Historic opportunity for courage and creativity
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LABOR LANDSLIDE
David Crowe epitomises Labor's victory in three vivid words – historic, stunning, extraordinary – before concluding his analysis with a slew of economic, political and security danger signs ('The sheer drama of this victory cannot hide the trouble for the future', 4/5). It's a truism to say that danger offers opportunity. Time will tell whether Labor uses its majority to seize the historic opportunity it has to confront those dangers with courage and creativity.
Unmentioned in Crowe's list and ignored throughout the campaign, the biggest opportunity Labor has is robust action to care for the Earth, keep our atmosphere healthy, and protect our rivers and oceans. The decimation of the Coalition poses the threat of complacency. Let's hope Labor is true to its ideals, shrugs lethargy off and acts boldly for nature and all of us.
Tom Knowles, Parkville
Intelligence and humanity on his side
'With great power comes great responsibility' is a well-worn trope, but of particular relevance now. Anthony Albanese has the power of US President Donald Trump but in his case, he has intelligence, knowledge and humanity on his side. Albanese and his team have the potential to do great things looking towards the future.
Peter Russo, West Brunswick
Channelling a Labor light
I was struck by how the prime minister was channelling Bob Hawke in his speech on the re-election of his government. It was wonderful to see his positive, strong attitude. Congratulations to the Labor Party on a spectacular win.
Maureen Goldie, Blackwood, SA
Time to address treatment of asylum seekers
The prime minister's commitment to fairer, aspirational and greater opportunities in his victory speech was uplifting. An opportunity open for actioning these values is to address the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in Australia or under its jurisdiction. Grant permanent visas to those assessed under the fast-track system, to those who arrived by boat, and to those who remain dumped in Papua New Guinea. And cease placing on Nauru those seeking asylum in our country. Jenni King, Camberwell
Impressive return, but there are lessons to learn
Labor deserves congratulations on its impressive return to government. Nonetheless, despite the euphoria of its substantive victory, the reality is it failed to be the first preference of almost two-thirds of the electorate.
Brian Marshall, Ashburton
Let's now look to the long term
Was the Labor win a reflection of support for Labor's plan? Or was it a reflection that the Greens are too far left and Liberals too far right? Either way, let's get past short-term politics and set some policies that are for the good of the country long term.
John Murray, Hawthorn East
Dutton still paying for time as Morrison's minister
Commentators and political observers often fail to recognise that an election is simply a snapshot in time and that a political trend may not end on election day. Saturday's result clearly indicates that the electorate had not finished punishing Scott Morrison in 2022 for the horrors of his government. Hence, Peter Dutton became the victim of further backlash and was punished not for his performance as opposition leader but for being a prominent minister in the Coalition government that performed so badly and cruelly in its final term.
Labor is the happy beneficiary of this trend but they should not be fooled into believing the result is a ringing endorsement of the government's performance in the past three years.
Robert James, Bentleigh
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The Advertiser
6 hours ago
- The Advertiser
Arbitrarily increasing defence spending would be a tremendous waste of money. Here's why
The United States is again putting a full-court press on Western nations to boost defence spending. There were reports this week that NATO members are expected to raise defence spending until they spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence. This would include almost doubling spending on defence platforms and assets (from 2 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP) and committing a further 1.5 per cent of GDP on defence-related investments including cyber security. The Treasurer pushed back, saying Australia had already taken significant steps by boosting spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP. He is right to rebuff this target, but not because Labor's defence spending commitment is sufficient for the job. The better reason to reject arbitrary spending levels for defence against GDP is that they tell you almost nothing about the defence capabilities Australia has - or the appropriateness of our defence spending arrangements. In truth, if Australia was to expand its defence spending but continue to spend it in the same way, there is little guarantee of a genuine improvement in our position. Unfortunately, the reality is that both sides of politics have allowed industry concerns and state government parochialism to dominate defence needs when it comes to procurement. There is no better example than our submarine program. Defence ministers continue to insist it is imperative for Australia to have the capability to design and manufacture submarines. This has led to us adopting risky, bespoke submarine designs, creating expensive orphan submarine classes (ones that are used by only one country). Risky procurements like orphan submarines inevitably run over time and over budget. There is also the potential for significant redesign and development costs - especially when those designing and constructing the submarines are effectively learning on the job. The terrible troubles that plagued the Collins Class for the first decade after it was commissioned were a case in point. The fact that we have made so little actual progress on the Collins replacement more than 15 years after the replacement project was first announced is further testament to that fact. Australia is now looking at a path of manufacturing nuclear submarines, an even more complex industry development task than the one we embarked on in the 1980s with the Collins. If Australia wanted to a see an actual return from investing money in industry development, we'd be better off committing to improving the US supply chain for Virginia Class submarines. At least, we'd know from the beginning that those companies can build and deliver a submarine. This is not at