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[Wang Son-taek] Strategic flaws in presidential election
With just a few days left before the presidential election, the race favors Lee Jae-myung, the Democratic Party of Korea's candidate. Most public opinion polls consistently show Lee holding a significant lead over his conservative rivals. Lee is now widely seen as the likely next president — a prospect that would have seemed distant just six months ago. To understand what has made the difference, and what it might mean for the future of South Korea, it is essential to examine the strategic decisions of the three major candidates during the last stretch of the race. Their successes, miscalculations and missed opportunities hold critical lessons for Korean politics beyond this election.
Lee Jae-myung's campaign has demonstrated several smart strategic approaches since the illegal martial law incident reshaped the nation's political landscape in December last year. Lee took a strong stance against the unconstitutional declaration, positioning himself as the central national figure who led the movement to cancel the martial law decree through parliamentary action. He has successfully maintained his image as the defender of democracy and the rule of law. This stance has not only solidified his Democratic Party base but has also helped him reach across political lines to voters eager for stability after months of national turmoil.
Perhaps most impressively, Lee has shown skill in defending himself against relentless personal attacks from the People Power Party. Throughout the campaign, the conservative party sought to frame Lee as a criminal, a man of questionable character and even a potential dictator. Yet Lee consistently refused to be pulled into the mud. Rather than falling into defensive postures, he turned these attacks into a source of strength, effectively transforming himself into the gravitational center of Korean politics.
Lee's strategic messaging has also focused on substantive themes, particularly economic development and pragmatic diplomacy, aimed at reassuring middle-ground voters. Despite repeated attempts to paint him as a dangerous leftist or even a "communist," Lee recently declared that the Korea-US alliance remains the backbone of his pragmatic foreign policy. This stance has allowed him to speak credibly to moderate and conservative voters, prioritizing national security and international credibility.
However, no campaign is without flaws, and Lee has shown occasional tactical missteps that risk blunting his strategic advantages. His comments about "Xie, Xie" (thank you in Chinese), remarks about "120 won coffee," and the "hotel economics" concept all sparked avoidable criticism. Although Lee was able to defend himself in each case, these episodes exposed the risk of overconfidence and a lack of message discipline — dangers that could still resurface in the final days of the race.
By contrast, People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo's campaign has been plagued by strategic errors. While many of his problems stem from broader failures within his party, as the presidential candidate, Kim ultimately bears responsibility. The People Power Party's most severe miscalculation has been its failure to distance itself from former President Yoon Suk Yeol. This election was triggered precisely because of Yoon's illegal and unconstitutional imposition of martial law. Yet the People Power Party did not join the efforts to impeach, arrest or remove Yoon. Nor did it expel him from the party; Yoon left on his terms. This failure to manage the Yoon crisis fatally undermined the party's credibility and undercut Kim's campaign.
Another strategic failure was the People Power Party's relentless negative attacks on Lee Jae-myung. Instead of weakening Lee, these attacks elevated him. Many voters watching the party's obsession with Lee increasingly saw him as the most potent, most formidable figure in the race — the only candidate who stood in the battleground while all the other competitors were blurred. The People Power Party did not seem to understand the psychological effect of excessive attack politics. When you focus too much on destroying someone, you signal that they are the real heavyweight and the one worth watching.
The People Power Party also over-relied on political engineering, devoting enormous energy to unifying conservative candidates rather than offering some compelling positive visions and attractive plans for the future to the electorate. Worse, the central figure in their unification efforts was acting President Han Duk-soo, widely seen as one of the behind-the-curtains collaborators of the Yoon Suk Yeol insurrection. The result was not a strengthened conservative coalition but a party mired in reputational damage.
Lee Jun-Seok, the leader of a conservative breakaway movement, has likewise pursued a paradoxical strategy. His two main goals in this election are to secure at least 15 percent of the vote, which would qualify his party for public funding to cover campaign expenses, and establish himself as a next-generation political leader. Yet his tactics — deepening generational and gender divides to capture segments of the electorate — are shortsighted. While "divide and rule" may appear clever in the short term, it damages his long-term brand. Rather than presenting himself as a potential unifier, he has crafted the image of a divisive, self-centered politician. This choice could hurt his future ambitions more than help them.
Ultimately, analyzing the strategies of these three candidates reveals why Lee Jae-myung holds such a commanding lead heading into the final stretch. His strong leadership and pragmatic outreach have given him the upper hand. Meanwhile, Kim Moon-soo's inability to address his party's fundamental liabilities, paired with the People Power Party's self-defeating attack strategies, has weakened and disorganized the conservative bloc. Lee Jun-seok's opportunistic, divisive tactics have further fractured the right without creating a viable alternative.
Still, no election is over until the last vote is counted. Even the most vigorous campaign can stumble under the weight of arrogance, missteps, or last-minute surprises. This election, perhaps more than most, teaches an enduring political lesson: real strength comes not from attacks or clever engineering but from the strategic wisdom to balance a sense of duty with flexibility, confidence with humility, vision with discipline, and leadership with responsibility. If the new president of Korea can maintain strategic wisdom even after victory, the political turmoil of the last six months could turn out to be a blessing in disguise.
Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer's own. — Ed.
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