Historic letter from Titanic survivor Colonel Gracie to go under the hammer
A letter card written by one of the most well-known survivors of the Titanic disaster is expected to sell for up to £60,000 at auction.
Colonel Archibald Gracie wrote the famous book The Truth About The Titanic, detailing his experiences onboard the ill-fated liner, which sank costing 1,500 lives.
The letter card is dated April 10 1912 and is postmarked Queenstown April 11 and London April 12 and is believed to be the only example from Gracie in existence from onboard the Titanic.
It is written over four sides to the seller's great-uncle who was an acquaintance of Gracie.
It is going under the hammer at Henry Aldridge and Son, of Devizes, Wiltshire, on April 26.
Auctioneer Andrew Aldridge said letters from survivors as high profile as Gracie rarely, if ever, come to market and this piece has never been offered for sale.
It reads in part: 'It is a fine ship but I shall await my journey's end before I pass judgment on her.
'The Oceanic is like an old friend and while she does not possess the elaborate style and varied amusement of this big ship, still her sea worthy qualities and yacht like appearance make me miss her.
'It was very kind of you to give me this kindly send off, with best wishes for your success and happiness. Archibald Gracie.'
Gracie boarded the Titanic at Southampton on April 10 1912 and was assigned first-class cabin C51.
He spent much of the voyage chaperoning various unaccompanied women.
He also spent time reading books he had found in the first-class library and discussing the US Civil War.
On the night of the sinking, Gracie had gone to bed early, intending to get up the next morning to play squash.
After awaking to a jolt as the Titanic hit an iceberg, he helped women and children into lifeboats.
As the ship began to sink, he managed to jump free and scramble on to an overturned collapsible boat from the ocean.
Eventually, Gracie and others on the overturned collapsible were rescued by other Titanic passengers onboard a lifeboat, before being taken to R.M.S. Carpathia.
Gracie's health never recovered from his ordeal, and he died eight months later.
His book was published the following year.
Mr Aldridge said: 'This letter is one of the finest of its type known, not only is it written by one of the most important first-class passengers on Titanic, Colonel Archibald Gracie.
'He survived the sinking clinging on to an upturned lifeboat and wrote one of the definitive books about the sinking shortly afterwards, The Truth About The Titanic.
'The letter itself contains the most prophetic line, 'It is a fine ship but I shall await my journey's end before I pass judgment on her'.
'Five days later Titanic was at the bottom of the North Atlantic.'
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