Apple's China sales dip on local competition as US tariffs add to headache
Apple reported a decline in revenue for mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan for the quarter ended March 29, as the US tech giant continued to lose ground in the Chinese market amid a trade war with the US and fierce domestic competition.
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Sales in the so-called Greater China region fell 2.25 per cent to US$16 billion, down from US$16.37 billion a year ago, according to its earnings statement released on Thursday, reflecting ongoing challenges in Apple's second-largest market.
The iPhone maker's revenue in China has consistently declined in recent years. The company saw an 8 per cent drop in sales in the region for its financial year ending September 28, 2024, and a 2 per cent decline for the year ending September 30, 2023.
Apple's performance in China is closely monitored by analysts as a key indicator of the trade relationship between the world's two largest economies, which are under pressure from tariffs and geopolitical tensions.
Apple CEO Tim Cook attends the China Development Forum in Beijing in March. Photo: AP
Apple CEO Tim Cook said in a post-earnings call on Thursday that US President Donald Trump's new import tariff policy would result in about US$900 million in additional costs for the company this quarter.
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