Insurgents kill 22 people in Nigeria
At least 22 people have been killed and several others wounded in two separate attacks over the weekend in northeastern Nigeria, local authorities reported, amid renewed militant violence in the troubled region.
The assaults targeted villages in Borno and Adamawa states on Saturday. In Borno's Gwoza area, suspected Islamist militants ambushed a group of civilians, killing ten of them, according to Mohammed Shehu Timta, emir of the region. He said two members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) were killed in an earlier attack on Friday.
'They went to a nearby bush in search of firewood on Saturday when the boys [insurgents] ambushed them and killed ten and left two with life-threatening injuries,' local outlets, including the Punch Newspaper, cited Timta as saying.
In Adamawa State's Hong district, gunmen believed to be Boko Haram fighters raided Kopre village, where 10 people were killed and several others injured, residents said, according to Reuters. Police in Adamawa confirmed the incident, saying it also targeted local hunters and members of the CJTF.
In a statement on Monday, regional police spokesperson Suleiman Yahaya Nguroje announced that more officers, including soldiers, have been deployed to 'augment the security strength in Kopre.'
'The Adamawa State Police command in sustaining collaboration with sister security agencies particularly the Military, continues to demonstrate its commitment to improve security across the border to prevent violent crimes, protect lives and property, arrest and recover illegal possession of firearms,' he stated.
The assaults come amid growing warnings from officials about a resurgence of militant violence in the northeast. Earlier this month, Borno's governor reportedly acknowledged that Boko Haram fighters had resumed attacks and kidnappings.
The West African nation has long grappled with insurgency, with Islamic State-affiliated organizations and Boko Haram carrying out frequent attacks. According to United Nations estimates, the conflict between jihadists and the Nigerian government has killed tens of thousands and displaced over two million people.
While Nigeria's military intensifies its counterterrorism operations – including airstrikes on militant strongholds – these campaigns have at times inflicted civilian casualties. In December, the army reported that at least ten people were accidentally killed in a bombing raid targeting an armed group's base in the northwestern state of Sokoto.
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Russia Today
7 days ago
- Russia Today
Syrian leader threatened by militants who put him in power
The insurgents who toppled previous Syrian leader Bashar Assad's government and brought new interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa to power could now threaten his political survival, the Washington Post wrote on Saturday. Multiple militant groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) took power in Damascus late last year. They included thousands of foreign fighters who remain in Syria, some of whom have ties to extremist groups like Islamic State and other radical factions, the newspaper wrote. While al-Sharaa 'seems intent on keeping' some of them around as he courts Western support, the 'hard-line Sunni Muslim militants' are already giving him trouble, WaPo wrote. Some of the militants were involved in massacres of Alawites along the Syrian coast in March, the outlet added. At least 1,300 people, including 973 civilians, were killed in the span of a few days, according to local media. Christian and Druze communities in Syria have also reportedly faced bloody sectarian violence since the change in power. The most radical of the foreign Islamists are 'turning their ire' on al-Sharaa, because the new president has not implemented Sharia law and allegedly cooperated with the US and Türkiye to target extremist factions in Syria, WaPo wrote. Earlier in May, US President Donald Trump met with al-Sharaa and announced the lifting of sanctions, most of which had been imposed during the rule of Assad. Al-Sharaa has called Trump's move 'a historic and courageous decision, which alleviates the suffering of the people, contributes to their rebirth, and lays the foundations for stability in the region.' Shortly after the Trump-Sharaa meeting, a top ideologue of Salafi jihadism, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, issued a fatwa branding the new Syrian leader an 'infidel.' Syria remains a hotbed of extremist activity and could destabilize at any time, according to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The country has become 'a playground for jihadist groups, including ISIS and others,' the top diplomat warned last week, adding that it could be 'weeks – not many months – away from potential collapse and a full-scale civil war.'
Russia Today
30-05-2025
- Russia Today
What is Trump's game in Syria?