all guaranteed should we commit to building an entirely new sub here. Given the risks of cost and time blowouts are well known, why do governments like Australia persist with such a risky procurement strategy? The answer is simple: politics. When it comes to defence spending, there is enormous political pressure from states like South Australia and Victoria to use defence dollars to conduct industry policy. In the case of the submarines, Australia's defence needs have been running a distant second to the need to commit to spending the money in Adelaide. Instead of focusing on how to get the best value capabilities for the money being invested, or ensuring that Australia can fulfil its required defence goals, the states compete to outbid each other for federal defence dollars to be spent in their state. The point is not that Australian defence industry is incapable of producing quality defence equipment; it's that spending the money in Australia for its own sake does nothing for defence. In fact, a disturbing percentage of our defence spending amounts to little more than money laundering handouts to the state governments. In that sense, we are right to push back against NATO and the US. Our approach shouldn't be to raise defence spending, it should be to improve defence capability to meet the tasks required of us. In practice, this means two things. First, Australians need far more clarity on what our defence force is actually for. Without greater clarity on what we are hoping to achieve in the defence space, it is all but impossible for people to understand whether we are headed down the right path. In a world where there is enormous competition for every dollar of government spending, the defence establishment must be as vocal as any other interest group as to why it needs more money. Second, we must genuinely commit to acquiring the capabilities that will best enable us to achieve the goals we have set for our defence force. This may mean some politically unpopular decisions need to be made. So be it. Our politicians are not elected to compete with each other over who can give the most money to the states. In an environment of genuine threats to Australia's safety, we must be ruthless in culling projects that are not meeting our needs. This change in approach should enable us to be far more agile in our defence planning. At the moment, because we are beholden to state government interests, we are committing to defence expenditure decades in advance that may or may not be wasted by the time it is spent. It is clear there has been a significant change in global attitudes to defence and, in particular, defence spending. This is an opportunity for Australia to start taking the issue of defence more seriously. However, throwing tens of billions more dollars at the existing system would be a terrible way to do that. The United States is again putting a full-court press on Western nations to boost defence spending. There were reports this week that NATO members are expected to raise defence spending until they spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence. This would include almost doubling spending on defence platforms and assets (from 2 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP) and committing a further 1.5 per cent of GDP on defence-related investments including cyber security. The Treasurer pushed back, saying Australia had already taken significant steps by boosting spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP. He is right to rebuff this target, but not because Labor's defence spending commitment is sufficient for the job. The better reason to reject arbitrary spending levels for defence against GDP is that they tell you almost nothing about the defence capabilities Australia has - or the appropriateness of our defence spending arrangements. In truth, if Australia was to expand its defence spending but continue to spend it in the same way, there is little guarantee of a genuine improvement in our position. Unfortunately, the reality is that both sides of politics have allowed industry concerns and state government parochialism to dominate defence needs when it comes to procurement. There is no better example than our submarine program. Defence ministers continue to insist it is imperative for Australia to have the capability to design and manufacture submarines. This has led to us adopting risky, bespoke submarine designs, creating expensive orphan submarine classes (ones that are used by only one country). Risky procurements like orphan submarines inevitably run over time and over budget. There is also the potential for significant redesign and development costs - especially when those designing and constructing the submarines are effectively learning on the job. The terrible troubles that plagued the Collins Class for the first decade after it was commissioned were a case in point. The fact that we have made so little actual progress on the Collins replacement more than 15 years after the replacement project was first announced is further testament to that fact. Australia is now looking at a path of manufacturing nuclear submarines, an even more complex industry development task than the one we embarked on in the 1980s with the Collins. If Australia wanted to a see an actual return from investing money in industry development, we'd be better off committing to improving the US supply chain for Virginia Class submarines. At least, we'd know from the beginning that those companies can build and deliver a submarine. This is not at all guaranteed should we commit to building an entirely new sub here. Given the risks of cost and time blowouts are well known, why do governments like Australia persist with such a risky procurement strategy? The answer is simple: politics. When it comes to defence spending, there is enormous political pressure from states like South Australia and Victoria to use defence dollars to conduct industry policy. In the case of the submarines, Australia's defence needs have been running a distant second to the need to commit to spending the money in Adelaide. Instead of focusing on how to get the best value capabilities for the money being invested, or ensuring that Australia can fulfil its required defence goals, the states compete to outbid each other for federal defence dollars to be spent in their state. The point is not that Australian defence industry is incapable of producing quality defence equipment; it's that spending the money in Australia