Did China take a back seat by not having its defence minister attend this year's Shangri-La Dialogue?
SINGAPORE: Almost everyone was talking about China at the Shangri-La Dialogue this weekend. The main question: Why did Beijing opt not to send its defence minister?
For the large part of the three-day security forum held at the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore, China was not around to push back against the criticisms levelled against it. But it appears that this was a calculated loss that Beijing is prepared to accept.
US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth mentioned China about 20 times in his speech on May 31, as he urged other countries in the Indo-Pacific to increase their defence expenditure, buy more American arms and buffer themselves against the 'threat' posed by China.
French President Emmanuel Macron on May 30 invited the security policymakers and military chiefs attending the forum to think of Russia's aggression in Ukraine as what China might do to Taiwan or the Philippines.
The role of the Chinese defence minister is to conduct defence diplomacy and explain China's security positions to other countries. Had he been at this weekend's top security gathering in Singapore, Beijing would have had the podium for over an hour to respond to Washington and address the concerns raised by other delegates.
Not this year. For the first time since 2019, China's defence minister did not attend. This meant the platform set aside for China had to be downsized accordingly.
Its delegation chief – a military scholar with the rank of a one-star general – spoke in a smaller room to a smaller audience for a shorter time than the minister would have had. He was one of five panellists at one of the three concurrent sessions at the end of the day on May 31.
As the vice-president of the People's Liberation Army National Defence University, Rear-Admiral Hu Gangfeng is not involved in combat operations or policymaking.
He gave a brief response to Hegseth's speech, dismissing his criticisms as 'unfounded accusations' and going against the spirit of the forum, to reduce and not magnify differences.
The Chinese embassy in Singapore, which belongs to the ministry of foreign affairs and usually remains backstage at the defence ministry-driven Shangri-La Dialogue, made the unusual move of posting a response to Hegseth's speech on its Facebook page, describing it as 'steeped in provocations and instigation' and a relentless hyping of the China threat.
But China's overall response to its critics at the forum this year was markedly low-key compared with the year before.
In 2024, the Chinese defence ministry officials briefed reporters hours after then US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin gave his speech; Minister Dong Jun held court at a plenary session the next day; and just before the forum ended, four or five military experts stood in different corners of a hotel room to answer journalists' questions almost in a speed-dating format.
Did China shoot itself in the foot by ceding the space at the annual forum for the US to run with its narrative of rallying allies and partners in the region against Beijing?
Not necessarily.
A Chinese security expert explained that while the delivery style may differ, whoever represents China at the forum is expected to deliver the same talking points that have been pre-cleared by the senior leadership, at the apex of which is President Xi Jinping, the de facto commander-in-chief. He declined to be named as he was not cleared to speak to the media.
Rear-Adm Hu alluded to this on May 31 when pressed to explain the absence of the defence minister: 'Objectively speaking, I'm the appointed person today to convey our thinking and exchange views with you all. I suppose you would've heard clearly our true thinking.'
He argued that China's representation at the forum changes over the years, and this variance should be seen as a 'perfectly normal work arrangement that does not impact the actual efficacy of our sharing of defence policy thinking'.
But this does not mean that China has given up on the Shangri-La Dialogue and will never send its defence minister again. Rear-Adm Hu reaffirmed that China still values and sees the forum as a 'very good platform to engage and discuss with all parties about regional cooperation in Asia-Pacific'.
This raises the question – if so, why didn't Beijing send its top defence diplomat here?
Observers have proffered a number of theories for Admiral Dong's no-show. A likely explanation is that since the leaders of China and the US have not talked and decided at the highest level on how to manage the bilateral relations, which are fractious across trade, politics and security, there is not much that their defence ministers can meet and talk about, in practical terms.
Having bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the forum in the third-party ground of Singapore is the other main purpose of being here, besides to speak at the forum.
For example, when Adm Dong attended the forum in 2024 for the first time as defence minister, his bilateral meetings with the then Defence Secretary was crucial for a reset of China-US military ties, which had stalled after then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi angered China by visiting Taiwan in 2022.
Given the uncertainty and unpredictability of bilateral ties, China may have opted for a conservative, wait-and-see approach this year by sending a lower-level representation.
Another supplementary consideration is: While Adm Dong appeared to have been in the clear after reportedly being questioned for corruption last year, rumours of other generals being investigated for corruption continue to surface.
The absence of high-level military officials would forestall awkward questions, even in casual conversation.
As with many things related to the Communist Party of China, the full picture may never emerge. Two scholars in the official Chinese delegation confessed to The Straits Times that they simply did not know the reason Adm Dong did not attend this year's forum.
For this year, Hegseth gets the spotlight all to himself. - The Straits Times/ANN
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