US President Donald Trump's recent announcement that he intends to lift all sanctions on Syria stands as one of the most unexpected and controversial foreign policy moves Washington has made in the past decade. Declared during Trump's Middle East tour at the US-Saudi Investment Forum in Riyadh, the decision marks a dramatic shift in America's approach to the region – one that could reshape the strategic landscape for both allies and adversaries. The sanctions on Syria, first imposed in 1979, were progressively tightened over decades in response to accusations of sponsoring terrorism, human rights abuses, and close ties with Iran. Their full repeal is an unprecedented gesture, especially considering that Syria's current president, Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, was until recently regarded by the US as a senior figure in Al-Qaeda – with a $10 million bounty once placed on his capture. In return, Damascus has made a series of strategic commitments. According to Trump, al-Sharaa has pledged to prevent the resurgence of Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS), bring all jihadist detention camps under state control, and expel all foreign terrorist formations from Syrian soil. This latter promise is particularly significant, as these militant units – many of them composed of fighters from Central Asia – played a pivotal role in the collapse of Bashar Assad's regime and the rise of the current leadership. Many of these same groups are also responsible for large-scale ethnic purges, including the massacres of Alawites and other religious minorities earlier this year. Thus, Trump's proposal does more than legitimize al-Sharaa's regime – it places on it the mantle of a regional stabilizer, albeit one whose legitimacy remains heavily disputed. The decision to lift sanctions cannot be divorced from Washington's broader economic and strategic interests. That the announcement came in Saudi Arabia is no coincidence – it signals a broader understanding with Riyadh, which is eager to deepen its footprint in post-conflict Syria. From the US perspective, the Syria deal is a building block in a new Middle Eastern architecture – one dominated by pro-Western governments and designed to neutralize Iranian influence. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have long viewed Syria's reconstruction as an opportunity to entrench themselves politically and economically. US sanctions had previously prevented them from acting overtly, and the lifting of restrictions may now be part of a grander bargain: Riyadh receives a green light to invest in Syria, while Washington secures massive financial commitments. On May 14 – the day of Trump's announcement – Saudi Arabia signed a $142 billion arms deal with the US and pledged an additional $600 billion in American investments. At first glance, Trump's move might appear as a betrayal of Israeli interests – an accusation made in several media commentaries. Yet in practice, Israel gains a neighbor that, while unpredictable, is now positioned to suppress Islamist radicals within its borders. This allows it to refocus on countering Iran and Hezbollah without the added distraction of threats emanating from Syria. The lifting of sanctions also aligns with Türkiye's strategic goals. President Erdogan, just prior to the Trump-al-Sharaa meeting, personally urged the US president to dismantle the sanctions. Türkiye is a key partner of Syria's new leadership but has been constrained by its own economic crisis. Moreover, the sanctions hindered Ankara's allies – particularly Qatar – from taking part in Syria's postwar reconstruction. In sum, Trump's Syrian deal represents more than just a diplomatic maneuver; it is a bold attempt to reengineer the regional balance of power. Whether it brings long-term stability or fuels new fault lines remains to be seen – but its impact on the Middle East is already unmistakable. The developments unfolding in Syria following the rise to power of Ahmed al-Sharaa increasingly evoke the atmosphere of 2011 – the era of the Arab Spring, when the Middle East fractured into two ideological and geopolitical camps. At the time, Türkiye and Qatar actively championed the cause of 'political Islam', seeking to expand their influence through the emergence of Islamist-oriented governments. In contrast, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates perceived Islamist forces as a direct threat to regional stability and the survival of their monarchical order. Today, under al-Sharaa's leadership, Syria once again reflects that same fault line. A sense of déjà vu looms: The region's main players find themselves navigating renewed tensions, caught between the desire to preserve influence and the necessity of adapting to a rapidly evolving reality. Ankara and Doha, both instrumental in al-Sharaa's ascent, view his leadership as an opportunity to reclaim their diminished standing in the Levant. Despite its internal economic turmoil, Türkiye continues to position itself as a regional arbiter, relying on a network of loyal political and military actors within Syria. Qatar, for its part, is providing financial and diplomatic support, effectively replicating the strategy it previously deployed in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia. Yet the current landscape differs markedly from that of 2011. Al-Sharaa, though buoyed by Turkish support, has signaled a desire for greater autonomy from the outset. His first official foreign visit was not to Ankara, but to Riyadh – a symbolic gesture toward Saudi Arabia and the UAE, whose economic power is now essential for Syria's reconstruction. It was also a clear signal that Damascus is open to dialogue, even with those who once backed the opposing side in the civil war. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the resurgence of politically motivated Islamist forces is a source of deep concern, though their response has remained deliberately muted. Rather than overt confrontation, these Gulf monarchies have opted for economic engagement, believing that financial leverage will grant them influence while curbing radicalization. They also see the new Syrian leadership as a potential partner in shaping a new Middle Eastern order – provided that Damascus does not become an instrument of Turkish expansionism. This explains al-Sharaa's active display of 'independent maneuvering', as he skillfully balances between centers of power – from the Gulf to Ankara, from Washington to Moscow. Amid this geopolitical mosaic, the US has crafted a new strategic vision. Under Trump's leadership, US policy increasingly focuses on economic leverage and security cooperation while moving away from direct military engagement in the Middle East. Trump proposes a new model: 'Regional self-sufficiency' under an American umbrella. The essence of this model is to arm and equip regional actors, enabling them to maintain stability independently, with the US acting as a supplier of advanced technology and a guarantor of balance. In return, Washington demands loyalty, political restraint, and – crucially – substantial financial contributions. This underpins the strategic alignment with Gulf monarchies, who possess the means and motivation to counterbalance Iran. At the same time, Trump is attempting to bridge the divide between Türkiye and Israel, laying the groundwork for an economic partnership despite ideological differences. The goal is to prevent friction among US allies and to forge a unified front against Iran and other hostile forces. Syria, in this context, becomes a testing ground for America's new security architecture – a controlled regional equilibrium maintained without the Pentagon's direct footprint. If successful, this model could be replicated in other crisis zones. A potential next step is the normalization of relations between Syria and Israel – a previously unimaginable prospect, now discussed as part of a broader settlement. In parallel, Trump plans to introduce a new Middle East peace framework that includes recognition of Palestine in exchange for diplomatic and economic incentives from Arab states. This scenario may also presage political change in Israel: If Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu resists the plan, centrist alternatives like Yair Lapid or Benny Gantz – more amenable to compromise – could come to the fore. All of this unfolds against the backdrop of a fundamental reordering of US global priorities. Washington is increasingly pivoting toward the containment of China, its primary strategic rival in the 21st century. The Middle East is no longer seen as a vital sphere; the new approach favors balance over expansion, mediation over presence, partnership over intervention. Thus, US regional strategy is evolving from rigid control to a more adaptive configuration – one in which local actors are granted greater autonomy, though still within an overarching framework engineered in Washington. Syria may well serve as the first case study of this new era – an era in which the return to the logic of 2011 unexpectedly becomes the launchpad for a very different Middle East. The US decision to lift sanctions on Syria following the rise of al-Sharaa to power marks a pivotal moment for a country that has endured over a decade of devastating war, international isolation, and socioeconomic collapse. This move not only removes one of the most significant external constraints on the Syrian leadership, but also opens a window of opportunity to construct a new model of governance – one grounded in pragmatism, economic rationality, and cautious multilateralism. Al-Sharaa now faces a critical choice: To use this opportunity to consolidate centralized authority and restore effective governance – or, through missteps or weakness, to allow Syria to fragment further into a collection of ethno-regional entities devoid of a unifying national project. The World Bank has cleared over $15 million of Syrian debt, once again making the country eligible for participation in international financing programs. This development was made possible through targeted financial contributions from the Gulf states – particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar – signaling their intention to take the lead in Syria's reconstruction. Following this, the IMF expressed its readiness to provide technical assistance, while the Syrian authorities issued a series of statements inviting investment in agriculture, energy, transportation infrastructure, and tourism. These actions indicate the new regime's ambition to craft an economic model that not only addresses the war's legacy but also generates employment, stabilizes the currency, boosts public revenues, and – most importantly – restores public trust in the institution of the state. However, economic recovery is only feasible if accompanied by the genuine restoration of governance. Syria remains deeply fragmented. Kurdish regions in the northeast are governed by a de facto autonomous administration with its own armed forces and international channels. In the south, the Druze community in Suwayda exhibits growing political and organizational independence, alongside protest movements and local defense initiatives. Along the