Australian judge resigns from Hong Kong's top court, sixth to step down in year
An Australian judge has resigned from Hong Kong's top court, becoming the sixth foreign member to step down over the past year, telling the Post on Friday he had observed that the role of non-permanent justices had 'become increasingly anachronistic and arguably cosmetic'.
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Justice Robert French, a non-permanent judge of the Court of Final Appeal since 2017, revealed that he had tendered his resignation on March 31. The judge, 78, stressed that he maintained his 'respect for the Hong Kong and international members of the court and their integrity and independence'.
'I reject the proposition that they are somehow complicit in the application by the executive of national security laws or somehow confer on them a spurious legitimacy,' French said, referring to the legislation imposed by Beijing in 2020 and the domestic law enacted last year.
The judiciary announced French's resignation earlier on Friday while the government said the presence or absence of individual judges would not undermine the integrity of the judicial system.
Justice Robert French had served on the top court since 2017. Photo: Court of Final Appeal
French said he would not be making any statement about the national security laws and associated practices but 'there will no doubt be future cases in which their interpretation and application will come before the court'.
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Asia Times
an hour ago
- Asia Times
Why Trump won't kill AUKUS
The Pentagon has announced it will review the massive AUKUS agreement between the United States, United Kingdom and Australia to ensure it's aligned with US President Donald Trump's 'America first' agenda. The US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby is reportedly going to oversee the review. The announcement has raised concerns in Australia, but every government is entitled to review policies made by its predecessors to consider whether there is a particular purpose. The UK has launched a parliamentary inquiry into AUKUS too, so it's not actually unreasonable for the US to do the same. There is a degree of nervousness in Australia as to what the implications are because Australia understandably has the biggest stake in this. But we need to consider what Colby has articulated in the past. 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Australia has already made a nearly A$800 million (US$500 million) down payment on expanding the US industrial capacity as part of the deal to ensure we get some subs in a reasonable time frame. There have also been significant legislative and industrial reforms in the US, Australia and UK to help facilitate Australian defence-related industries unplug the bottleneck of submarine production. There is no question that there is a need to speed up production. But we are already seeing significant signs of an uptick in the production rate, thanks in part to the Australian down payment. And it's anticipated that the rate will significantly increase in the next 12–18 months. Even still, projects like this often slide in terms of timelines. The leaders of the three nations announced details of the submarine deal in San Diego in 2023. Photo: Etienne Laurent / EPA via The Conversation I'm reasonably optimistic that, on balance, the Trump administration will come down on the side of proceeding with the deal. There are a few key reasons for this: 1) We're several years down the track already. 2) We have more than 100 Australian sailors already operating in the US system. 3) Industrially, we're on the cusp of making a significant additional contribution to the US submarine production line. And finally, most people don't fully appreciate that the submarine base just outside Perth is an incredibly consequential piece of real estate for US security calculations. Colby has made very clear the US needs to muscle up to push back and deter China's potential aggression in the region. In that equation, submarines are crucial, as is a substantial submarine base in the Indian Ocean. China is acutely mindful of what we call the 'Malacca dilemma.' Overwhelmingly, China's trade of goods and fossil fuels comes through the Malacca Strait between Malaysia and Indonesia's island of Sumatra. The Chinese know this supply line could be disrupted in a war. And the submarines operating out of Perth contribute to this fear. This is a crucial deterrent effect the US and its allies have been seeking to maintain. And it has largely endured. Given that nobody can predict the future, we all want to prevent a war over Taiwan and we all want to maintain the status quo. As such, the considered view has been that Australia will continue to support the US to bolster its deterrent effect to prevent such a scenario. As part of the US review of the deal, we could see talk of a potential slowdown in the delivery rate of the submarines. The Trump administration could also put additional pressure on Australia to deliver more for the US. This includes the amount Australia spends on defence, a subject of considerable debate in Canberra. 