The bodies of a Belgian mother and her son were recovered in southern Jordan after flash flooding
Druze near Damascus resist demand to turn in arms as tensions boil
JARAMANA, Syria: Druze residents near Syrian Arab Republic's capital are resisting a demand by the Islamist-led government to hand in their light weapons, saying authorities have yet to address fears of new attacks by Sunni Muslim militants after days of sectarian violence.
Clashes last week pitted Sunni fighters against armed Druze residents of the town of Jaramana southeast of Damascus, later spreading to another district near the capital and then south to the predominantly Druze province of Sweida.
Such violence threatens the new government's control of Syria, where armed gangs are attacking religious minorities and Israel is stepping up its military intervention under the banner of protecting the Druze community.
Syrian authorities have negotiated deals to allow Druze fighters to protect their own areas as enlisted members of Syria's security forces, but this week asked that all weapons held by residents of these areas be turned in to the state.
'We told them, as soon as there is a state capable of regulating its forces, we'll have no problem handing in our weapons,' said Makram Obeid, a member of the Jaramana committee that is negotiating with the Syrian government.
Obeid said his committee had told government officials it would be better for them to focus on disarming the gangs now harassing minorities.
'It's our right to be scared, because we saw what happened in other areas,' he told Reuters, an apparent reference to killings in March of hundreds of civilians from the Alawite minority to which former President Bashar Assad belongs.
It was the deadliest episode of sectarian violence in years in Syria, where a 14-year war ended last December when rebels toppled Assad, who fled to Russia.
'People want to feel safe. It's enough to have (more than) 11 years of killing, strikes, and worries,' Obeid said. 'And we're coming to another phase that we thought, with the collapse of the regime, would leave us in a much better place. But until now, we don't feel reassured.'
Fahad Haydar, a resident of Jaramana, echoed those fears.
'These weapons that are turned against us — that's what we're afraid of. If those weapons get handed in, then we'll hand in ours,' he told Reuters.
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Mowaffaq Abu Shash, a Druze cleric in Jaramana, said the Druze had already compromised enough.
'We take one step, they ask for a second. We take the second step, they ask for a third,' he said. 'We ask for a guarantee that what happened on the coast will not happen to us.'
One influential Druze spiritual leader, Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hajjri, has called for international intervention to protect his community from Syria's leaders, whom he has branded 'terrorists.'
The Druze, an Arab minority sect who practice a religion originally derived from Islam, live in Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Israel has vowed to protect Syria's Druze militarily if they face threats.
Last week's violence was ignited by a voice recording purportedly cursing the Prophet Muhammad, which Sunni militants suspect was made by a Druze. More than a dozen people were killed in Jaramana before the violence spread west and south.
It also drew in Israel, which carried out a drone strike on what it said were fighters preparing to attack Druze in the town of Sahnaya, west of Jaramana. A Syrian security source told Reuters one member of the security forces was killed in the strike.
As the clashes reached Sweida province, Israel bombed near the presidential palace in Damascus — the clearest sign yet of its hostility toward Syria's new leaders.
Syria's interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa once headed a branch of Al-Qaeda before renouncing ties to the group in 2016.
