica
Space race next: US, China rushing to nuclearize the moon
The first space race was about flags and footprints. Now, decades later, landing on the moon is old news. The new race is to build there, and doing so hinges on power. In April 2025, China reportedly unveiled plans to build a nuclear power plant on the moon by 2035. This plant would support its planned international lunar research station. The United States countered in August, when acting NASA Administrator Sean Duffy reportedly suggested a US reactor would be operational on the moon by 2030. While it might feel like a sudden sprint, this isn't exactly breaking news. NASA and the Department of Energy have spent years quietly developing small nuclear power systems to power lunar bases, mining operations and long-term habitats. As a space lawyer focused on long-term human advancement into space, I see this not as an arms race but as a strategic infrastructure race. And in this case, infrastructure is influence. A lunar nuclear reactor may sound dramatic, but it's neither illegal nor unprecedented. If deployed responsibly, it could allow countries to peacefully explore the moon, fuel their economic growth and test out technologies for deeper space missions. But building a reactor also raises critical questions about access and power. Nuclear power in space isn't a new idea. Since the 1960s, the US and the Soviet Union have relied on radioisotope generators that use small amounts of radioactive elements – a type of nuclear fuel – to power satellites, Mars rovers and the Voyager probes. Nuclear energy in space isn't new – some spacecraft are nuclear-powered. This photo shows the nuclear heat source for the Mars Curiosity rover encased in a graphite shell. The fuel glows red hot because of the radioactive decay of plutonium-238. Photo: Idaho National Laboratory, CC BY The United Nations' 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, a nonbinding resolution, recognizes that nuclear energy may be essential for missions where solar power is insufficient. This resolution sets guidelines for safety, transparency and international consultation. Nothing in international law prohibits the peaceful use of nuclear power on the moon. But what matters is how countries deploy it. And the first country to succeed could shape the norms for expectations, behaviors and legal interpretations related to lunar presence and influence. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, ratified by all major spacefaring nations including the US, China and Russia, governs space activity. Its Article IX requires that states act with 'due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties.' That statement means if one country places a nuclear reactor on the moon, others must navigate around it, legally and physically. In effect, it draws a line on the lunar map. If the reactor anchors a larger, long-term facility, it could quietly shape what countries do and how their moves are interpreted legally, on the moon and beyond. Other articles in the Outer Space Treaty set similar boundaries on behavior, even as they encourage cooperation. They affirm that all countries have the right to freely explore and access the moon and other celestial bodies, but they explicitly prohibit territorial claims or assertions of sovereignty. At the same time, the treaty acknowledges that countries may establish installations such as bases — and with that, gain the power to limit access. While visits by other countries are encouraged as a transparency measure, they must be preceded by prior consultations. Effectively, this grants operators a degree of control over who can enter and when. Building infrastructure is not staking a territorial claim. No one can own the moon, but one country setting up a reactor could shape where and how others operate – functionally, if not legally. Building a nuclear reactor establishes a country's presence in a given area. This idea is especially important for resource-rich areas such as the lunar south pole, where ice found in perpetually shadowed craters could fuel rockets and sustain lunar bases. These sought-after regions are scientifically vital and geopolitically sensitive, as multiple countries want to build bases or conduct research there. Building infrastructure in these areas would cement a country's ability to access the resources there and potentially exclude others from doing the same. Dark craters on the moon, parts of which are indicated here in blue, never get sunlight. Scientists think some of these permanently shadowed regions could contain water ice. Photo: NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center Critics may worry about radiation risks. Even if designed for peaceful use and contained properly, reactors introduce new environmental and operational hazards, particularly in a dangerous setting such as space. But the UN guidelines do outline rigorous safety protocols, and following them could potentially mitigate these concerns. The moon has little atmosphere and experiences 14-day stretches of darkness. In some shadowed craters, where ice is likely to be found, sunlight never reaches the surface at all. These issues make solar energy unreliable, if not impossible, in some of the most critical regions. A small lunar reactor could operate continuously for a decade or more, powering habitats, rovers, 3D printers and life-support systems. Nuclear power could be the linchpin for long-term human activity. And it's not just about the moon – developing this capability is essential for missions to Mars, where solar power is even more constrained. The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space sets guidelines to govern how countries act in outer space. Photo: United States Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, CC BY-NC-ND The United States has an opportunity to lead not just in technology but in governance. If it commits to sharing its plans publicly, following Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty and reaffirming a commitment to peaceful use and international participation, it will encourage other countries to do the same. The future of the Moon won't be determined by who plants the most flags. It will be determined by who builds what and how. Nuclear power may be essential for that future. Building transparently and in line with international guidelines would allow countries to more safely realize that future. A reactor on the Moon isn't a territorial claim or a declaration of war. But it is infrastructure. And infrastructure will be how countries display power – of all kinds – in the next era of space exploration. Michelle L D Hanlon is professor of Air and Space Law, University of Mississippi This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
AllAfrica
13 hours ago
- Politics
- AllAfrica
Trump-Putin summit: This isn't how wars are ended
