US-Israeli aid mechanism complicit in war crimes, UN says
At least 410 Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli military while trying to collect aid from the controversial new US-Israeli aid hubs in Gaza, which is "a likely war crime," the United Nations human rights office, Ohchr, said on Tuesday.
'Israel's militarised humanitarian assistance mechanism is in contradiction with international standards on aid distribution,' spokesperson Thameen al-Keetan said in a statement.
'The weaponization of food for civilians, in addition to restricting or preventing their access to life-sustaining services, constitutes a war crime and, under certain circumstances, may constitute elements of other crimes under international law.'
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
The National
3 hours ago
- The National
The UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon needs retooling
The fate of Unifil, the UN interim force in Lebanon, whose renewal is scheduled in August, may be hanging by a thread. According to the Hebrew version of the Israeli daily Israel Hayom on June 8, the US and Israel have agreed to end the force's operations, with Washington having a major say in the matter as it funds around a quarter of its budget. The final outcome remains unclear, however, and the Lebanese authorities remain optimistic that Unifil's mandate will be renewed. More relevant today, however, is that the context has substantially changed in the past six months, encompassing the uncertainties surrounding the conflict involving the US, Israel and Iran. When Lebanon and Israel reached a ceasefire agreement last November, one aspect of the deal was the strengthening and expansion of a committee whose role would be to 'monitor, verify, and assist in ensuring enforcement of [the agreement]'. The parties agreed it would be headed by a US general and include a French representative, in addition to Lebanese, Israeli and Unifil representatives. In parallel, the administration of former US president Joe Biden had sent Israel a letter on the side in which it gave the Israeli government the right to strike militarily against any violation of the agreement – immediately in south Lebanon and only after giving the Lebanese army time to do so first in other parts of the country. The Donald Trump administration has maintained the same approach, and Israel continues to attack Hezbollah targets to this day. Israel can achieve its objectives more forcefully and directly through a hegemonic military approach that doesn't require it to navigate through international institutions, for which it has contempt Not surprisingly, this situation has encouraged Israel to go along with any American decision to terminate Unifil. There is nothing more the Israeli government would like than to exploit the free rein that Washington has accorded them in Lebanon, without the burden of international oversight through the UN force. At a time when Israel has significantly expanded its regional ambitions and is operating freely in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and now Iran – in preparation for what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called a 'new Middle East" – Unifil represents a hindrance. Today, the Israelis can achieve their objectives more forcefully and directly through a hegemonic military approach that doesn't require them to navigate through international institutions, for which they have contempt. One would assume that unconditional US backing for Israel, coupled with US President Donald Trump's antipathy towards spending his country's money on UN endeavours, means that Unifil may be doomed. While that may be the case, the regional situation simply cannot be ignored in assessing the force's future. Mr Trump, whatever his commitment to Israel, is not someone who relishes being dragged into conflicts not of his choosing. Southern Lebanon creates such a risk. While there are indications he knew of the recent Israeli attack on Iran, the fact that Israel did not deliver a knockout blow and that the US intervened last weekend has created political problems for Mr Trump. It not only divided his base, there were never any guarantees Washington had a silver bullet guaranteeing victory against Iran. If this invites more caution from the US President, he may have an interest in ensuring that Unifil remains in place, as it may bring an added level of stability to southern Lebanon. In other words, while the US may cut its spending for the UN force, it may also be more amenable to compromises that keep Unifil alive. Among the potential ideas circulating is that Unifil be retooled and made to adapt to the new political environment in Lebanon – what Assaf Orion, an Israeli general at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has called 'forging Unifil 3.0'. This would involve cutting the force's numbers to make it leaner, satisfying the cost-cutting preferences of the Americans, while allowing it to more effectively support the Lebanese army in asserting its authority in the country's south. Mr Trump's recent statements in Saudi Arabia implied that he would like to calm the situation in the region. This doesn't square with Israel's plans to impose its will by force on surrounding countries. What kind of tranquillity can be achieved if Israel continues to bomb Lebanon, Syria and Iran, while threatening Turkey because of its expanding influence in Syria? In other words, a peaceful Middle East cannot follow from Israel's desire to sustain its regional military supremacy. Whether any of the people close to the President who are of Lebanese origin will have a say on Unifil is an interesting, speculative question. It can't be ruled out that Thomas Barrack, Mr Trump's envoy to Turkey and Syria, Michel Issa, the new ambassador to Lebanon, and Massad Boulos, whose son is married to one of Mr Trump's daughters, may be asked privately to weigh in on Lebanese affairs. It would be in character for Mr Trump to consult with those around him if Unifil renewal were brought to his attention. While nothing indicates that the ethnic origins of these individuals would shape their advice if they were asked for their views, Mr Barrack and Mr Issa might seek outcomes that benefit them in their respective roles. Anything that avoids rocking the Lebanese boat may be such a thing. It is too early to say what will happen to Unifil. However, one thing seems increasingly evident: the force cannot go on as it is. The situation in Lebanon and the region has changed too much, so that it makes sense to assimilate these changes into Unifil's role, which has to be reinforced. Killing Unifil, on the other hand, would merely create an uneasy vacuum that only makes matters worse.
