The Australia-US alliance is facing a decisive test, and not just over the Middle East

The Guardian

5 hours ago

Would Australia go to war to support the United States in conflict with China over Taiwan – or elsewhere? The government avoids discussing the question, let alone answering it, by dismissing it as hypothetical. But it will not go away, for two reasons.
First, the possibility of us going to war over Taiwan looms over the whole debate about our military preparedness and defence spending, and gives it urgency. That is because choosing to fight China alongside the US is a scenario in which Australia would find itself drawn into a major conflict. Surely we should be talking about that choice now, in advance, rather than wait till a crisis breaks?
But the other reason the question won't go away is that Washington wants it answered, and soon. Today, of course, all eyes are on the Middle East as Donald Trump ponders whether to join Israel's apparently open-ended war with Iran.
Until recently that would almost certainly mean Australia too was faced with a choice as to whether to follow the US into yet another Middle East war. But things are different now. The defence minister, Richard Marles, has dismissed any Australian involvement, saying on Tuesday: 'We are not a part of this conflict.' That is because, despite Iran and Gaza, China's epochal challenge to the US makes the Taiwan question, not the Middle East, the decisive test of our US alliance.
Trump's isolationism means the risk of a US-China war over Taiwan is lower now than it was under Joe Biden. But it remains the US military's key concern, as the defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, made clear in Singapore. Australia's commitment in such a conflict has become a touchstone of our seriousness as an ally at a time when ever-closer enmeshment with Washington under Aukus has become the core of the Albanese government's foreign and defence policies. It goes to the heart of whether Aukus really is in US interests, and thus whether Aukus will survive. It will be a central question in the Pentagon's review of the pact.
That is because under Aukus the US is supposed to be passing some of its vital and scarce Virginia-class submarines to Australia. It makes no sense to do that unless it is sure that we would send them to join the US fleet in a war.
The same is true of the buildup of US combat forces, including long-range bombers, at Australian bases. That too makes no sense unless we guarantee in advance that those forces can be used in a war against China. So for the Pentagon the question of Australia's stance in a US-China war is not remotely hypothetical.
All this no doubt explains why Marles edged closer to engaging on the issue on Monday at a defence conference in Canberra. He did not say, as one breathless headline had it, 'US-China war: we would be involved.' But he did drop two plain hints to Washington.
He said: 'Australia's geography today is more relevant to great power contest than it has been … arguably at any point in our history.' This conveyed to Washington that the government understands how central Australia has become to the US military contest with China, and how much US planning for war with China now assumes Australian support.
A few moments later he said: 'The defence of Australia is intimately connected with the peace and stability of the Pacific, the peace and stability of south-east Asia, of north-east Asia, of the north-east Indian Ocean.' He went on: 'The geography of our national security, it lies much less along the coastline of the continent, as it does further afield.' This conveys that the government's military posture is focused on fighting alongside the US far from our shores in places like the Taiwan Strait, rather than defending the continent itself.
Others speaking at the conference went further, with one former senior official saying: 'We would be involved.' This seems to reflect the broader consensus of the Canberra bureaucracy.
But do Anthony Albanese and his senior minsters agree? Do Marles' comments reflect anything more than a desire to placate Washington without really answering a question they would prefer to leave in the too-hard basket, hoping it will go away?
If so, they are making a big mistake. It is time for Australia to have a serious conversation about our involvement. Two questions should be uppermost.
First, what would be our aims in taking part in a conflict? The obvious ones are to help defend Taiwan's democracy, to help preserve the US position as the leading power in Asia and stop China taking its place, and to 'pay our dues' as a US ally.
Second, how likely are we to achieve these aims? The short answer is very unlikely. With or without Australia's support, the US has no serious chance of winning a war with China over Taiwan. That means Taiwan would not be saved, the US position in Asia would be not preserved, and Australia's value as an ally would disappear. Like Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, we would have followed Washington into a war that achieved neither its objectives nor ours but this time at unimaginably greater cost.
That being so, we should give Washington a plain answer to its Taiwan question. The answer should be no.
Hugh White is emeritus professor of strategic studies at ANU. His Quarterly Essay Hard New World: Our Post-American Future was published this month