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Australia has been on the US side since federation. Given this, the US government will likely make sure this deal goes ahead. The Trump administration may try to squeeze more concessions out of Australia as part of 'the art of the deal,' but it won't sink the pact. However, many people will undoubtedly say this is the moment Australia should break with AUKUS. But then what? What would Australia do instead to ensure its security in this world of heightened great power competition in which Australia's interests are increasingly challenged? Walking away now would leave Australia more vulnerable than ever. I think that would be a great mistake. John Blaxland is professor, Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
RTHK
4 hours ago
- RTHK
Khamenei warns Israel faces 'bitter and painful fate'
Khamenei warns Israel faces 'bitter and painful fate' Onlookers gather in front of a building damaged in an Israeli strike on the Iranian capital Tehran. Photo: AFP Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Friday that Israel will face 'severe punishment' over its attack on his country. Khamenei's statement was carried by the state-run IRNA news agency. It confirmed that top military officials and scientists had been killed in the attack. "The Zionist regime [Israel] unleashed its wicked and bloody hand in a crime against Iran this morning and revealed its vile nature. With this attack, the Zionist regime has prepared a bitter fate for itself, which it will definitely receive," Khamenei said. Earlier, an Iranian armed forces spokesperson said Israel and the United States will pay a "heavy price" following the attack. Iranian state television quoted the spokesperson as saying that Israel had carried out attacks against Iran with US support. It comes after Israeli public broadcaster Kan reported that Israel had fully coordinated with and notified Washington before the strike. The spokesperson for the United Nations chief, Antonio Guterres, said that the Secretary-General "is particularly concerned by Israeli attacks on nuclear installations in Iran while talks between Iran and the United States on the status of Iran's nuclear programme are underway." "The Secretary-General asks both sides to show maximum restraint, avoiding at all costs a descent into deeper conflict, a situation that the region can hardly afford." Oman, which is mediating those talks said it considers the Israeli strikes as "a dangerous, reckless escalation, representing a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter." It added that it "holds Israel responsible for this escalation and its consequences, and calls upon the international community to adopt a firm and unequivocal stance to halt this dangerous course of action". Australia and New Zealand's governments have also condemned the Israeli strikes. Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong said she was 'alarmed by the escalation' between Israel and Iran, which she said risked further destabilising an already volatile region. New Zealand's Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said the strikes were 'a huge concern' for his government and 'potentially catastrophic' for the Middle East. 'The risk of miscalculation is high,' he said. The two countries were among five that enacted travel and financial sanctions on two far-right Israeli government ministers on Wednesday, accusing them of 'inciting extremist violence' against Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, meanwhile, will hold an economic security meeting on Friday to discuss Israel's strike on Iran, media there reported. (Reuters/AP) _____________________________ Last updated: 2026-06-13 HKT 12:13
Asia Times
a day ago
- Asia Times
Forging a European third pole in the Indo-Pacific
At the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, European leaders signaled an ambitious new intent to play a bigger role in Indo-Pacific affairs. French President Emmanuel Macron called for a 'strategic balance' in Asia, while European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas described Europe as a 'partner, not a power.' Officials from Germany, Sweden, and Finland echoed these views. The proposition is that Europe could serve as a stabilizing third pole, positioned between China's assertiveness and the United States' fluctuating and uncertain commitments. This framing has intuitive appeal. Europe is viewed as technologically capable, geopolitically distant and less hegemonic than either the US or China. Yet the Indo-Pacific remains a maritime-first theater, where strategic relevance is defined not by sentiment but by presence and sustained investment. The Indo-Pacific region accounts for over 60% of global maritime trade and encompasses some of the world's most contested flashpoints, including the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. China now fields the world's largest navy, with 355 ships in 2025 and a projected 440 by 2030. The US retains dominance in tonnage and strike capability but is capable of building only 1.5 ships annually, compared to China's at least