Understanding Pakistan's balancing act on Iran

Indian Express

4 hours ago

Islamabad has extended strong rhetorical support to Tehran amid the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict, calling Israel's actions a 'violation of all rules of civilised behaviour…and international humanitarian law'.
Yet it has stopped short of making any tangible military commitments to Iran. Earlier this week, when a top Iranian general claimed on television that Pakistan had promised to extend its nuclear deterrent to Iran, Pak Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar issued a swift denial, saying 'there [had] been no such statement' from Islamabad's side.
Islamabad's tightrope walk vis-à-vis Tehran was also apparent in statements that came out during Army Chief General Asim Munir's visit to Washington this week. Even as Gen Munir in a public address on Wednesday declared 'clear and strong' support for Iran, the Pak military press release after his meeting with US President Donald Trump later that day simply stated that both US and Pakistan 'emphasised the importance of resolution of the conflict'.
This delicate, deliberate balancing act is a product of Pakistan's complicated relationship with Iran as well as larger geopolitical considerations, especially regarding its relationship with the US and anxieties about India.
The relationship between the two Islamic republics can be best described as fraternal and strategic albeit with perennially simmering mutual suspicion and hostility.
Iran was the first country to recognise Pakistan in 1947, and the Shah's regime extended military and diplomatic assistance to Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars. But beyond the oft-emphasised veneer of Islamic brotherhood lie a number of friction points, which have surfaced frequently in the years after the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
🔴 The 900-km Iran-Pakistan border runs through the Baloch heartland, with the Pak province of Balochistan on one side and the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan on the other. Each side accuses the other of providing safe haven to separatist groups. There have been at least 15 border clashes — most often after Iran has struck alleged terrorist targets across the border — in the past decade alone, most recently in January 2024.
🔴 Iran and Pakistan have historically been at odds over Afghanistan. Like India, Shia-majority Iran supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces in the late 1990s, out of concerns stemming from a strongly anti-Shia group ruling a neighbour with which it shares a 921-km-border. Notwithstanding the current strain in ties, Pakistan has historically patronised the Taliban.
🔴 Pakistan's relationship with Saudi Arabia, which funds and sustains several networks of Sunni madrasas in the country, has often come at the expense of its potential ties with Iran. This is notable given that Sunni sectarian groups in Pakistan, often nurtured in these madrasas, have long persecuted the country's Shia minority.
Iran's post-Revolution rupture with the US and Pakistan's continuing reliance on American support has further complicated the Islamabad-Tehran relationship. This is at the heart of Islamabad's current balancing act.
Pakistan is a rentier economy, reliant on foreign aid. During the Cold War, even as India chose to remain non-aligned, Pakistan under Gen Ayub Khan joined the Western bloc, positioning itself as a bulwark against communist expansion in South Asia.
This enshrined a certain reliance on the US that has persisted over the decades (although the relationship has seen its fair share of ups and downs, depending on Washington's interest in the region).
Post the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the US, Pakistan acted as a springboard for US action against Taliban in Afghanistan. Islamabad was the welcome recipient of an enormous amount of American material and military support during this time — whose dividends it continues to reap even today.
But NATO's pullout from Kabul in 2021, and Washington shifting from its Afghanistan-centric 'War on Terror' to more China-centric Indo-Pacific objectives removed the default reason for US-Pakistan cooperation. During his term, former US President Joe Biden neither spoke to nor met any senior Pak leader.
With Iran potentially becoming embroiled in a prolonged conflict with Israel (and by extension the US, although the degree of American involvement remains unclear), Pakistan likely sees an opening to restore its geostrategic importance to Washington. Even though it provides rhetorical support to Iran, its instant and vocal rejection of extending any military assistance to Tehran will be reassuring for the US (and Israel).
This might also make Pakistan an ideal player (at least in its own eyes) to potentially de-escalate the conflict, something that would further bolster its relevance for the US.
Trump said after his (long-scheduled) meeting with Gen Munir: '[The Pakistanis] know Iran very well, better than most… It's not that they're bad with Israel, they know them both actually…'.
On June 16, Pak Foreign Minister Dar claimed that Islamabad was making efforts to amplify Iran's willingness to negotiate with the US (contingent on Israel halting its strikes).
From India's perspective, there are three key points to note here.
🔴 India has long made efforts to isolate Pakistan diplomatically, and enjoyed a degree of success in this regard. But recent India-Pak hostilities during Op Sindoor, and the US response to them — Trump himself has repeatedly taken credit for the ceasefire, much to New Delhi's displeasure — has presented Islamabad with a window to re-hyphenate itself with New Delhi, and re-inject some substance in its bilateral relationship with the US.
Pakistan's attempts to play up American mediation (with regards to Op Sindoor), and its tone vis-à-vis Iran when talking to the US are a part of its ongoing strategy to regain relevance as a regional player.
🔴 Iran has been a key element in India's strategy to circumvent Pakistan in regional connectivity projects. India's investment and operation of the deep-sea port in Chabahar, and the International North South Trade Corridor through Iran, potentially threaten to undermine the importance of Pakistan's own deep sea port at Gwadar (merely 70 km away on the same coast).
Inherent limitations aside, Pakistan has sufficient reasons to make the most of any opportunity to wean Tehran away from New Delhi. Support for Iran, rhetorical though it may be, is seen by Islamabad as a means to do this, especially since New Delhi's own statements neither condemn nor condone either side. It must be noted, however, that this is insufficient to credibly threaten India-Iran ties, which are rooted in mutual strategic interests.
🔴 Pakistan's view of Israeli action against Iranian nuclear sites might also be coloured by its own experience during Op Sindoor, and the possibility of India hitting Pakistan's nuclear storage sites during a future conflict. For Pakistan, Israel's actions being potentially normalised by the international community might set a precedent for India to act similarly in the future.
That said, there is no comparison between Iran, which is yet to weaponise its nuclear capabilities and Pakistan, a declared nuclear weapons power for almost three decades. Unlike Israel, India remains committed to being a responsible nuclear weapons power, with respect for both international nuclear safety norms as well its 1991 agreement with Pakistan to not attack each other's nuclear installations.
Bashir Ali Abbas is a Senior Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi