Separate radical Muslim prisoners to stop violence in Britain's jails

Telegraph

11-05-2025

Islamist extremists in jails should be segregated from other prisoners, a leading counter-extremism expert has said.
In an article for The Telegraph, Ghaffar Hussain, a former officer in the Government's Prevent counter-terrorism programme, said the UK should follow the example of countries such as France, Spain and Holland, where extremist prisoners were often separated from the general prison population.
His comments come in the wake of a violent attack on officers by the brother of the Manchester Arena bomber.
There are three 'separation units' in jails in England and Wales, including one at the high-security HMP Frankland jail in county Durham, where Hashem Abedi, the Manchester bomb plotter, attacked three officers with two home-made knives and boiling cooking oil.
However, Mr Hussain said the units designed to isolate the most dangerous extremists were being under-used – two, including HMP Frankland, are currently out of commission – which 'raises concerns about the system's capacity to manage the increasing number of terrorist inmates'.
This weekend it emerged that Axel Rudakubana, the Southport killer, had allegedly thrown boiling water over an officer at HMP Belmarsh on Thursday. The alleged attack is being investigated by police.
'Without comprehensive reforms, including enhanced staff training, better resource allocation, and a deeper understanding of extremist ideologies, the prison system will continue to fall short in its efforts to de-radicalise extremists,' said Mr Hussain.
'The UK's approach contrasts with strategies employed in other European countries. In the Netherlands, Spain and France, extremist prisoners are often segregated from the general population, preventing them from influencing other inmates.
'These countries have reported improved prison safety and more effective targeting of counter-radicalisation interventions. For example, France has established specialist units within high-security prisons to assess and rehabilitate radicalised offenders, followed by continued support post-release.'
Mr Hussain said Britain's prisons risked not only being ineffective in rehabilitating extremists but could also be contributing to the spread of extremist ideologies by failing to separate Islamists.
He said the attack by Abedi was a 'glaring reminder' of the threat from extremists inside and outside prisons. 'It also shows how our prison system is allowing radical ideologies to fester and grow, so they can then spill back out onto our streets,' he said.
'Reports have said that prison staff often lack the training and confidence to distinguish between genuine religious practices and extremist behaviour. This uncertainty can lead to either overreaction or, more commonly, inaction.
'Overcrowding, understaffing, and the resulting stress create an environment where radical ideologies can thrive. Islamist gangs exploit these conditions, offering protection and a sense of belonging to vulnerable inmates.
'The rise in Muslim inmate numbers, driven by both sentencing and conversions, has been linked to the influence of these gangs. The erosion of authority within prisons allows these groups to enforce their own rules, sometimes through makeshift Sharia courts.
'Staff intimidation and corruption make the problem worse, with some wardens bribed to smuggle contraband or overlook illegal behaviour.'
Britain's prisons are failing to de-radicalise and fuelling extremism
Our prisons are incubators of extremism and terrorism. The brutal attack by Hashem Abedi, the brother of the Manchester Arena bomber, on prison officers at HMP Frankland is a glaring reminder of the threat we face from extremists inside and outside our prisons, writes Ghaffar Hussain.
It also shows how our prison system is allowing radical ideologies to fester and grow, so they can then spill back out on to our streets.
The attack is not an isolated case. In 2019, Usman Khan, a convicted bomb plotter, knifed two young people to death at Fishmongers' Hall in London shortly after his release.
Similarly, Sudesh Amman, released in early 2020, injured two individuals in a stabbing spree in Streatham before being shot dead by police. These incidents underscore a troubling pattern – the UK's prison system is failing to de-radicalise extremist offenders and, in some cases, may be exacerbating the problem.
There is a real lack of expertise in prisons on how to counter extremist ideologies. Without a clear grasp of the motivations driving radicalisation, any attempted interventions often miss the mark. For instance, the flagship government Healthy Identity Intervention programme, designed to address extremist beliefs, has been widely derided for its ineffectiveness.
Reports have said that prison staff often lack the training and confidence to distinguish between genuine religious practices and extremist behaviour. This uncertainty can lead to either overreaction or, more commonly, inaction.
Ian Acheson, a former prison governor who led a 2016 review into Islamist extremism in prisons, highlighted this issue, stating that there was an 'institutional timidity' and an unwillingness to confront the problem directly. He noted that the prison service had been 'asleep for the last six years' in understanding the nature and extent of this problem.
Environment where radicalism can thrive
Mr Acheson's review made 69 recommendations, but these were 'conflated' into 11 in the official response, with some key suggestions rejected or only partially implemented.
For instance, his proposal to ban attendance at Friday prayers for those who disrupt or abuse faith activity was dismissed, with officials citing existing powers for governors. Moreover, the process of referring prisoners to separation centres designed to isolate radicalisers is currently underused with only a fraction of the available places in these centres being occupied.
Overcrowding, understaffing, and the resulting stress create an environment where radical ideologies can thrive. Islamist gangs exploit these conditions, offering protection and a sense of belonging to vulnerable inmates.
The rise in Muslim inmate numbers, driven by both sentencing and conversions, has been linked to the influence of these gangs. The erosion of authority within prisons allows these groups to enforce their own rules, sometimes through makeshift Sharia courts.
Staff intimidation and corruption make the problem worse, with some wardens bribed to smuggle contraband or overlook illegal behaviour.
The UK's approach contrasts with strategies employed in other European countries. In the Netherlands, Spain and France, extremist prisoners are often segregated from the general population, preventing them from influencing other inmates. These countries have reported improved prison safety and more effective targeting of counter-radicalisation interventions.
For example, France has established specialist units within high-security prisons to assess and rehabilitate radicalised offenders, followed by continued support post-release.
In response to the growing threat, the UK has implemented separation centres within certain prisons to isolate the most dangerous extremists. However, only one such centre remains operational, raising concerns about the system's capacity to manage the increasing number of terrorist inmates.
Without comprehensive reforms, including enhanced staff training, better resource allocation, and a deeper understanding of extremist ideologies, the prison system will continue to fall short in its efforts to de-radicalise extremists.
So our prisons risk remaining not just ineffective in rehabilitating extremists but may also contribute to the spread of extremist ideologies. As Ian Acheson aptly stated: 'Broken staff cannot help fix broken people.'