U.S. spy agencies told to gather intelligence on Greenland
U.S. officials have ordered spy agencies to ramp up efforts to gather intelligence on Greenland, according to two sources with knowledge of the matter, in a sign President Donald Trump apparently remains focused on acquiring the island.
The directive was first reported by The W all Street Journal.
The move has drawn objections from Denmark, a NATO ally which rules the semi-autonomous island.
Denmark's foreign minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, has said he will summon the American ambassador over the report. 'It worries me greatly because we do not spy on friends,' Rasmussen said, according to the Ritzau news agency.
The Office of the Director of Intelligence sent out a directive last week to intelligence agencies to gather information on Greenland's independence political movement, perceptions about U.S. interest in the island's resources and to identify people who back Washington's goals for the Arctic island, the sources said.
The directive came in the form of a 'collection emphasis message, ' which sets priorities for intelligence efforts, the sources said.
James Hewitt, a spokesman for the White House National Security Council, said in an email: 'We don't comment on matters of intelligence. However, the President has been very clear that the U.S. is concerned about the security of Greenland and the Arctic.'
The director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, alleged in a statement that government officials were trying to undercut Trump by leaking classified information.
'The Wall Street Journal should be ashamed of aiding deep state actors who seek to undermine the President by politicizing and leaking classified information,' the statement said. 'They are breaking the law and undermining our nation's security and democracy. Those who leak classified information will be found and held accountable to the fullest extent of the law.'
Gabbard added: 'I have referred three illegal leaks to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution, and we are investigating nearly a dozen more.'
It was unclear why the administration was turning to espionage to glean information on a U.S. ally that could likely be obtained by diplomats or open-source research, said Marc Polymeropoulos, a former career CIA officer.
'This seems to be something that could be handled by diplomatic and State Department channels,' he said. 'Why would you waste precious intelligence resources on this?'
In an interview last weekend with NBC News' Kristen Welker, Trump refused to rule out seizing the territory by force.
'I don't say I'm going to do it, but I don't rule out anything,' Trump said. 'We need Greenland very badly. Greenland is a very small amount of people, which we'll take care of, and we'll cherish them, and all of that. But we need that for international security.'
In a speech to a joint session of Congress in March, Trump said: 'One way or the other, we're going to get it.'
A January poll commissioned by the Danish newspaper Berlingske and Greenlandic daily Sermitsiaq showed 85% of Greenlanders do not want their island to become a part of the United States.
The U.S. military has a base in northwestern Greenland, which is part of a ballistic missile early-warning system.
Greenland has taken on increasing strategic importance as global warming has sparked a competition in the Arctic among the world's powers. And Greenland's rare earth minerals, uranium and iron are of increasing global interest as climate change could make those natural resources more accessible.
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