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Arab News
5 hours ago
- Arab News
How the easing of sanctions is aiding Syria's path back into the Arab fold
LONDON: Syria's slow return to the Arab fold is set to pick up pace. After Arab states cautiously reengaged following Bashar Assad's fall in December, plans by the US and EU to lift sanctions have turned hesitation into opportunity. As these barriers begin to ease, old allies are moving to renew ties — not only reviving diplomatic channels but also launching a high-stakes race to shape Syria's postwar recovery and revival. Leading the charge is Saudi Arabia, which has positioned itself as the key broker of Syria's regional reintegration. Riyadh has hosted members of Syria's new leadership and convened high-level meetings to coordinate Arab and international support for reconstruction. A turning point came on May 14, when Saudi Arabia hosted a landmark meeting between US President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa — the first such encounter between American and Syrian leaders in more than 25 years. The meeting, facilitated by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, took place just one day after Trump's surprise announcement that Washington would lift all sanctions on Syria. 'This shift in US policy came after President Trump and Secretary Marco Rubio became convinced that Syria could spiral back into chaos and civil war — something regional allies did not want — if economic conditions remained frozen and sanctions continued to block governance,' Sameer Sabounji, policy officer and director of legal affairs at the Syrian American Council, told Arab News. That decision has triggered a wave of normalization efforts across the region. With Saudi Arabia taking the lead, Arab states are ramping up economic, diplomatic and security cooperation, signaling a new phase in efforts to stabilize and rebuild the war-torn country. 'Arab states are invested in Syria's recovery,' said Sabounji. 'Which is why I think they helped 'warm' the Trump administration to Al-Sharaa and gave the US the confidence to be bold in Syria.' Signs of this momentum also emerged on May 20, when Jordan and Syria signed an agreement to form a Higher Coordination Council, highlighting deepening bilateral ties. Talks focused on expanding energy cooperation and linking electric grids to support Syria's reconstruction and transition. The effort is multilayered. In April, Saudi Arabia announced plans to pay off Syria's $15 million World Bank debt — a move intended to unlock international reconstruction grants and further integrate Syria into the region's economic framework. According to Sabounji, regional powers have strong incentives to push for sanctions relief. 'Arab countries and Turkiye stand to gain immensely from Syria's reconstruction, but sanctions were deterring serious investment,' he said. He added that stronger regional trade routes and cross-border pipeline projects — connecting Gulf Cooperation Council countries to Iraq, Turkiye, the Mediterranean and even Azerbaijan — could boost regional economies, promote self-sufficiency and incentivize greater cooperation from Israel. Echoing that view, Ghassan Ibrahim, founder of the Global Arab Network, likened sanctions relief to 'the fall of the Berlin Wall' for Syrians. 'These restrictions were the wall separating Syria from the rest of the world,' he told Arab News. 'Now, Syrians feel more open and optimistic — there's a growing sense that Syria is a land of opportunity.' This optimism is not only economic but also geopolitical. Ibrahim Al-Assil, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, highlighted Syria's pivotal geography in broader regional ambitions. 'It's because of the location of Syria and the potential of Syria in the region, and in the regional aspiration of the Saudis and the economic prosperity that Syria could contribute to this — Syria is at a very sensitive spot on the map,' he told CNN last month. 'Stabilizing Syria could help stabilize the Middle East.' Al-Assil argued that a revitalized Syrian economy would directly benefit neighboring countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkiye by enabling refugee returns and unlocking cross-border development. 'Any improvement in the Syrian economy would be felt directly in Lebanon, would be felt directly in Jordan, and that would also open the doors for the Syrian refugees to go back to their countries, similar for Turkiye, also,' he said. 'Syria connects Turkiye and Europe to Arabia, and the rest of the Middle East.' Beyond economic considerations, security remains a critical concern. Syria's location at the crossroads of Asia, Europe and Africa has long made it a key player in regional dynamics. But that same geography has also facilitated the spread of captagon, a powerful amphetamine that has flooded Gulf markets. Syria's southern border with Jordan — particularly the Nassib crossing — has become a key route for drug smuggling. Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, consider the captagon trade a serious threat to social stability and security. Allegations that the Assad regime used the drug trade as leverage to regain regional acceptance have only added urgency to normalization efforts. 'The Assad regime flooded the region with drugs like captagon, sparking addiction crises in the region, and causing chaos and instability, driving displacement, which added strain to the region,' said Sabounji. A more stable Syria would help curb drug smuggling and reduce the flow of illegal weapons. 