Instead of wasting more time on the flawed Aukus submarine program, we must go to plan B now

The Guardian

11-03-2025

The Trump administration's actions in abandoning long-term alliances with Europe, support for Nato and Ukraine is a wakeup call. The new reality underscores the need for a fundamental review of arrangements to supply Australia's nuclear-powered submarines. We need a sovereign solution which avoids vulnerability to a change in US and UK priorities and shortfalls in their defence budgets.
The new UK-designed submarine, 'Aukus-SSN', is too big and too expensive for Australia's geographical and strategic needs. It is also likely to be too late and over budget. The UK's defence budget is under extreme stress as the country's priorities swing firmly to Europe.
The proposal to sell us submarines from the US navy's inventory as a stop gap is a pipe dream. Not only is the mix of different types of SSN logistically impractical for Australia's small navy but the US will not be able to construct additional submarines in time to meet its own needs and cover the gap between the retirement of the Collins until arrival of Aukus-SSN. As the nominee for head of policy at the Pentagon, Elbridge Colby, has warned, the US faces 'a very difficult problem' in meeting its pledge to supply three Virginia-class submarines to Australia.
It is time for plan B: building the smaller, cheaper, easier-to-crew French Suffren-class boat.
Timescale is the first critical criterion. The first of Australia's Collins-class submarines retires in 2038, having served 40 years. We should aim to commission a replacement submarine no later than 2036, providing two years to achieve an operational capability. Thereafter we should deliver a new submarine every two years, replacing each Collins as they retire. Nuclear propulsion provides higher speed and superior mobility. This makes the nuclear-powered submarine more flexible and survivable, compared with a conventional submarine.
Australia's submarines must be optimised for anti-submarine and anti-surface ship warfare. Intelligence and surveillance contribute to our understanding and provide warning of developing threats.
Personnel requirements are the second key issue. The Royal Australian Navy is already having difficulty recruiting and retaining personnel; the crew size of the new submarine should be a critical selection criterion.
Against this backdrop, the options for plan B are obvious (and limited). The Suffren-class SSN, now in production for the French Navy, meets these criteria. It would be significantly cheaper to build, own and crew than the Virginia or Aukus-SSN. Suffren's smaller size and better manoeuvrability makes it more capable in the shallow and confined waters of most interest to us in Australia's north.
Australia could operate the 12 Suffren demanded by our geography and still need fewer crew members and at less cost than the Aukus plan for eight larger submarines. Suffren is designed to Nato standards, assuring interoperability with US and UK allies.
We should cease making payments for unspecified and uncontracted support to the US and UK's submarine enterprises. We must begin urgent preparations for jointly building the first batch of three Suffren with France, before evolving to a fully Australian build, with Australian design support.
Issues such as where the first batch are built – Cherbourg or Adelaide – and the amount of change, if any, in the first batch are matters for early resolution. The priority should be meeting the delivery target. The ability to evolve the SSN design during the building program, to meet changes in both threat and requirement and to maximise an Australia-based supply chain should also be priorities.
This would be best achieved by Australia buying the design IP and rights, establishing a sovereign capability to act as the design authority for the new SSN; as was done for the Swedish-designed Collins class. Dependencies such as ongoing supply of the reactors, refuelling and design support should an integral part of the plan.
The incoming federal government, of whichever persuasion, needs to commit to urgent implementation of plan B, with an aim of beginning the build by 2028. Time is tight. This is not a case of 'she'll be right' – continuing to invest more time and resources in the flawed Aukus-SSN program, which is subject to US goodwill and vulnerable to US and UK's over-stretched defence budgets, is not an option if we are to develop a sovereign submarine capability.
In an increasingly uncertain world, we do not want to be left without submarines to protect an island nation.
Peter Briggs is a retired Royal Australian Navy rear admiral