Terrorising hope: Pahalgam attack and the Pakistan army

Time of India

03-05-2025

Associate Fellow, Center of Policy Research and Governance, New Delhi. Final Year Doctoral Candidate, Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. LESS ... MORE
The terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir is not just an act of terror, it is a direct assault on the idea of normalcy. On April 22, 2025, when gunmen opened fire on tourists enjoying the meadows of Baisaran, they weren't merely executing an attack, they were sending a calculated message. The message was aimed not just at the state, but at society at large: that peace remains fragile, and that the symbols of progress are vulnerable.
In recent years, the government has projected tourism and infrastructure as dual pillars of post-Article 370 Kashmir. The region, once characterized by conflict, was now being framed as a site of revival with record-breaking tourist arrivals (34 lakh in the year 2024 itself), infrastructure megaprojects, and even global visibility through events like the 2023 G20 summit in Srinagar. But these very successes have now become the targets.
The TRF doctrine
Militant groups, particularly The Resistance Front (TRF), have shifted strategy. Instead of focusing attacks on military installations or political leaders, they are going after soft civilian targets. The objective is no longer limited to damaging the state apparatus—it is about disrupting everyday life, eroding public confidence, and psychologically destabilizing communities.
A case in point is the attack at the Z-Morh tunnel construction site in Ganderbal district on October 20, 2024. In this attack, six non-local labourers and one local doctor were killed. These individuals were not soldiers; they were contributors to a civilian infrastructure project meant to improve connectivity and economic opportunities in the region. By targeting a critical piece of infrastructure and those helping build it militants aimed to instill fear among workers, scare off future investments, and signal that even state-led development projects are not safe. This wasn't an assault on security forces; it was a direct strike on the idea that Kashmir can be rebuilt.
TRF's tactical shift is neither spontaneous nor random. It has evolved over years. Emerging in the post-2019 landscape and widely considered to be a proxy of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, TRF has built a pattern of attacking civilians who symbolize recovery, coexistence, and reintegration.
In October 2021, the group orchestrated the assassination of Makhan Lal Bindroo, a prominent Kashmiri Pandit pharmacist in Srinagar. He was a figure of quiet resilience—a returnee who had stayed on in Kashmir, committed to his work and his community. TRF's message was clear: no symbol of peaceful return would be spared. Through 2023, they expanded this pattern, targeting migrant labourers from other states who had come to Kashmir for construction, agriculture, and retail jobs. These labourers were building roads, bridges, and homes quite literally laying the foundation for a new Kashmir.
By 2024, this strategy had matured into a consistent doctrine of terror that goes beyond the battlefield. In both the Pahalgam attack and the Ganderbal tunnel killings, the victims represented a hopeful trajectory. They were tourists, workers, and professionals—ordinary people whose presence signified progress. The violence directed at them was a calculated attempt to fracture that narrative. India must recognize that this is no longer a conventional security problem alone. This is narrative warfare. Militants are attacking not just lives but ideas – ideas of trust, of unity, of belonging. The notion that Kashmir is healing is what they seek to rupture.
To meet this evolved threat, India needs an evolved response. Conventional counterinsurgency is no longer enough. What's needed now is a dual-deterrence doctrine—one that targets both the ideological ecosystem that sustains militancy and the tactical apparatus that enables it.
Qualitative deterrence: Exposing the Pakistan Army's proxy empire
India must adopt a doctrine of qualitative deterrence—not focused on battlefield metrics, but on the systemic erosion of legitimacy for Pakistan's military-jihadi complex. The Pakistan Army, which already struggles for legitimacy within its own borders, must no longer be treated globally as a professional force. Its self-assigned role as the 'guardian of Pakistan's ideology' has steadily mutated into an Islamist-authoritarian enterprise, where generals act as messianic clerics and ideological commissars, demands exposure.
India must lead a strategic campaign to delegitimise this force, diplomatically, informationally, and symbolically. The aim is clear: strip the Pakistan Army of the legitimacy it holds in multilateral forums. A military that fuels jihad cannot enjoy the privileges of a professional force under Geneva Convention while advancing the politics of holy war. Qualitative deterrence is about making the ideology behind Pakistan's terror proxies a global liability—not just an Indian security concern.
Quantitative deterrence: Imposing real costs
India must simultaneously adopt a doctrine of quantitative deterrence – focused on imposing measurable, escalating costs on those who plan and execute terror operations. This means not just targeting proxy jihadi commanders, but also targeting the ISI regulars—the military planners and field operatives who enable, fund, and direct these attacks.
India should be prepared to act both overtly and covertly, deploying calibrated strikes, surgical eliminations, and deep penetration intelligence missions. The goal is simple: make each act of terrorism operationally expensive and personally dangerous for its architects.
While qualitative deterrence shatters the ideological facade, quantitative deterrence bleeds the system dry logistically, tactically, and psychologically. It sends a clear message: no terror plot will come without proportional consequence, and no uniform will guarantee immunity if it's worn in the service of jihad.
Make deterrence a daily practice, and hope a national policy
To make deterrence real, India must anchor it in everyday practice. This means smarter, intelligence-led policing, not just heavier deployments. It means treating worker colonies, tourist hubs, and construction sites as strategic spaces, protected through surveillance, emergency protocols, and civic coordination. And it means countering digital propaganda with local narratives that affirm resilience over fear. If deterrence is strategy, then protecting hope must be policy—and together, they are the only true counter to a terror that thrives on fear, not firepower.
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Views expressed above are the author's own.