'It would also help curb or even prevent a resurgence of Daesh,' said Sabounji. 'The interim Syrian government's efforts to disrupt and apprehend smuggling networks also helps promote border security and reduces the illegal flow of weapons.' Though territorially defeated in 2019, Daesh remains active in Syria, with about 2,500 fighters operating primarily in the east and northeast. Persistent instability and a diminished foreign military presence have allowed the organization to regroup, especially in areas near the Euphrates River and major cities like Damascus. • Syria was suspended from the Arab League in 2011 over Assad's violent crackdown on anti-government protests. • It was readmitted in May 2023, signaling a regional push for normalization despite persistent challenges. • The isolated Assad regime relied on support from Russia and Iran to defy sanctions throughout the civil war. Addressing this threat requires coordinated counterterrorism and stronger governance — something regional actors now see as achievable through reintegration rather than isolation. Sabounji also highlighted another strategic dimension: countering Iranian influence. 'Re-welcoming Syria into the Arab fold would counterbalance Iran's position and influence in the region,' he said. Ibrahim of the Global Arab Network agreed, suggesting that many regional powers view sanctions relief as a way to shift Syria away from reliance on Iran and, to a lesser extent, Russia — toward more moderate Arab and global partnerships. 'One of the key impacts of lifting sanctions is improved security — both inside Syria and across the region,' he said. 'It's also likely to influence the government's behavior, encouraging it to choose more constructive partners. 'When Syria was under heavy sanctions, it had limited options and would engage with anyone willing to offer support. But now, with sanctions being lifted quickly, the government is being pushed to align itself with more moderate actors.' Iran's regional role has long been a point of contention. Its support for proxy groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis, pursuit of nuclear capabilities, and efforts to undermine state institutions through militias have alarmed both Arab and Western policymakers. 'Arab countries welcome the chance to build a more stable and prosperous Syria,' said Sabounji. 'They think Al-Sharaa can accomplish that. He needs help, though, and sanctions relief is a prerequisite.' He added that regional actors are exhausted by conflict and are eager for a future focused on growth and stability. 'This is a bold and refreshing Middle East foreign policy,' said Sabounji. 'The Trump administration is signaling that regional problems need regional solutions.' That shift reflects a departure from traditional US interventionism. 'Instead of dictating policy, the US listened to what Arab countries and Turkiye were saying to it. They want to stabilize Syria and want the US to lift sanctions to enable them to do that.' And then there is the possibility of doing business. 'I'm sure President Trump also did not want US companies to be held back by sanctions and not be able to compete for lucrative deals in Syria's reconstruction,' said Sabounji. The new policy recalibrates US-Arab relations and sends a message. 'Israel is no longer the only voice Washington listens to in the region,' he said. 'The administration is clearly pushing for harmony in the region, but it is also not waiting on Israel anymore. It has decided to strike ahead with improving or cultivating closer relations with each country, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran, even if dialogue or normalization with Israel stalls.' Syria's path back to the fold began with a long exile. In November 2011, the Arab League suspended Syria in response to the Assad regime's violent crackdown on anti-government protests. Still, Syria remained central to Arab diplomacy. Over time, countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia shifted their approach, seeking to curb Iranian and Turkish sway. These evolving dynamics paved the way for Syria's return to the Arab League in 2023, after 12 years of isolation, despite lingering concerns about the Assad regime's conduct. Following Assad's ouster in December 2024, Saudi Arabia quickly emerged as the lead Arab player in Syria's reentry. In January 2025, Riyadh hosted Syria's new foreign minister, Asaad Al-Shaibani, marking the first high-level meeting since the leadership change. That same month, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan visited Damascus, highlighting support for Syria's recovery. Then, in February, Al-Sharaa made his first official foreign trip to the Kingdom, where he met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to discuss deepening diplomatic and economic ties. Other Gulf states have since followed suit, pledging support for Syria's reconstruction. The international community is watching closely to see how the new government treats minorities and maintains stability. After more than a decade of turmoil, Syria's return to the Arab world may finally be within reach. But its success hinges on the careful balancing of regional interests, global engagement and a genuine commitment to rebuilding a fractured nation.
Asharq Al-Awsat
7 hours ago
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Will Lebanon Learn from al-Sharaa's Government?
