Will a Strike Supersede the Nuclear Deal?

Asharq Al-Awsat

2 days ago

The recent spike in leaked intelligence assessments warning that the Israeli military could strike Iran's nuclear facilities should the ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran fall through, is redrawing the red lines around what Israel considers an 'existential threat' amid sweeping regional and international shifts.
Talk of an 'imminent strike' is not limited to speculation in the media any longer, and it is not another round of the war of words between the two sides. It has become the subject of intelligence reports, direct and indirect statements by Israeli and American officials, and discussions in think tanks across the globe.
More significantly, military experts are closely following the drills of the Israeli air force, precision munition transfers, and strategic deployments that suggest Israel is potentially ready to launch an attack within seven hours of a final decision, leaving the US intervention with a narrow window to intervene.
So, are we truly approaching zero hour? Or is this still all part of a complex messaging game that Israel and the United States are playing to pressure Iran? Moving on to the broader context, especially with the shifting balance of power in the region, do recent developments make a strike seem more or less likely?
Although Iran continues to enrich uranium at rates that border on the level needed to make weapons-grade levels (60 percent), it has lost much of its strategic leverage following devastating blows suffered by its regional proxies, particularly Hezbollah and Hamas. Their capacity to deter and support has severely diminished.
At the same time, the focused Israeli strikes on Iranian military and intelligence targets in October 2024, along with the mysterious blast at Shahid Rajaee Port in April that destroyed large stockpiles of solid fuel used in ballistic missiles, have clearly undercut Tehran's ability to respond with asymmetric escalation.
This erosion of Iran's deterrence tools makes Israeli military action more plausible, especially since its government has adopted a policy of 'preemptive defense' and typically prioritizes military considerations over political objectives.
The consensus in Israel has changed dramatically since the October 7 attack in 2023. The prevalent instinct is now that existential threats, like Iran's nuclear program, can no longer be tolerated or entrusted to the slow pace of diplomacy.
Thus, Washington's threat to end military and diplomatic coordination with Israel if the latter defies the timeline set by the US and undercut Washington's ongoing talks with Tehran, seems both strategic and serious. It signals that some in the US establishment are increasingly apprehensive about the prospect of an Israeli strike.
Crucially, key Arab states share this view. Regional capitals have openly rejected escalation by Israel that would foil the effort to reach a diplomatic resolution. These governments have also sent direct messages to Tehran, urging Iran to engage constructively with de-escalation efforts and avoid sliding into a broader conflict that would be disastrous for all sides.
Some are cautiously hoping that this emerging American-Arab umbrella could help reduce the risk of military escalation. For all the confidence he publicly demonstrates in Israel's ability to act independently, Prime Minister Netanyahu understands that launching a major operation without US support, and in clear defiance of influential regional actors, could incur steep strategic costs.
Complicating this picture further, an Israeli strike is unlikely to be 'surgical' in the traditional sense. Reports suggest it would be a prolonged campaign that spans several days and targets multiple sites deep within Iran. This makes uncontrolled escalation more likely and forces Israel to make complex security and defense calculations, despite Iran not having the capacity to inflict maximum punishment.
Although Donald Trump has shown no objection to Israeli threats being leaked to the media, since they add pressure on Iran, this convergence of interests is temporary. The US and Israel are managing optics without agreeing on substance. Trump would clearly rather seal a 'good' nuclear deal, sparing the US a regional fiasco and boosting his domestic political standing, furthering his personal ambitions, and bringing him closer to the Nobel Peace Prize.
Whether or not Israel ultimately conducts an attack, the current moment reflects fundamental shifts in the strategic calculus. Once able to rely on its proxies for deterrence, Iran now finds itself increasingly constrained. Israel, previously unable to proceed without an American green light, now has more room to maneuver. As for the United States, it had once been the uncontested architect of regional diplomacy and is now bound by the insular logic of 'America First.'
This is a moment of truth. It comes with great risks and carries rich implications. Either diplomacy succeeds in defusing the crisis through a real and durable solution, or we may be witnessing the opening chapter of a clash that could reshape the Middle East for generations.