coastal regions – home to significant Alawite and Christian minorities – distrust toward centralized power continues to grow, especially amid persistent ethno-sectarian tensions. These communities, should the center weaken, may gravitate toward political separatism or at least self-organization into autonomous administrative structures. If the al-Sharaa government fails to propose a coherent model of political integration – one that includes power-sharing, resource distribution, and the participation of regional elites in governance – Syria could enter a new phase of 'soft disintegration': A de facto federalization where unity is maintained in name only. In this context, foreign policy becomes critically important. Fully aware of the dangers of unilateral alignment, Ahmed al-Sharaa is pursuing a balanced external strategy. Unlike the previous era, which was defined by dependence on a narrow circle of allies, Syria's new president is embracing a diversified diplomatic approach. He seeks to build relations with the West and the US – especially in the context of economic recovery and Syria's international rehabilitation – without abandoning existing strategic ties. It is within this framework that Russia remains a key partner to Syria across several strategic domains. Russia continues to play a central role in Syria's security architecture and diplomatic positioning, including defending Syrian interests at the UN Security Council and engaging in technical, military, and energy cooperation. Its presence in Tartus and Khmeimim, involvement in humanitarian initiatives, and potential contributions to infrastructure reconstruction ensure its continued relevance in any long-term settlement scenario. At the same time, Damascus under al-Sharaa is also looking to build stronger ties with other non-Western power centers – including China, India, and Brazil – while deepening economic engagement with the Arab world. This will help Syria avoid overdependence on any single actor and enhance its strategic flexibility amid global uncertainty. This approach reflects a clear-eyed understanding of Syria's geopolitical reality: The country can no longer afford to be part of rigid geopolitical axes. Its survival now depends on its ability to navigate between competing powers – leveraging their rivalry for national benefit without becoming anyone's pawn. Maintaining cooperative relations with Russia and expanding dialogue with non-Western powers is not just a matter of foreign policy – it is a means of preserving autonomy in a context of limited sovereignty. The lifting of sanctions and al-Sharaa's ascent have opened a potential path toward stabilization. But the durability of this trajectory depends on the regime's ability not only to harness economic resources but also to execute a complex, multi-layered political and diplomatic agenda. Domestically, this means launching mechanisms of integration and decentralization; externally, it requires deft maneuvering between Western and non-Western actors. In this evolving environment, Russia remains an important partner for Syria – not as an exclusive ally, but as a key component in the multifaceted diplomacy that al-Sharaa will seek to construct in order to reinforce not just his own authority, but the very foundations of the Syrian state.
Russia Today
05-05-2025
- Russia Today
International car-smuggling ring exposed in Africa
Interpol has located around 150 stolen vehicles and seized 75 as the result of an operation in 12 West African countries, the Аfrique-sur7 news agency reported on Sunday. The vehicles were stolen in the EU and Canada before being smuggled, it added. Operation 'Safe Wheels' was carried out from March 17 to 30 in cooperation with law enforcement agencies from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire), Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo. Most of the stolen vehicles were transported from Canada, with others reported stolen in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Toyota models were the most represented among the seized vehicles, followed by Peugeot and Honda. In Lagos, Nigeria, customs officers discovered six vehicles in freight containers arriving from Canada. Four of the vehicles showed signs of break-in and all six were confirmed as stolen in Canada in 2024. David Caunter, director of organized and emerging crime at Interpol, stated, 'Each year, hundreds of thousands of vehicles are stolen around the world, yet the initial theft is often only the beginning of a vehicle's journey into the global criminal underworld.' 'Stolen vehicles are trafficked across the globe, traded for drugs and other illicit commodities, enriching organized crime groups and even terrorists,' he added. According to Interpol's press service, stolen vehicles uncovered during the operation were smuggled using both land and maritime routes. The operation also led to the initiation of 18 new investigations and uncovered the involvement of two organized crime groups. During the 'Screen West Africa 2024' operation, more than 100 luxury vehicles stolen from Canada and various European countries were recovered, revealing a network that smuggled stolen cars into West Africa, Interpol's press service announced in January. Nearly half of the recovered vehicles were traced back to Canada. 'The proceeds from these stolen vehicles often fund organized crime activities, including arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and terror networks,' the press service said. In 2024, approximately 270,000 vehicles were identified as stolen globally through the Stolen Motor Vehicle (SMV) database.
