Sirens and explosions heard in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv as missiles fly across the sky: reports
Air raid sirens and booms rang out in Jerusalem while missiles flew across the sky on Sunday evening, Agence France-Presse journalists said, as Israel and Iran exchanged fire for a third day.
'Sirens sounded in several areas across Israel following the identification of missiles launched from Iran towards the State of Israel,' the military said in a statement.
Iran's armed forces told residents of Israel to leave the vicinity of 'vital areas' for their safety, in a video statement broadcast by state television on Sunday evening.
'We have a data bank of vital and critical areas in occupied territories [Israel] and call upon you not to let the brutal regime use you as human shields. Do not stay or travel near these critical areas,' an armed forces spokesman said.
Israel earlier on Sunday unleashed a punishing barrage of strikes across Iran, hitting targets from the west to Tehran and as far east as Mashhad, after Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to make the country pay a 'heavy price' for killing civilians.
With no let-up in sight, Iran said it would begin opening mosques, metro stations and schools to serve as makeshift bomb shelters for civilians, as Israel kept up its withering blows.
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Asia Times
42 minutes ago
- Asia Times
No good options for Iran in Israel war
The scale of Israel's strikes on multiple, sensitive Iranian military and nuclear sites on Friday was unprecedented. It was the biggest attack on Iran since the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s. As expected, Iran responded swiftly, even as Israeli attacks on its territory continued. The unfolding conflict is reshaping regional dynamics, and Iran now finds itself with no easy path forward. The timing of the Israeli strikes was highly significant. They came at a critical point in the high-stakes negotiations between Iran and the United States over Tehran's nuclear program that began earlier this year. Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report accusing Tehran of stockpiling highly enriched uranium at levels dangerously close to weaponization. According to the report, Iran has accumulated around 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity. If this uranium is further enriched to 90% purity, it would be enough to build nine to ten bombs. The day before Israel's attack, the IAEA board of governors also declared Iran to be in breach of its non-proliferation obligations for the first time in two decades. The nuclear talks recently hit a stumbling block over a major issue – the US refusal to allow Iran to enrich any uranium at all for a civilian nuclear program. Iran has previously agreed to cap its enrichment at 3.67% under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a nuclear deal between Iran, the US and other global powers agreed to in 2015 (and abandoned by the first Trump administration in 2018). But it has refused to relinquish its right to enrichment altogether. US President Donald Trump reportedly urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to attack Iran last week, believing he was close to a deal. But after the attack, Trump ramped up his threats on Iran again, urging it to agree to a deal 'before there is nothing left.' He called the Israeli strikes 'excellent' and suggested there was 'more to come.' Given this context, it is understandable why Iran does not view the US as an impartial mediator. In response, Iran suspended its negotiations with the US, announcing it would skip the sixth round of talks scheduled for Sunday. Rather than compelling Iran to agree to a deal, the excessive pressure could risk pushing Iran towards a more extreme stance instead. While Iranian officials have denied any intention to develop a military nuclear program, they have warned that continued Israeli attacks and US pressure might force Tehran to reconsider as a deterrence mechanism. On several occasions, Trump has insisted he is not seeking 'regime change' in Iran. He has repeatedly claimed he wants to see Iran be 'successful' – the only requirement is for it to accept a US deal. However, in Iran's view, the US proposal is not viewed as a peace offer, but as a blueprint for surrender. And the fear is that this would ultimately pave the way for regime change under the guise of diplomacy. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responded to the latest US proposal by insisting that uranium enrichment remains a 'red line' for Iran. Abandoning this right from the Iranian perspective would only embolden its adversaries to escalate their pressure on the regime and make further demands – such as dismantling Iran's missile program. The fear in Tehran is this could push the country into a defenceless state without a way to deter future Israeli strikes. Furthermore, capitulating to the US terms could ignite domestic backlash on two fronts: from an already growing opposition movement, and from the regime's base of loyal supporters, who would see any retreat as a betrayal. In this context, many in Iran's leadership believe that giving in to Trump's terms would not avert regime change – it would hasten it. Caught between escalating pressure and existential threats, Iran finds itself with few viable options other than to project strength. It has already begun to pursue this strategy by launching retaliatory missile strikes at Israeli cities. This response has been much stronger than the relatively contained tit-for-tat strikes Israel and Iran engaged in last year. Iran's strikes have caused considerable damage to government and residential areas in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Iran sees no alternative but to push forward, having already been drawn into open confrontation. Any sign of weakness would severely undermine the regime's legitimacy at home and embolden its adversaries abroad. Moreover, Tehran is betting on Trump's aversion to foreign wars. Iranian leaders believe the US is neither prepared nor willing to enter another costly conflict in the region – one that could disrupt global trade and jeopardize Trump's recent economic partnerships with Persian Gulf states. Therefore, Iran's leadership likely believes that by standing firm now, the conflict will be limited, so long as the US stays on the sidelines. And then, Iran's leaders would try to return to the negotiating table, in their view, from a position of strength. Ali Mamouri is research fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Asia Times
an hour ago
- Asia Times
Israeli war aims: destroying Iran's nuke program, regime change
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel's attack on Iran's nuclear facilities could last for at least two weeks. His timing seems precise for a reason. It's clear the Israel Defense Forces and the country's intelligence agencies have devised a methodical, step-by-step campaign. Israeli forces initially focused on decapitating the Iranian military and scientific leadership and, just as importantly, destroying virtually all of Iran's air defenses. Israeli aircraft not only can operate freely over Iranian air space now. They can refuel and deposit more special forces at key sites to enable precision bombing of targets and attacks on hidden or well-protected nuclear facilities. In public statements since the start of the campaign, Netanyahu has highlighted two key aims: to destroy Iran's nuclear program, and to encourage the Iranian people to overthrow the clerical regime. With those two objectives in mind, how might the conflict end? Several broad scenarios are possible. US President Donald Trump's special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, was to have attended a sixth round of talks with his Iranian counterparts on Sunday aimed at a deal to replace the Iran nuclear agreement negotiated under the Obama administration in 2015 –but that session was canceled. Trump withdrew from that agreement during his first term in 2018, despite Iran's apparent compliance to that point. Netanyahu was opposed to the 2015 agreement and has indicated he does not believe Iran is serious about a replacement. So, accepting negotiations as an outcome of the Israeli bombing campaign would be a massive climbdown by Netanyahu. He wants to use the defanging of Iran to reestablish his security credentials after the Hamas attacks of October 2023. Even though Trump continues to press Iran to accept a deal, negotiations are off the table for now. Trump won't be able to persuade Netanyahu to stop the bombing campaign to restart negotiations. Destruction of Iran's nuclear program would involve destroying all known sites, including the Fordow uranium enrichment facility, about 100 kilometres south of Tehran. According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi, the facility is located about half a mile underground, beneath a mountain. It is probably beyond the reach of even the United States' 2,000-pound deep penetration bombs. The entrances and ventilation shafts of the facility could be closed by causing landslides. But that would be a temporary solution. Taking out Fordow entirely would require an Israeli special forces attack. This is certainly possible, given Israel's success in getting operatives into Iran to date. But questions would remain about how extensively the facility could be damaged and then how quickly it could be rebuilt. And destruction of Iran's nuclear centrifuges – used to enrich uranium to create a bomb – would be only one step in dismantling its program. Israel would also have to secure or eliminate Iran's stock of uranium already enriched to 60% purity. This is sufficient for up to ten nuclear bombs if enriched to the weapons-grade 90% purity. But does Israeli intelligence know where that stock is? Collapse of the Iranian regime is certainly possible, particularly given Israel's removal of Iran's most senior military leaders since its attacks began on Friday, including the heads of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Iranian armed forces. And anti-regime demonstrations over the years, most recently the 'Women, Life, Freedom' protests after the death in police custody of a young Iranian woman, Mahsa