Cambodian soldier killed in clash with Thai army at disputed border
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A Cambodian soldier was killed on Wednesday after an exchange of gunfire with the Thai army at the border, a Cambodian army spokesman said, a rare fatality in a long sensitive frontier region.
"One of our soldiers died during the fight, and there were some injuries, but we don't have detailed figures yet", said Cambodian Royal Army spokesman Mao Phalla.
The Royal Thai Army said in a statement that the clash happened after Cambodian soldiers started firing near Ubon Ratchathani province in Thailand's east.
Thai soldiers fired back in response to gunshots from Cambodia's border force, leading to an exchange lasting around 10 minutes before the Cambodians requested a ceasefire, according to the Thai army statement.
Mao Phalla confirmed "there were clashes", but said Thai soldiers had attacked Cambodian troops who were on border patrol duty in northern Preah Vihear province, which borders Ubon Ratchathani.
"Our soldiers died in the trenches. The Thais came to attack us," he said.
Bloody military clashes between Cambodia and Thailand erupted in 2008 over the site of an ancient Khmer temple in Preah Vihear located near the border.
The row over a patch of land next to the 900-year-old Preah Vihear temple led to several years of sporadic violence, resulting in at least 28 deaths before the International Court of Justice ruled the disputed area belonged to Cambodia.
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