Will we see more nuclear proliferation?
Eight decades have passed since the energy contained within an atom was used in warfare. Yet rather than suffering nuclear Armageddon, the world has achieved a surprising nuclear stability – so far. Equally remarkable, while nuclear technology has spread to many countries, only a small fraction have chosen to use it to develop weapons. The world has benefited from an effective non-proliferation regime, a set of rules, norms and institutions that have discouraged – albeit haltingly and imperfectly – nuclear proliferation. But can it survive an era of rapid geopolitical shifts?
In the 1960s, US president John F. Kennedy predicted that there would be around 25 countries with nuclear weapons by the 1970s. Yet today, there are only nine, because governments took steps to prevent proliferation.
In 1968, they negotiated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which recognised that five states already had nuclear weapons, but secured pledges from others not to develop them. For decades, the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has sent inspectors to countries developing nuclear energy to ensure that it is used only for civilian purposes. And in the 1970s, US president Jimmy Carter's administration placed a high priority on slowing proliferation, in part through the newly created Nuclear Suppliers Group, whose member states pledged restraint in the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology.
This non-proliferation regime has become an important part of the world order, but some analysts believe it faces new threats. Even IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi worries about its future.
Beyond this regional challenge in the Middle East lurks a global threat to the non-proliferation regime. After World War II, Germany and Japan limited their own nuclear plans because of their alliance with the US. The credibility of American nuclear deterrence was sufficient to provide them with security, and the same has been true for dozens of other states, both in Nato and in East Asia. But now that the Trump administration is weakening these alliances, it has also weakened America's extended deterrence, prompting others to examine whether they should have their own nuclear weapons. They are well aware that Ukraine gave up the Soviet-era nuclear weapons stationed on its soil, only to be attacked by Russia (which had guaranteed Ukraine's territorial integrity in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum).
Some analysts say we should not worry, because proliferation would have beneficial effects on world politics. Just as nuclear weapons sustained prudence in US-Soviet relations, they contend, so might nuclear weapons stabilise regional power balances today.
But this more-is-better attitude would be tenable only if the political conditions were similar. It presupposes stable command-and-control systems; an absence of serious civil wars or destabilising motivations (such as irredentist passions); and discipline over the temptation to launch preemptive strikes during the early stages of a conflict, when new nuclear weapons capabilities are soft and vulnerable.
Such assumptions are unrealistic in many parts of the world. Far from enhancing security, the first effects of acquiring a nuclear capability in many circumstances may be to increase one's vulnerability and insecurity. Moreover, even a local, 'tactical' nuclear strike would be a serious breach of an 80-year global taboo.
One also must consider the destabilising roles that nonstate actors could play. Even if the risk of a terrorist group acquiring a nuclear device is low, the mere possibility creates severe challenges. The fact that weapons-usable materials can be stolen or sold to rogue states on the black market means that the threat posed by nonstate groups does not depend solely on their technological capabilities. Nor would today's superpowers necessarily be immune from the effects. The wide or rapid spread of nuclear capabilities could affect the global strategic balance and the prospects of a peaceful and just world order in the future.
Obviously, political and technical trends will continue to change.
©Project Syndicate, 2025
Joseph S Nye, Jr
The writer is Professor Emeritus at Harvard University and a former dean of Harvard Kennedy School, is a former US assistant secretary of defence and the author of Do Morals Matter?
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