for its own sake does nothing for defence. In fact, a disturbing percentage of our defence spending amounts to little more than money laundering handouts to the state governments. In that sense, we are right to push back against NATO and the US. Our approach shouldn't be to raise defence spending, it should be to improve defence capability to meet the tasks required of us. In practice, this means two things. First, Australians need far more clarity on what our defence force is actually for. Without greater clarity on what we are hoping to achieve in the defence space, it is all but impossible for people to understand whether we are headed down the right path. In a world where there is enormous competition for every dollar of government spending, the defence establishment must be as vocal as any other interest group as to why it needs more money. Second, we must genuinely commit to acquiring the capabilities that will best enable us to achieve the goals we have set for our defence force. This may mean some politically unpopular decisions need to be made. So be it. Our politicians are not elected to compete with each other over who can give the most money to the states. In an environment of genuine threats to Australia's safety, we must be ruthless in culling projects that are not meeting our needs. This change in approach should enable us to be far more agile in our defence planning. At the moment, because we are beholden to state government interests, we are committing to defence expenditure decades in advance that may or may not be wasted by the time it is spent. It is clear there has been a significant change in global attitudes to defence and, in particular, defence spending. This is an opportunity for Australia to start taking the issue of defence more seriously. However, throwing tens of billions more dollars at the existing system would be a terrible way to do that. The United States is again putting a full-court press on Western nations to boost defence spending. There were reports this week that NATO members are expected to raise defence spending until they spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence. This would include almost doubling spending on defence platforms and assets (from 2 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP) and committing a further 1.5 per cent of GDP on defence-related investments including cyber security. The Treasurer pushed back, saying Australia had already taken significant steps by boosting spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP. He is right to rebuff this target, but not because Labor's defence spending commitment is sufficient for the job. The better reason to reject arbitrary spending levels for defence against GDP is that they tell you almost nothing about the defence capabilities Australia has - or the appropriateness of our defence spending arrangements. In truth, if Australia was to expand its defence spending but continue to spend it in the same way, there is little guarantee of a genuine improvement in our position. Unfortunately, the reality is that both sides of politics have allowed industry concerns and state government parochialism to dominate defence needs when it comes to procurement. There is no better example than our submarine program. Defence ministers continue to insist it is imperative for Australia to have the capability to design and manufacture submarines. This has led to us adopting risky, bespoke submarine designs, creating expensive orphan submarine classes (ones that are used by only one country). Risky procurements like orphan submarines inevitably run over time and over budget. There is also the potential for significant redesign and development costs - especially when those designing and constructing the submarines are effectively learning on the job. The terrible troubles that plagued the Collins Class for the first decade after it was commissioned were a case in point. The fact that we have made so little actual progress on the Collins replacement more than 15 years after the replacement project was first announced is further testament to that fact. Australia is now looking at a path of manufacturing nuclear submarines, an even more complex industry development task than the one we embarked on in the 1980s with the Collins. If Australia wanted to a see an actual return from investing money in industry development, we'd be better off committing to improving the US supply chain for Virginia Class submarines. At least, we'd know from the beginning that those companies can build and deliver a submarine. This is not at all guaranteed should we commit to building an entirely new sub here. Given the risks of cost and time blowouts are well known, why do governments like Australia persist with such a risky procurement strategy? The answer is simple: politics. When it comes to defence spending, there is enormous political pressure from states like South Australia and Victoria to use defence dollars to conduct industry policy. In the case of the submarines, Australia's defence needs have been running a distant second to the need to commit to spending the money in Adelaide. Instead of focusing on how to get the best value capabilities for the money being invested, or ensuring that Australia can fulfil its required defence goals, the states compete to outbid each other for federal defence dollars to be spent in their state. The point is not that Australian defence industry is incapable of producing quality defence equipment; it's that spending the money in Australia for its own sake does nothing for defence. In fact, a disturbing percentage of our defence spending amounts to little more than money laundering handouts to the state governments. In that sense, we are right to push back against NATO and the US. Our approach shouldn't be to raise defence spending, it should be to improve defence capability to meet the tasks required of us. In practice, this means two things. First, Australians need far more clarity on what our defence force is actually for. Without greater clarity on what we are hoping to achieve in the defence space, it is all but impossible for people to understand whether we are headed down the right path. In a world where there is enormous competition for every dollar of government spending, the defence establishment must be as vocal as any other interest group as to why it needs more money. Second, we must genuinely commit to acquiring the capabilities that will best enable us to