It's been about 150 days since Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam took office. On one hand, Lebanon is experiencing its best chapter in two decades. On the other hand, there are concerns about the slow pace of progress – and that another war is on the verge of erupting. Regardless of whether the fighters on both sides of the Litani River are preparing for a decisive battle – which is unlikely or not—the road is long before Lebanon can fully reclaim its sovereignty from both Israel and Hezbollah. Israeli forces still occupy Lebanese land, and Hezbollah has handed over only a fraction of its weapons – barely the tip of the iceberg. The repeated rhetoric in both presidents' speeches about the 'Israeli enemy' carries no real weight today, nor is it necessary in modern political discourse. The bitter truth, for some, is this: it is Israel – not the Lebanese authorities – that will determine the shape of Hezbollah's future. Israel will define its size, the limits of its capabilities, and its influence. Neighboring Syria is facing a similar situation, but has chosen a different approach. Bashar al-Assad's regime has collapsed, just like Hezbollah's grip has weakened, leaving behind a complex legacy to navigate with the region's 'superpower' neighbor. Israeli forces are also present on Syrian soil and continue to target Syrian sites frequently. Amid this complex situation, President Ahmed al-Sharaa's government has managed to turn crisis into opportunity – and has earned global praise not only for what it has done, but for what it has deliberately chosen not to do. It quickly abandoned the ostrich-head-in-the-sand approach of previous regimes, which had failed to address internal and external politics with realism. Al-Sharaa did not attack Israel in his speeches. He did not mobilize his forces or instruct his militias to clash or even respond to Israeli fire. Nor did he inflate government statements with false claims of confrontations and victories. In fact, he never even referred to Israel as 'the enemy,' nor did he reject mediation or negotiations with the 'evil' neighbor. He made it clear: his goal is to stabilize war-torn Syria – not destabilize those around it. Lebanon's president and prime minister come from elite circles – military and civilian alike. Salam is a graduate of the Sorbonne in France and Harvard in the US – arguably the most internationally qualified leader in Lebanese political history. In contrast, President al-Sharaa is a product of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and had seen nothing of the world before assuming power except what lay between Iraq's Anbar and Syria's Idlib. You don't need a magnifying glass to see that al-Sharaa has advanced Syria's recovery, securing deals with both friendly and hostile powers. He has neutralized threats from Israel, Iran, Iraqi factions, and US sanctions – through dialogue – and has lured foreign investors with contracts to build and operate airports, ports, energy facilities, and industrial projects. We recognize that the challenges in Beirut differ from those in Damascus. Nevertheless, Lebanon today has a rare opportunity – perhaps once in forty years – to end decades of foreign domination, from the Palestinians to the Syrians and now the Iranians. This moment demands flexibility and a new approach, unlike the rigid policies of the past. Looking at the two warring sides – Hezbollah and Israel – Hezbollah has only three possible futures. First: It could return as a cross-border regional force, threatening Israel, managing Yemen's Houthis, and operating in Syria and Iraq. But that now seems impossible given Israel's insistence on a policy of preempting any force that poses a border threat. Note that Egypt, Jordan, and Syria – under their treaties with Israel –agreed to regulate weapons types and distances from the border, something Hezbollah used to reject. Yet under the ceasefire agreement, it accepted withdrawal from south of the Litani River, surrendering heavy weapons, military production platforms, and dismantling its infrastructure. Second: Hezbollah could reposition itself as a purely local force. That would require acknowledging the shift in the balance of power and abandoning its role as a threat to Israel or as a bargaining chip for Iran. It may try to keep its weapons to maintain dominance in Lebanon. To counter that, Lebanese and Israeli authorities are cooperating – Israel provides Beirut with intelligence on hidden arms, and the Lebanese side carries out raids and seizures. But Hezbollah is skilled at the game of hiding – though the current environment is tougher than before. This time, there's no escape, even after sidelining US mediator Morgan Ortagus, whom Hezbollah and its allies portray as Netanyahu's puppet. The reality is: it's Israel – not the US – that now dictates Lebanon's course. This is underscored by the unprecedented scale of Israeli strikes on the southern suburbs – the first since the war's end. The Lebanese presidency has promised to restore full state sovereignty by disarming Hezbollah and ending Lebanon's role as a proxy warfront. So far, it hasn't succeeded. Without this, stability will remain fragile, and investment will stay limited. Lebanon's future over the next 10 or 20 years hinges on what happens in these very days, transforming the country from a militia playground into a sovereign state focused on its internal affairs and the needs of its citizens. This is exactly what al-Sharaa is doing in Syria – with courage and cunning – even though his circumstances are arguably far more difficult and dangerous than those faced by Lebanon's leadership. And it's false to claim that the world simply rushed to support al-Sharaa – not at all. He set his priorities clearly, forged his own alliances, and refused to be blackmailed by local or regional propaganda about 'jihad' or the 'enemy.' His task now is to fight remnants and separatists, repair the economy, and focus on building a state that's been collapsing since the end of the Cold War.
Asharq Al-Awsat
7 hours ago
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Lebanon... Where Are Things Headed?