A hastily arranged summit between President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin is set for August 15, 2025, in Alaska, where the two leaders will discuss a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will not attend, barring a last-minute change. Longtime diplomat Donald Heflin, now teaching at Tufts University's Fletcher School, shares his perspective on the unconventional meeting and why it's likely to produce, as he says, a photograph and a statement, but not a peace deal. Wars end for three reasons. One is that both sides get exhausted and decide to make peace. The second, which is more common: One side gets exhausted and raises its hand and says, 'Yeah, we're ready to come to the peace table.' And then the third is – we've seen this happen in the Mideast – outside forces like the US or Europe come in and say, 'That's enough. We're imposing our will from the outside. You guys stop this.' What we've seen in the Russia-Ukraine situation is that neither side has shown a real willingness to go to the conference table and give up territory. So the fighting continues. And the role that Trump and his administration are playing right now is that third possibility, an outside power comes in and says, 'Enough.' Now you have to look at Russia. Russia is maybe a former superpower, but a power, and it's got nuclear arms and it's got a big army. This is not some small, Middle Eastern country that the United States can completely dominate. They're nearly a peer. So can you really impose your will on them and get them to come to the conference table in seriousness if they don't want to? I kind of doubt it. Residents of Kramatorsk, Ukraine, step out of their car amid residential buildings bombed by Russian forces on Aug. 10, 2025. Photo: Pierre Crom / Getty Images via The Conversation The analogy a lot of people are using is the Munich Conference in 1938, where Great Britain met with Hitler's Germany. I don't like to make comparisons to Nazism or Hitler's Germany. Those guys started World War II and perpetrated the Holocaust and killed 30 or 40 million people. It's hard to compare anything to that. But in diplomatic terms, we go back to 1938. Germany said, 'Listen, we have all these German citizens living in this new country of Czechoslovakia. They're not being treated right. We want them to become part of Germany.' And they were poised to invade. The prime minister of Great Britain, Neville Chamberlain, went and met with Hitler in Munich and came up with an agreement by which the German parts of Czechoslovakia would become part of Germany. And that would be it. That would be all that Germany would ask for, and the West gave some kind of light security guarantees. Czechoslovakia wasn't there. This was a peace imposed on them. And sure enough, you know, within a year or two, Germany was saying, 'No, we want all of Czechoslovakia. And, P.S., we want Poland.' And thus World War II started. German dictator Adolf Hitler, right, shakes hands with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain during their meeting at Godesberg, Germany, on Sept. 23, 1938. Photo: New York Times Co. / Getty Images via The Conversation Czechoslovakia wasn't at the table. Ukraine's not at the table. Again, I'm not sure I want to compare Putin to Hitler, but he is a strongman authoritarian president with a big military. Security guarantees were given to Czechoslovakia and not honored. The West gave Ukraine security guarantees when that country gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994. We told them, 'If you're going to be brave and give up your nuclear weapons, we'll make sure you're never invaded.' And they've been invaded twice since then, in 2014 and 2022. The West didn't step up. So history would tell us that the possibilities for a lasting peace coming out of this summit are pretty low. Here's what usually happens in most countries that have a big foreign policy or national security establishment, and even in some smaller countries. The political leaders come up with their policy goal, what they want to achieve. And then they tell the career civil servants and foreign service officers and military people, 'This is what we want to get at the negotiating table. How do we do that?' And then the experts say, 'Oh, we do this and we do that, and we'll assign staff to work it out. We'll work with our Russian counterparts and try to narrow the issues down, and we'll come up with numbers and maps.' With all the replacement of personnel since the inauguration, the US not only has a new group of political appointees – including some, like Marco Rubio, who, generally speaking, know what they're doing in terms of national security – but also many who don't know what they're doing. They've also fired the senior level of civil servants and foreign service officers, and a lot of the mid-levels are leaving, so that expertise isn't there. That's a real problem. The US national security establishment is increasingly being run by the B team – at best. You have two leaders of two big countries like this, they usually don't meet on a few days' notice. It would have to be a real crisis. This meeting could happen two or three weeks from now as easily as it could this week. And if that happened, you would have a chance to prepare. You'd have a chance to get all kinds of documents in front of the American participants. You would meet with your Russian counterparts. You'd meet with Ukrainian counterparts, maybe some of the Western European countries. And when the two sides sat down at the table, it would be very professional. They would have very similar briefing papers in front of them. The issues would be narrowed down. None of that's going to happen in Alaska. It's going to be two political leaders meeting and deciding things, often driven by political considerations, but without any real idea of whether they can really be implemented or how they could be implemented. Again, the situation is kind of haunted by the West never enforcing security guarantees promised in 1994. So I'm not sure how well this could be enforced. Historically, Russia and Ukraine were always linked up, and that's the problem. What's Putin's bottom line? Would he give up Crimea? No. Would he give up the part of eastern Ukraine that de facto had been taken over by Russia before this war even started? Probably not. Would he give up what they've gained since then? OK, maybe. Then let's put ourselves in Ukraine's shoes. Will they want to give up Crimea? They say, 'No.' Do they want to give up any of the eastern part of the country? They say, 'No.' People who understand the process of diplomacy think that this is very amateurish and is unlikely to yield real results that are enforceable. It will yield some kind of statement and a photo of Trump and Putin shaking hands. There will be people who believe that this will solve the problem. It won't. Donald Heflin is executive director of the Edward R Murrow Center and Senior Fellow of Diplomatic Practice, The Fletcher School, Tufts University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
