APS, May 9 incidents dominate CB hearing
ISLAMABAD:
The Supreme Court on Friday called into question the distinction between the 2014 APS terrorist attack and the May 9 protests, asking how the treatment of civilians involved in both incidents differed.
Justice Musarrat Hilali made the remarks during the hearing of the case pertaining to the trial of civilians in military courts,
A seven-member constitutional bench, headed by Justice Aminuddin Khan, heard the intra-court appeal against military trials of civilians.
During the proceedings, ex-chief justice Jawwad S. Khawaja's counsel, Khawaja Ahmad Hussain, argued that ordinary civilians were not subject to the Military Act, which applies only to civilian employees of the Pakistan Armed Forces.
Justice Hassan Rizvi inquired whether the Army Act applied to attacks on air bases, while Justice Hilali reiterated her concern over the different treatment of civilians in the APS attack and the May 9 protests.
Khawaja Ahmad Hussain explained that the APS attack was an act of terrorism, which led to the 21st Constitutional Amendment. Justice Hilali noted that the victims of the APS attack were all civilian children.
He maintained that while May 9 suspects should be tried, their cases should not fall under military courts.
Justice Aminuddin remarked that the judiciary has the authority to review any law that contradicts the Constitution.
Referring to the Pakistan Army's official May 9 statement, Hussain questioned the fairness of military trials, arguing that a victim cannot be both a party and a judge in the same case.
Justice Hilali responded that these arguments pertain to the merits of the case, while Justice Aminuddin urged the counsel to focus on legal aspects rather than broader implications.
Justice Mandokhail questioned the effectiveness of the 21st Constitutional Amendment, which established military courts for a four-year period, asking whether it had yielded any tangible benefits.
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