For the sake of peace, at the cost of war

The Hindu

5 hours ago

Through history, Iran's relationship with nuclear weapons has had four phases. In the first, it was a model state. When the UN opened the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for signatures on July 1, 1968, Shah Reza Pahlavi signed it on the first day and ratified it two years later as part of his efforts to increase access to nuclear power in Iran under the White Revolution.
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Until the late 1970s, Iran enjoyed a good reputation under the NPT by furthering its goals to restrict the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Then the Islamic Revolution toppled the Shah in 1979, and the Ayatollah assumed supreme power in the new Islamic Republic. This launched the second phase, more like several phases of ambiguity, lasting from 1979 until 2002. The driving concern in these periods was whether Iran would build nuclear weapons. Will it? Won't it?
While Ayatollah Khomeini had been ambivalent towards nuclear weapons, Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war spurred him to reconsider his deterrence strategy. Thus, until the early 2000s, there were indications that Iran was amassing technical know-how of nuclear weapons but no overt signs that it was actually building one.
But then in 2002, a group of dissidents called the National Council of Resistance revealed to the world that Iran had been secretly pursuing a nuclear weapons programme for at least two decades in the form of a nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz and a facility to produce heavy water in Arak. Since Iran had not declared the existence of these facilities under the NPT, it became persona non grata under the treaty.
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The incident effectively launched the third phase in 2005, when inspectors of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said Iran was not complying with its obligations to report evidence of past weapons-related activities. This was also a diplomatic failure since Iran had signed its Additional Protocol with France, Germany, and the U.K. in 2003 to allow more intrusive inspections of its facilities in exchange for diplomatic support and cooperation in multilateral fora. But in 2006, Iran said it would stop implementing the Protocol over frustration that its assurances were not being taken seriously.
The IAEA's conclusion invited the UN Security Council to launch punishing sanctions from 2006 to 2014. This period also coincided with the rule of Iran's hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who doubled down on what he called Iran's right to enrich uranium for civilian use even as he contended with a national economy significantly weakened by the sanctions. It was not until Hassan Rouhani succeeded him in 2013 that Iran indicated its willingness to return to the negotiating table in return for sanctions relief.
The result was the historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group in 2015. Although it imposed a slew of restrictions on Iran that took the Islamic nation far beyond its obligations under the NPT — which was still in effect — Iran complied in exchange for lifting the sanctions. In fact, in many respects, Iran returned to being a model state, serving a reminder that rational diplomacy à la the NPT during the Cold War could achieve non-proliferation. But all of this came to nought for reasons that are hard to understand, but increasingly tempting to guess at, when in 2018 the new U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and restored 'maximum pressure' sanctions.
Iran responded at first by resorting to what it said were mechanisms under the deal that allowed it to disobey enrichment limits when resolving disputes. But, by 2022, Iran had blown past its JCPOA safeguards when it became clear it had enriched uranium to within a hair's breadth from the level required to make an atomic weapon. Should Iran exit the NPT by coming in possession of such a warhead, it could spark a regional arms race and strike a profound blow to the treaty's credibility. West Asian states such as Saudi Arabia may be compelled to seek nuclear weapons of their own.
Earlier this month, Israel launched air strikes against Iran's nuclear establishment as part of its insistence that Iran must never possess nuclear weapons while also touting its 'right to self-defence'. It had the U.S.'s backing under the returning Trump administration. Russia and China have demanded stronger sanctions while denouncing Israel. European nations have refused unilateral military action fearing the collapse of the non-proliferation regime itself. Their fear is not unwarranted: Article X of the NPT gives Iran the right to withdraw citing 'extraordinary events' that jeopardise its interests, grounds for which Israel's aggression has now created.
Iran's twisting relationship with the NPT over the years has been a roller coaster of compliance and contention. While it long proclaimed adherence to the treaty's basic tenets and benefited from them vis-à-vis civilian nuclear technology, its covert activities in violation of the NPT's safeguards progressively undermined trust and led to an international crisis that is still unfolding.
Evolving perspectives
Both the IAEA's and the Security Council's evolving perspectives in this time echo the international community's split approaches towards Iran: pressure versus engagement. Nonetheless, the major powers agree on one point: Iran must not be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons. President Masoud Pezeshkian has also said Tehran is not seeking them but as long as Israel's campaign continues, Iran's path to diplomacy is blocked and it will keep one hand on the nuclear option.
The situation today remains fluid and dangerous. Iran has advanced its nuclear capability to an unprecedented degree while still officially forswearing nuclear arms. The coming months will determine whether a new diplomatic understanding can be reached to bring Iran back into fuller compliance, and thus ease sanctions, or whether the NPT itself will be tested by a potential withdrawal. Since Iran has repeatedly asserted its right under the treaty to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the U.S. had previously proposed in the Oman talks to set up a low-enrichment facility in a third country to supply just the reactor fuel to Iran. Israel's onslaught has left these talks in a limbo, however.
International monitors have stressed that should Israel continue its bombing, which seems likely, the world may face either a nuclear-armed Iran or a war to prevent it. This is unfortunate because the NPT was created to prevent just these outcomes.