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Anwar's immunity bid fails in rule-of-law test for Malaysia

Anwar's immunity bid fails in rule-of-law test for Malaysia

Asia Times2 days ago

In a landmark June 4 ruling, Malaysia's High Court denied Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's controversial attempt to shield himself from civil proceedings by invoking a constitutional mechanism — a move critics say was a veiled attempt at political immunity.
The court's rejection of Anwar's bid marks the beginning of a legal confrontation unprecedented in Malaysian history: a sitting prime minister now stands to defend himself in court while governing the nation.
The decision arrives on the heels of a motion by Anwar's legal team seeking to refer eight constitutional questions to the Federal Court. These questions, according to the defense, pertained to the burdens placed on the Prime Minister's Office by an ongoing civil suit and were framed not as an immunity plea but as a request for a 'constitutional filter.' Yet the distinction was semantic at best.
'We are not claiming immunity,' Anwar's counsel asserted on June 3. 'We are simply seeking clarity to protect the executive's function.' But the subtext was clear: Anwar wanted out of the dock.
The case in question — a civil suit filed by Muhammed Yusoff Rawther alleging sexual misconduct by Anwar — predates Anwar's premiership. The incident allegedly occurred in 2018, and Rawther filed the suit in 2020.
Notably, Anwar did not attempt to strike out the suit at any point over the past three years. Only on May 23, 2025 — a staggering 912 days after he assumed office — did he pivot to constitutional arguments.
Rawther's lawyer, Muhammad Rafique Rashid Ali, minced no words in court. 'Why did the Prime Minister take 912 days to raise this issue?' he asked. 'If the matter truly affected his ability to discharge executive functions, he should have addressed it long ago.'
Rafique also pointed out that Anwar's affidavit failed to provide any reason for the delay — a procedural omission that, in the eyes of many, exposed the real motivation behind the application.
More damningly, Rafique invoked Article 8 of the Federal Constitution, which guarantees equal protection under the law. 'No man — not even the Prime Minister — can stand above that,' he said. 'Immunity, whether cloaked as a filter or wrapped in legalese, is still immunity.'
Presiding Judge Roz Mawar Rozain dismissed all eight questions as 'untenable, abstract and speculative.' She ruled that the Federal Court need not be burdened with academic hypotheticals. The trial, she affirmed, will proceed as scheduled on June 16, and 20,000 ringgit (US$4,700) in legal costs were awarded to Rawther.
Anwar's team immediately sought an urgent stay of the ruling, but it also was dismissed. They now have 30 days to file an appeal to the Court of Appeal, though the countdown to the trial has already begun.
In her oral judgment, Roz Mawar made it clear: Articles 39, 40, and 43 of the Constitution — which Anwar's team cited to support their plea — contain no implicit or explicit provision for immunity. The Constitution, she emphasized, enshrines accountability, not executive insulation.
Anwar's maneuver has drawn comparisons to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's 2020 attempt to sidestep legal scrutiny. Facing multiple indictments, Netanyahu petitioned the Knesset for parliamentary immunity, claiming the charges were politically motivated.
While Israel's system at least provides a legal pathway for such immunity via legislative vote, Malaysia's does not. Anwar's attempt to manufacture a similar buffer through the courts was both bold and, ultimately, unsuccessful.
In both cases, the public response was the same: dismay at the spectacle of a sitting prime minister attempting to rewrite the rules mid-game. Anwar's critics say his move reeks of the same hubris — a desperate attempt to evade moral reckoning while cloaked in constitutional garb.
For a man who once stood as the face of Reformasi, the optics are devastating. Here is Anwar — long celebrated as a martyr of political injustice, imprisoned under Mahathir Mohamad's authoritarian regime — now attempting to insulate himself from due process using the very levers of power he once opposed.
This isn't Anwar's first brush with accusations of overreach. His 1999 conviction for abuse of power — widely seen as politically charged — is now being unearthed in conversations across social media and political circles alike. History, as they say, echoes.
The parallel doesn't stop there. Like Thailand's Thaksin Shinawatra — another leader accused of self-enrichment and later pardoned — Anwar has blurred the lines between public service and political dynasty.
His appointment of Thaksin as ASEAN adviser and his own daughter Nurul Izzah as Deputy President of the PKR have raised questions about nepotism and political insulation, further damaging his image as a reformer.
Conversely, Rawther's credibility has only been strengthened by this legal victory. He has, for years, insisted that his pursuit of justice is not politically motivated.
The June 4 ruling — which affirms the legitimacy of his claim and the court's commitment to due process — lends weight to that assertion.
In a political landscape often defined by backroom deals and unaccountable elites, Rawther has emerged as a symbol of perseverance — a private citizen holding the nation's most powerful man to legal scrutiny.
This verdict could well reshape how Malaysia is seen on the regional stage. As the country currently chairing ASEAN, the world is watching. The failure of Anwar's immunity gambit is a litmus test of Malaysia's democratic maturity.
What signal would it have sent if a sitting Prime Minister could so easily erect a legal wall around himself? The judiciary, by rejecting this narrative, has reaffirmed Malaysia's commitment to constitutional supremacy and rule of law.
In Rafique's words outside the court, 'This ruling ensures that in Malaysia, no executive, no prime Minister, no monarch can place himself above the people.'
This episode will linger in the nation's political memory — not just for what it reveals about Anwar's instincts, but for what it says about the resilience of Malaysia's institutions.
The prime minister now finds himself in uncharted territory: governing while on trial, a dual burden with no modern precedent in Malaysia.
Anwar once said, 'Justice is the soul of governance.' It remains to be seen whether he will honor that creed — or be judged by it.

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