When General Joseph Aoun was elected President of the Lebanese Republic and Judge Nawaf Salam was named Prime Minister, both developments seemed engulfed in a revolutionary climate. There was a popular mobility expressing itself in all kinds of ways that reflected a broadly shared desire to break with the 'ancien regime' that brought the country misery, with its calamities culminating in a catastrophic war and occupation. As a result, ideas- around the role of the state, rejecting violence and war, and striving toward a new vision for Lebanon- that had long been suppressed exploded onto the surface. However, the people in charge have chosen to defuse this revolutionary climate and allowed a return to business as usual. Accordingly, all that remains of this climate are two documents, which, in the end, are official statements: the president's inaugural address and the government's ministerial statement. However, what we have seen in the (relatively long) interim, suggests that these texts were never meant to be implemented, only to signal positive intent. True, the new cabinet includes competent and respected ministers who have tackled some reforms in an acceptable manner. However, all of that addresses outcomes more than it does causes, with the latter deemed deferrable to a day in the future that may never come. There might be many reasons behind the decision not to take the initiative and deal with the fundamentals: fear of armed clashes that would threaten Lebanon's presumed civic peace, the embarrassment some feel about the fact that the new political situation emerged as the result of the war Israel had waged on the country and their discomfort with seeming like they are finishing the job that the Jewish state had started, or an attachment to what remains of the 'alliance of minorities' theory, especially in light of the recent shift in Syria and the rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa's authority. Another possible reason is that the ruling parties have agreed to leave addressing these matters until after the negotiations between Iran and the US run their course, in the hope that these issues will resolve themselves without the need for intervention. However, this approach risks an ill-fated reiteration of the Chehabist presidency that grew out of an understanding between the US and Egypt. Whatever their considerations, the authorities seem determined to resolve an extremely exceptional situation through extremely conventional means. Here, we find a substantial dose of irrationality that assumes (albeit without saying so) that Lebanon, the weaker party in this equation, is the one in control. While the president's inaugural address and the ministerial statement cry for implementation, the authorities have persistently called for addressing Hezbollah's weapons through 'dialogue,' without managing to compel the party to clearly and unequivocally commit to giving its weapons up following Israel's withdrawal. Moreover, a number of the president's appointments suggest that he is applying the 'no victor, no vanquished' theory, another parallel with the 1958 compromise. For their part, regional and international actors have, with a shared sense of urgency, been pushing Lebanon to take the initiative. It has become clear that the wily cunning the Lebanese are famous for will not convince the world to 'make allowances' without an answer to the question of the state's monopoly on arms. Meanwhile, there is a growing conviction that moving slowly has stalled progress on all fronts amid crushing economic hardship and diminishing hope in a successful summer season. Most critically, Israel's aggression and its interpretation of the ceasefire have imposed sharp polarization that is squeezing the middle of the road that Lebanon's leaders have sought to occupy. Finally, there came the painful strike on Beirut's southern suburb- a humiliating attack that, if it was not a sign that the war would resume, warned of similar strikes becoming a way of life. The state, in turn, could do nothing more than condemn the attack 'in the strongest terms' and denounce the 'cover for it provided by America'. As for the threat to 'suspend cooperation' with the committee monitoring the cessation of hostilities, this sulking will probably have no impact after all balances of power had collapsed. While some have said that Israel is the one implementing the president's speech and the ministerial statement, with iron and fire, Lebanon's despair was apparent as the world paid no attention to the last assault, reaffirming that its objections to Israel's conduct are reserved solely for the genocide in Gaza. Will Lebanon transition to a way of life shaped by strikes Israel carries out whenever it sees fit? Or will the country ultimately opt for a painful surgical operation the rulers of Lebanon who are seeking safe passage- possibly to nowhere- may not survive? What we can say with certainty, in any case, is that ending the current state of affairs must be prioritized. Nothing would do more to achieve this than acting on the victory attained by the principle of a state monopoly on arms, instead of obscuring or circumventing it through talk of national unity and ensuring that no side is victorious nor vanquished. This principle does not call for celebration or triumphalism. However, disregarding it will lead to sorrow and despair that Israel alone decides to inflict on us. This principle will leave Lebanon's national identity with fresh and visible fractures on top of the latent ones. This outcome, painful enough as it is, has been made inevitable by Lebanon's current political and sectarian alignments, which stubbornly refuse to reflect, reconsider, or learn from past bitter experiences. In the final analysis, fracturing Lebanese nationalism remains less harmful than fracturing the Lebanese nation itself in ways that would render the country itself untenable.