Amini, in 2022, have shown how unpopular the regime is. That said, the regime has survived many challenges since coming to power in 1979, including war with Iraq in the 1980s and massive sanctions. It has developed remarkably efficient security systems that have enabled it to remain in place. Another uncertainty at this stage is whether Israeli attacks on civilian targets might engender a 'rally 'round the flag' movement among Iranians. Netanyahu said in recent days that Israel had indications the remaining senior regime figures were packing their bags in preparation for fleeing the country. But he gave no evidence. Could the US become involved in the fighting? This can't be ruled out. Iran's UN ambassador directly accused the US of assisting Israel with its strikes. That is almost certainly true, given the close intelligence sharing between the US and Israel. Moreover, senior Republicans, such as Senator Lindsey Graham, have called on Trump to order US forces to help Israel 'finish the job'. Trump would probably be loath to do this, particularly given his criticism of the 'forever wars' of previous US administrations. But if Iran or pro-Iranian forces were to strike a US base or military asset in the region, pressure would mount on Trump to retaliate. Another factor is that Trump probably wants the war to end as quickly as possible. His administration will be aware the longer a conflict drags on, the more likely unforeseen factors will arise. Could Russia become involved on Iran's side? At this stage that's probably unlikely. Russia did not intervene in Syria late last year to try to protect the collapsing Assad regime. And Russia has plenty on its plate with the war in Ukraine. Russia criticised the Israeli attack when it started, but appears not to have taken any action to help Iran defend itself. And could regional powers such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates become involved? Though they have a substantial arsenal of US military equipment, the two countries have no interest in becoming caught up in the conflict. The Gulf Arab monarchies have engaged in a rapprochement with Iran in recent years after decades of outright hostility. Nobody would want to put this at risk. We don't know the extent of Iran's arsenal of missiles and rockets. In its initial retaliation to Israel's strikes, Iran has been able to partially overwhelm Israel's Iron Dome air defence system, causing civilian casualties. If it can continue to do this, causing more civilian casualties, Israelis already unhappy with Netanyahu over the Gaza war might start to question his wisdom in starting another conflict. But we are nowhere near that point. Though it's too early for reliable opinion polling, most Israelis almost certainly applaud Netanyahu's action so far to cripple Iran's nuclear program. In addition, Netanyahu has threatened to make Tehran 'burn' if Iran deliberately targets Israeli civilians. We can be confident that Iran does not have any surprises in store. Israel has severely weakened its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. They are clearly in no position to assist Iran through diversionary attacks. The big question will be what comes after the war. Iran will almost certainly withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and forbid more inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Israel will probably be able to destroy Iran's existing nuclear facilities, but it's only a question of when – not if – Iran will reconstitute them. This means the likelihood of Iran trying to secure a nuclear bomb in order to deter future Israeli attacks will be much higher. And the region will remain in a precarious place. Ian Parmeter is a research scholar in Middle East studies at Australian National University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Asia Times
3 hours ago
- Asia Times
Israeli attack on Iran a major failure of US power and diplomacy
If America genuinely did not want Israel to attack Iran and its nuclear facilities, then the launching by its ally of what in effect is now an all-out war must represent a major failure of US power and diplomacy. That failure should not all be laid at the door of President Donald Trump, as the path toward it had already been created by his predecessor, Joe Biden. Nonetheless, it exposes the true nature of Trump's foreign policy: loud talk plus a short attention span, leading to strategic incoherence. This is the attack that successive US administrations for at least two decades have feared might happen and, so, have sought to prevent. They have feared such an attack because the consequences of war between the Middle East's sole known nuclear power, Israel, and the region's largest military force, Iran, are unknowable and could be perilously difficult to contain. Moreover, the Americans have feared this attack because – even while they have not wanted Iran to develop its own nuclear weapons, and so have felt sympathetic to Israel's desire to block that development – they have been convinced that bombing raids would never be able to destroy Iran's uranium-enrichment and nuclear weapons facilities. Those facilities