eight. By contrast, European capabilities remain insufficient for sustained operations in the Indo-Pacific. Only France, the United Kingdom and Italy operate aircraft carriers. The UK has two Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, but only one is deployable at a time due to maintenance cycles. As of 2025, the UK's Royal Navy fields just 16 operational F-35Bs, well short of the 24 typically required for a full carrier air wing. France's sole carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, when docked, removes its carrier-based airpower from the theater. Italy's Cavour and Trieste remains reliant on AV-8B Harriers, with fewer than 10 next-generation aircraft available as of 2024. All three navies face shortfalls in escorts and support vessels. While a US carrier strike group typically includes four to six escorts and one to two support ships, European deployments often manage only two to three escorts. It is therefore unsurprising that less than 5% of Europe's naval assets are deployed to the Indo-Pacific. Europe's current naval presence may be limited but three avenues offer Europe the opportunity to make meaningful, near-term contributions to Indo-Pacific security. First, Europe could pursue full membership in the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), the region's foremost multilateral security forum. Established in 2010, ADMM-Plus comprises ASEAN and eight dialogue partners: The United States, China, Japan, India, Australia, Russia, New Zealand, and South Korea. The forum has conducted more than 20 joint exercises and supports expert working groups in areas such as maritime security, counterterrorism and cyber defense. However, bloc cleavages are deepening. Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea are much more dependent on US defense systems, while Russia, in the aftermath of its war in Ukraine, is increasingly dependent on China. ADMM-Plus may be due for a strategic evolution, one in which Europe could act as a stabilizing third pillar of Indo-Pacific security. Europe's full membership as dialogue partners would enable it to contribute meaningfully to regional capacity-building, particularly in maritime domain awareness, counter-piracy and cybersecurity, areas where it possesses deep technical expertise. Second, Europe can increase its strategic relevance in the region by linking defense exports to local industrial development. Southeast Asian states increasingly expect arms deals to include technology transfers, job creation and long-term economic value. This was reflected in ASEAN chairman Anwar Ibrahim's SLD25 statement that 'trade is part of our strategic architecture.' Recent European defense deals have embraced this logic. Sweden's Gripen sale to Thailand included training and maintenance infrastructure. France's 7.5 billion euro (US$8.6 billion) Rafale agreement with Indonesia and Germany's 1.2 billion euro submarine contract with Singapore similarly offered industrial participation. To move beyond fragmented, bilateral arrangements, however, the EU should use instruments such as the European Peace Facility (EPF) and Security Action for Europe (SAFE), a 150 billion euro defense investment fund approved in May 2025. These mechanisms can support coproduction, joint ventures and localized assembly aligned with both European supply chain interests and Southeast Asia's development needs. Finally, programs like SAFE are designed to strengthen Europe's defense industrial base by financing large-scale joint procurement and infrastructure. But scaling this capacity cost-effectively may require trusted partnerships beyond Europe's borders. ASEAN offers that potential, particularly if it is more closely integrated into European defense supply chains. If structured to meet SAFE's eligibility criteria – such as majority EU ownership or controlled IP – these arrangements could support the program's objectives of efficiency, resilience and industrial depth while enabling Southeast Asian states to modernize affordably under transparent, rules-based frameworks. All in all, Europe's growing Indo-Pacific aspirations are diplomatically significant but strategically incomplete. To play a central role, Europe needs to embed itself in regional institutions such as ADMM-Plus, align defense engagement with economic development and integrate trusted regional partners into its defense industrial supply chains. These moves won't match American force projection or offset Chinese naval expansion, but they could anchor Europe as a durable, strategic partner in a region looking for options beyond the familiar two superpower poles. Marcus Loh is chairman of the Public Affairs Group at the Public Relations and Communications Association (PRCA) Asia Pacific. He also serves on the executive committee of SGTech's Digital Transformation Chapter, contributing to national conversations on AI, data infrastructure, and digital policy. A former president of the Institute of Public Relations of Singapore, Loh has played a longstanding role in shaping the relevance of strategic communication and public affairs in an evolving policy, technology and geoeconomic landscape.