achieve the goals we have set for our defence force. This may mean some politically unpopular decisions need to be made. So be it. Our politicians are not elected to compete with each other over who can give the most money to the states. In an environment of genuine threats to Australia's safety, we must be ruthless in culling projects that are not meeting our needs. This change in approach should enable us to be far more agile in our defence planning. At the moment, because we are beholden to state government interests, we are committing to defence expenditure decades in advance that may or may not be wasted by the time it is spent. It is clear there has been a significant change in global attitudes to defence and, in particular, defence spending. This is an opportunity for Australia to start taking the issue of defence more seriously. However, throwing tens of billions more dollars at the existing system would be a terrible way to do that. The United States is again putting a full-court press on Western nations to boost defence spending. There were reports this week that NATO members are expected to raise defence spending until they spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence. This would include almost doubling spending on defence platforms and assets (from 2 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP) and committing a further 1.5 per cent of GDP on defence-related investments including cyber security. The Treasurer pushed back, saying Australia had already taken significant steps by boosting spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP. He is right to rebuff this target, but not because Labor's defence spending commitment is sufficient for the job. The better reason to reject arbitrary spending levels for defence against GDP is that they tell you almost nothing about the defence capabilities Australia has - or the appropriateness of our defence spending arrangements. In truth, if Australia was to expand its defence spending but continue to spend it in the same way, there is little guarantee of a genuine improvement in our position. Unfortunately, the reality is that both sides of politics have allowed industry concerns and state government parochialism to dominate defence needs when it comes to procurement. There is no better example than our submarine program. Defence ministers continue to insist it is imperative for Australia to have the capability to design and manufacture submarines. This has led to us adopting risky, bespoke submarine designs, creating expensive orphan submarine classes (ones that are used by only one country). Risky procurements like orphan submarines inevitably run over time and over budget. There is also the potential for significant redesign and development costs - especially when those designing and constructing the submarines are effectively learning on the job. The terrible troubles that plagued the Collins Class for the first decade after it was commissioned were a case in point. The fact that we have made so little actual progress on the Collins replacement more than 15 years after the replacement project was first announced is further testament to that fact. Australia is now looking at a path of manufacturing nuclear submarines, an even more complex industry development task than the one we embarked on in the 1980s with the Collins. If Australia wanted to a see an actual return from investing money in industry development, we'd be better off committing to improving the US supply chain for Virginia Class submarines. At least, we'd know from the beginning that those companies can build and deliver a submarine. This is not at all guaranteed should we commit to building an entirely new sub here. Given the risks of cost and time blowouts are well known, why do governments like Australia persist with such a risky procurement strategy? The answer is simple: politics. When it comes to defence spending, there is enormous political pressure from states like South Australia and Victoria to use defence dollars to conduct industry policy. In the case of the submarines, Australia's defence needs have been running a distant second to the need to commit to spending the money in Adelaide. Instead of focusing on how to get the best value capabilities for the money being invested, or ensuring that Australia can fulfil its required defence goals, the states compete to outbid each other for federal defence dollars to be spent in their state. The point is not that Australian defence industry is incapable of producing quality defence equipment; it's that spending the money in Australia for its own sake does nothing for defence. In fact, a disturbing percentage of our defence spending amounts to little more than money laundering handouts to the state governments. In that sense, we are right to push back against NATO and the US. Our approach shouldn't be to raise defence spending, it should be to improve defence capability to meet the tasks required of us. In practice, this means two things. First, Australians need far more clarity on what our defence force is actually for. Without greater clarity on what we are hoping to achieve in the defence space, it is all but impossible for people to understand whether we are headed down the right path. In a world where there is enormous competition for every dollar of government spending, the defence establishment must be as vocal as any other interest group as to why it needs more money. Second, we must genuinely commit to acquiring the capabilities that will best enable us to achieve the goals we have set for our defence force. This may mean some politically unpopular decisions need to be made. So be it. Our politicians are not elected to compete with each other over who can give the most money to the states. In an environment of genuine threats to Australia's safety, we must be ruthless in culling projects that are not meeting our needs. This change in approach should enable us to be far more agile in our defence planning. At the moment, because we are beholden to state government interests, we are committing to defence expenditure decades in advance that may or may not be wasted by the time it is spent. It is clear there has been a significant change in global attitudes to defence and, in particular, defence spending. This is an opportunity for Australia to start taking the issue of defence more seriously. However, throwing tens of billions more dollars at the existing system would be a terrible way to do that.