are widely dispersed around the country and hidden deep underground. This is not just a matter that requires a few 'surgical strikes.' We can only speculate as to why the Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, has chosen to attack now. Although it is certainly clear that Israeli intelligence agencies' penetration of Iran's political, military and scientific leadership has been deep and impressive, the range of contradictory messages coming out of Israel about how close Iran was to being able to produce a usable nuclear weapon – a year, several months, merely weeks – suggests that Israeli knowledge of the true state of Iran's nuclear program is less than precise. Having launched this war, Netanyahu is following up with further powerful attacks. As the first exchanges, including attacks on both Tel Aviv and Tehran, have shown, this is not going to be just a series of symbolic blows. The big question is whether Iran will attack not just Israeli targets but also American ones, perhaps military bases, naval vessels or embassies across the Middle East. And then the even bigger question is how America will respond. In fact, Netanyahu may well have calculated that it will be through Iranian attacks on American targets that the US military can be brought directly into this war. His gambit could have been to say to President Trump something like this: 'We have started this, but we all know that we cannot fully finish it, as only the huge power of American bunker-busting bombs can succeed in destroying Iran's nuclear facilities. Your negotiations with Iran were getting nowhere: join us and we can end this danger for at least a generation, perhaps more.' Pressure appears to be growing inside Republican circles in America to do just that. America's failure of power and diplomacy has occurred because first under Biden but even more so under Trump the US has given Netanyahu carte blanche to do whatever he likes in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran. It did this by continuing to provide Israel with weapons regardless of its actions, and by never following up on whatever warnings or criticisms either Biden or Trump may have made. And Trump multiplied this effect by his casual and poorly thought-through remarks in support of moving the nearly two million Palestinians out of Gaza. That would amount to ethnic cleansing but the remarks implicitly endorse the view of far-right members of the Israeli government not only that a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza is undesirable but that formation of such a state should be blocked actively by seeking to drive the Palestinians farther away from Israel. While Netanyahu has been resuming his war in Gaza against Hamas, President Trump has focused his attention on making money in Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Gulf. His administration did seek to negotiate a deal with Iran over its uranium enrichment program. However, those negotiations so far had not looked likely to reach any agreement that would be better than the 2015 deal that he dumped in 2018 during his first term in office. So it would be reasonable for Netanyahu to have supposed that, if Trump did not like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that the US and Europe had agreed with Iran in 2015, he could now be persuaded to support military attacks instead. In the short term, that supposition has been proved correct. Although America was not involved with Israel's attack, Trump's first move has been to try to exploit the threat of further Israeli attacks as a way to force Iran to make bigger concessions in the Oman nuclear talks, or whenever and wherever those talks resume. Yet this is unlikely to succeed, at least until Iran has carried out whatever major retaliation it has in mind. Whatever now happens – and we should all be preparing for some pretty bad things to happen – this attack will confirm a general reality about nuclear weapons. It is that although it is true, as Israel and soon Trump will doubtless say, that Iran has been attacked to prevent it from gaining a nuclear bomb, the Iranians and others will know that they would not have been attacked if they had already possessed such a bomb. The incentive for Iran, like North Korea, Pakistan and India before it, to gain a nuclear weapon as a deterrent will only increase, and that incentive will be shared by other countries. It is paradoxical, in a sense. Nuclear deterrence between two hostile countries can work when both have nuclear capabilities, a deterrence which almost certainly helped to contain the fight that India and Pakistan had last month over terrorism and the disputed region of Kashmir. But when just one of the hostile countries has that capability, it can be destabilizing. Formerly editor-in-chief of The Economist, Bill Emmott is currently chairman of the Japan Society of the UK, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the International Trade Institute. A version of this article has been published in Italian by La Stampa and can be found in English on the substack Bill Emmott's Global View. It is republished here with kind permission.
