Why many Israelis support attacking Iran

Boston Globe

7 hours ago

To understand why, it is helpful to consider the timing of the Israeli attack. Since 1979, Iran has gradually positioned itself as Israel's main enemy. The revolutionary Islamic regime has viewed Israel as a foreign implant in the region and its leaders have openly called for Israel's destruction. (It is difficult to think of another instance in which one sovereign state calls for the destruction of another, highlighted by the fact that the two don't even share a border.) Israel, for its part, has responded with a series of sabotage operations and targeted killings against Iranian security and nuclear figures over the years.
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Over the past decade, Iran has accelerated plans to encircle Israel with a 'ring of fire,' believing that arming paramilitary forces like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis with missiles, rockets, and drones would lead to Israel's annihilation. And though the leader of Hamas, Yahya Sinwar, launched his murderous plan on Oct. 7 without the full participation from Hezbollah and Iran that he had hoped for, most Israelis directly link Iran — which funded, armed, and trained Hamas — to the attack. That attack is what touched off the bloody conflict that has now lasted 20 months.
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Iran's nuclear program, which has included attempts at developing military nuclear capabilities over the years, is seen by the Israeli public and its leaders as the epitome of these efforts to destroy Israel.
and believed that Israel needed to be able to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In other words, almost no one in Israel believes that nuclear weapons in the hands of the current regime are anything other than a major danger.
So why did Israel wait until now? Over the years, the possibility of attacking Iran's nuclear facilities has come up from time to time,
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For its part, the United States did not demonstrate a willingness to join in, and even now, it seems happy to allow Israel to act on its own — at least as long as Iran doesn't directly target American interests. In addition, over the years, Iran has built deterrent capabilities against Israel, consisting mainly of its enormous missile arsenal and, even more so, the one it placed on Israel's northern border in the hands of Hezbollah. Various Israeli governments have repeatedly decided that the cost was not worth the benefit of independent action.
So what changed? Four key factors have contributed to Israel's decision to attack last week. The first was the loss of Iran's deterrent power. Israel's surprisingly successful attacks against Hezbollah in October 2024 removed most of the missile threat from the north and, more importantly, broke the spirit of the group — which was built by Iran in large measure to deter Israel from attacking its nuclear program. This demoralization was illustrated by
Second, the United States has changed. President Trump, who withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and ordered the
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Third, Iran's nuclear program was getting closer to the nuclear threshold. When the nuclear deal was in full force, Iran was kept a year away from the ability to enrich uranium to military grade. But by the time of the Israeli attack,
Finally, there is the change brought about by the war itself. Hamas's attack on Oct. 7 and the events that followed created enormous fear of one kind in Israeli leadership circles while breaking down the barrier of another kind of fear. The fear of taking comprehensive, reality-altering action that characterized pre-war Israel, has been replaced by fear of any enemy building up its strength under the cover of short-term quiet.
Many in Israel, in both security and political circles, have become convinced that Israel must act with maximum aggression toward enemies that challenge its existence. This is partly why Israel continues to hold territory in Syria and Lebanon, and why many Israelis believed that now was a window of opportunity that had to be exploited to act against Iran.
The direct confrontation between the two countries that began after Israel's
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Although it is too early to know how this phase of the direct war between Iran and Israel will end, Netanyahu could well emerge with the upper hand. He almost certainly believes this will benefit him politically after two years in which he struggled to restore his status. And yet, despite the deep cynicism many Israelis feel toward their prime minister, it is difficult to find prominent voices expressing opposition to the current operation against Iran.
But if they are looking for a way to distinguish themselves from the prime minister, Netanyahu's political rivals now have room to act. The key must be to ask how to exploit the achievement created by the June 13 attack. Unlike Netanyahu and his allies, they must make it clear that weakening Iran should be used to promote political accords in our war-torn region — arrangements that should include the Palestinians.