Sydney Morning Herald
7 hours ago
- Sydney Morning Herald
‘A kind of monster': Why does everyone hate universities?
In the lead-up to the federal election, university administrators were chilled by the messages they were hearing from the conservative side of politics: that research was an indulgence, that academics should just focus on teaching, and – a comment said to have been addressed to post-doctoral candidates – that a PhD didn't necessarily confer expertise. 'The hostility was so great,' said one senior administrator. But if they had hoped for a warm embrace from Labor, they haven't got it. The much-hyped University Accord has fizzled. The hikes to humanities fees have not been rolled back. The main funders of research, international students, have been in the government's sights. 'Labor in the last term of government was hostile, too,' said the administrator. 'Not as hostile as the Coalition, but they were hostile.' Universities, it seems, have no friends. Not the government, which sees no votes in tertiary education and seems unwilling to waste political capital on serious reform. Not the Coalition, which uses them as fuel for its culture wars, dismisses their management as overpaid fat cats, and, during the Morrison-Dutton era, seemed to confect a Marx-style class war between the 'quiet [presumably uneducated] Australians' and the intellectual 'elites'. But universities' traditional friends have turned on them too. Tertiary unions are furious about chronic staff underpayment. Academics are leaving, exhausted by stifling workloads and casualised jobs. Students are unhappy; they're paying through the nose for an insipid version of the rich experience their parents enjoyed. Loading We're so busy beating up universities that we forget what a disastrous own goal we're kicking as we do it. The accord was plain about what will happen if Australia doesn't have a healthy tertiary education system – we will not have the skills we need, our economy will suffer, and we will stifle the potential of our children. We need high-quality research too, to keep up with the rest of the world and to protect our sovereign interest. The unis don't deserve all that hate. While they are certainly not helping themselves, they're not the ones who caused the mess, and they're going to need some friends, somewhere, to help them out of it. Emeritus Professor Graeme Turner, who drove the development of cultural and media studies in Australia, has laid out the dire state of the sector in his new book, Broken: Universities, Politics and the Public Good (to be released on Tuesday). 'I think it is reaching crisis point,' he said. 'It's really affecting the knowledge infrastructure that's available in this country.'
The Age
7 hours ago
- The Age
‘A kind of monster': Why does everyone hate universities?
In the lead-up to the federal election, university administrators were chilled by the messages they were hearing from the conservative side of politics: that research was an indulgence, that academics should just focus on teaching, and – a comment said to have been addressed to post-doctoral candidates – that a PhD didn't necessarily confer expertise. 'The hostility was so great,' said one senior administrator. But if they had hoped for a warm embrace from Labor, they haven't got it. The much-hyped University Accord has fizzled. The hikes to humanities fees have not been rolled back. The main funders of research, international students, have been in the government's sights. 'Labor in the last term of government was hostile, too,' said the administrator. 'Not as hostile as the Coalition, but they were hostile.' Universities, it seems, have no friends. Not the government, which sees no votes in tertiary education and seems unwilling to waste political capital on serious reform. Not the Coalition, which uses them as fuel for its culture wars, dismisses their management as overpaid fat cats, and, during the Morrison-Dutton era, seemed to confect a Marx-style class war between the 'quiet [presumably uneducated] Australians' and the intellectual 'elites'. But universities' traditional friends have turned on them too. Tertiary unions are furious about chronic staff underpayment. Academics are leaving, exhausted by stifling workloads and casualised jobs. Students are unhappy; they're paying through the nose for an insipid version of the rich experience their parents enjoyed. Loading We're so busy beating up universities that we forget what a disastrous own goal we're kicking as we do it. The accord was plain about what will happen if Australia doesn't have a healthy tertiary education system – we will not have the skills we need, our economy will suffer, and we will stifle the potential of our children. We need high-quality research too, to keep up with the rest of the world and to protect our sovereign interest. The unis don't deserve all that hate. While they are certainly not helping themselves, they're not the ones who caused the mess, and they're going to need some friends, somewhere, to help them out of it. Emeritus Professor Graeme Turner, who drove the development of cultural and media studies in Australia, has laid out the dire state of the sector in his new book, Broken: Universities, Politics and the Public Good (to be released on Tuesday). 'I think it is reaching crisis point,' he said. 'It's really affecting the knowledge infrastructure that's available in this country.'