The National
3 hours ago
- The National
What companies can do to mitigate risks of Middle East conflict
For years, multinational companies operated in the Middle East with the belief that while politics could flare up, trade would largely continue. That assumption, while once reasonable, is now under serious strain. The war between Israel and Iran leaves companies facing the prospect of major operational disruption. Political instability in the Middle East is not new. From the Iran-Iraq Tanker War in the 1980s to the 1990 Gulf War, the region has experienced repeated shocks. Yet despite these disruptions, commercial flows (particularly energy) have largely continued. That continuity is now threatened. As long-time adversaries Israel and Iran exchange air strikes and retaliations, and the US repositions naval assets to the region, companies doing business in the Middle East are confronting a hard truth: supply chains are not protected from conflict; they are increasingly shaped by it. What's the impact? The war poses serious operational risks – not only for companies with direct exposure in the Middle East, but also for global firms reliant on the region's shipping corridors. Vital routes through the Strait of Hormuz and major regional ports such as Jebel Ali, Sohar and Fujairah serve as critical nodes in global supply chains, handling oil, liquefied natural gas, container freight, auto parts and electronics bound for markets across Asia and Europe. Disruptions in the Gulf ripple outward, driving up freight costs, delaying shipments and straining inventory systems around the globe. Energy, manufacturing and logistics firms, even those with their headquarters in Europe, Asia or North America, remain tightly bound to these flows. A case in point is the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway that links the Gulf to the Arabian Sea. Roughly one fifth of the world's oil passes through this chokepoint. It also functions as a vital artery for container traffic in and out of Dubai's Jebel Ali port. Since the war started, insurance premiums for ships passing through the strait have jumped more than 60 per cent, reflecting fears of missile attacks and electronic interference. Freight rates for large crude carriers from the Gulf to China have more than doubled. Many shipping firms, including Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd, began diverting vessels around Africa's Cape of Good Hope months ago to avoid attacks from Houthi rebels in the Red Sea. These detours have already introduced delays and higher fuel costs. The Israel-Iran conflict has expanded the threat zone into the Gulf and eastern Mediterranean, prompting some tanker companies like Frontline to refuse new contracts through Hormuz. What can companies do? The first step in response is clear-eyed stress testing. Too often, this takes the form of box-ticking exercises. But in the current environment, firms must go deeper. An effective stress test maps all critical inputs – logistics routes, suppliers, warehousing nodes – and then runs real scenarios: What if the northern Israeli port city Haifa is offline for two weeks? What if Hormuz is blocked for five days?Overflight permissions above Israel, Iran and nearby airspace have already been revoked or restricted, forcing carriers to reroute flights and suspend operations. The operational cost is no longer hypothetical. The goal isn't to predict the future, but to prepare for plausible disruptions. Each scenario requires firms to estimate recovery time, switching costs and the impact on customers. Where backup options don't already exist – alternative ports, substitute suppliers or inland storage – they must be established before disruption forces a reaction. The urgency is particularly acute for exporters racing to shift goods ahead of the US administration's 'liberation day' tariff hikes – most visibly seen in the surge in container bookings between Asia and the US. When companies front-load goods, disruptions in major shipping lanes suddenly become a major vulnerability. Even a small delay in a critical route like the Gulf, Red Sea or Hormuz can disrupt timed inventory strategies, sharply increase costs, and risk stock-outs. Another pressure point is insurance. Coverage for assets, cargo and personnel in the Gulf is being rapidly repriced, as war-risk premiums on tankers soar. Boards must reassess their financial shields. Which facilities and transit corridors are still insurable? Are policies clear on what constitutes a conflict zone? Is coverage structured to remain valid amid escalation? In this environment, firms with deep local networks are better placed to cope with uncertainty. Local partners offer more than market access – they provide intelligence, continuity and leverage. When international trade routes are under stress, it is local agents who know which port remains operational, which corridors are open and which ministries are accessible. In a crisis, corporate headquarters are often the last to know. Local partners are often the first. This does not mark a full withdrawal from the region. The Middle East remains central to global energy and shipping flows. But it does signal a recalibration – away from blanket engagement and towards more selective, risk-adjusted exposure. Companies with assets near active conflict zones are likely to reallocate rather than withdraw, shifting operations towards more stable Gulf states such as the UAE or Oman. As a result, regional supply chains are being quietly restructured, not for speed or cost, but for resilience. This shift was already in motion. The latest escalation will only accelerate it. For corporate boards, the question is no longer whether to act, but how fast. That starts with diversifying suppliers and routes to avoid over-reliance on any single area. It also means identifying which products and markets matter most, and protecting those first.
Middle East Eye
6 hours ago
- Middle East Eye
US to fund controversial Gaza aid group with $30m: Report
The Reuters news agency reported on Tuesday that the US is giving $30m to the scandal-plagued Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), a private US initiative backed by Israel that has been behind deadly food distribution sites in Gaza. Reuters cites four of its own sources as well as a government document it has reviewed for its story. This is the first known US government financial contribution to the organisation, which uses private US military and logistics firms to transport aid into the Palestinian enclave for distribution at so-called secure sites, where Palestinians have been shot dead while seeking help. At least 410 Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli military while trying to get aid from the distribution hubs in Gaza, which the UN says is "likely war crime", adding that 'scores of people of all ages are being killed and injured every day'. The document seen by Reuters showed an initial $7m disbursement had been made. The US could approve additional monthly grants of $30 million for the GHF.
