Rare video captures super pod of 2,000 dolphins breaching and playing off California coast
SAN FRANCISCO — A California boat captain has captured rare video of a super pod of more than 2,000 dolphins breaching off the coast of Monterey Bay, including the more elusive northern right whale dolphin.
Northern right whale dolphins are often spotted farther away from shore and in deeper waters, but Evan Brodsky, a captain and videographer with private boat tour company Monterey Bay Whale Watch, encountered the mammals last week about 11 miles from the harbor. The dolphins are one of two dolphin species without a dorsal fin.
'They're all smooth,' said Brodsky, and joked, 'When they jump, they look like flying eyebrows.'
Brodsky was out around noon Friday with two other crew members conducting research when they spotted a dozen dolphins. They followed the pod until they estimated there were more than 2,000 of them, including light gray baby calves, and several hundred Pacific white-sided dolphins.
'We were so excited it was hard to hold in our emotions. We had the biggest grins from ear to ear,' he said, adding that one of his coworkers may have shed a tear at the sight.
Northern right whale dolphins live in pods of 100 to 200, according to the nonprofit Whale and Dolphin Conservation. They are gregarious and highly social and often mix with other dolphin species, including Risso's dolphins, a super pod of which Brodsky captured on drone video last month.
Adults are about 10 feet long and weigh over 200 pounds, Brodsky said.
People come from around the world to try to see a northern right whale dolphin in the bay's deep underwater canyons, said Colleen Talty, a marine biologist with Monterey Bay Whale Watch. Monterey is about 120 miles south of San Francisco.
She said the dolphins could be clustering to fend off predators, feed on the same food or socialize.
'We don't always see baby dolphins,' she said, 'so that's pretty nice.'
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