Fortifying India's Borders: ISRO's Satellite Solution After Pahalgam
पहलगाम में 26 सैलानियों की निर्मम हत्या The recent announcement by ISRO Chairman V. Narayanan, who also serves as the Secretary of the Department of Space, about India's plan to launch 100–150 satellites over the next three years has sparked hope for a more secure nation. Speaking in the wake of the tragic terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, which claimed 26 lives, Narayanan underscored the inadequacy of India's current fleet of 55 satellites to monitor its vast borders and 7,500-kilometre coastline. His vision, bolstered by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's space sector reforms, hinges on leveraging private sector participation to bolster India's surveillance capabilities. But can this ambitious satellite expansion truly prevent atrocities like the Pahalgam attack? The answer lies in the transformative potential of space technology and the challenges that lie ahead. The Pahalgam attack exposed the vulnerabilities in India's border security apparatus. Terrorist infiltrations across rugged terrains and porous borders remain a persistent threat, often exploiting gaps in real-time intelligence. Narayanan's proposed satellite surge aims to address this by creating a robust network of eyes in the sky. Satellites equipped with high-resolution cameras, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and infrared sensors can provide continuous monitoring of border regions, even in adverse weather or at night. For instance, SAR-enabled satellites, like those planned by private startups such as PierSight, can penetrate cloud cover and detect movements across vast areas. Such technology could have potentially identified suspicious activity near Pahalgam, enabling preemptive action by security forces. With 100–150 additional satellites, India could achieve near-constant surveillance, drastically reducing blind spots along the Line of Control (LoC) and coastal areas. Moreover, the involvement of private players, facilitated by Modi's reforms, is a game-changer. Companies like Ananth Technologies, which contributed to the PSLV-C60 mission, demonstrate the private sector's growing prowess in satellite manufacturing. By handholding these firms, ISRO can accelerate production and deployment, ensuring cost-effective and scalable solutions. This public-private synergy could lead to the development of small, agile satellites—similar to those used in the Space Docking Experiment (SpaDeX)—capable of rapid repositioning to track dynamic threats. In the context of Pahalgam, a constellation of such satellites could have relayed real-time data to ground stations, enabling swift coordination between the Army, paramilitary forces, and local police to thwart the attack. However, the road to preventing tragedies through satellite surveillance is not without hurdles. The sheer volume of data generated by 150 additional satellites demands advanced artificial intelligence (AI) for processing and analysis. Without robust AI systems, critical intelligence could be buried under a deluge of imagery. Narayanan's mention of the AI-powered O-ARM system at Kauvery Hospital hints at the growing role of AI in precision tasks, and ISRO must similarly invest in AI-driven analytics to filter actionable insights from satellite feeds. Additionally, the integration of satellite data with on-ground intelligence networks remains a challenge. The Pahalgam attack underscores the need for seamless coordination between space-based surveillance and field operations, which requires significant upgrades to India's command-and-control infrastructure. Narayanan's vision also extends beyond security, with plans for a climate change satellite for G20 nations. This dual focus—security and global cooperation—reflects India's aspiration to be a space superpower. Yet, the immediate priority must be operationalising the satellite network to prevent incidents like Pahalgam. By combining cutting-edge technology, private sector innovation, and AI-driven intelligence, India can transform its borders into impregnable fortresses. The SpaDeX mission's success, placing India among an elite group of nations capable of satellite docking, proves ISRO's technical mettle. Now, it must translate this expertise into a security paradigm that ensures no family in Kashmir—or anywhere else—endures the pain of another Pahalgam. The skies are watching; it's time for India to act. ( The author Girish Linganna of this article is an award-winning Science Writer and a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru. He is also Director of ADD Engineering Components, India, Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany. You can reach him, at: girishlinganna@gmail.com )
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