Stock markets tumble globally as new Trump tariffs hit China, Canada and Mexico
Stock markets worldwide fell sharply on Tuesday after US President
Donald Trump threatened to take a sledgehammer to the global economy, sparking fears of a global trade war following his imposition of a blanket 25 per cent levy on all Canadian and Mexican imports and an additional 10 per cent on Chinese goods.
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Pressured by their respective companies and a desire not to look weak domestically, America's three biggest trading partners teed up retaliatory tariffs. The three account for some 42 per cent of all imports into the US, the world's largest economy.
As the world woke up to the fact this was actually happening, analysts sought to assess how long the tariffs were likely to last, with China's expected to be more 'sticky' and less easily rolled back – seen in Trump's decision to levy lower levels on China.
'He intends on keeping the China tariffs on for the long term, which means he needs to proceed in such a way that they are seen as manageable, not least from a market perspective,' said Andrew Bishop of consultancy firm Signum Global Advisors.
'Whereas we have high conviction he'll be repealing the blanket North American tariffs in short order,' he added.
The three countries quickly signalled their resolve to fight back.
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