Why is China quietly helping Africa build a Great Green Wall across the Sahara?
About two decades ago, African nations launched an audacious plan: a 7,700km 'Great Green Wall' to hold back the Sahara Desert's southward march. Yet years passed and progress was stalled after being plagued by funding shortages, political instability and a lack of scalable solutions.
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China, now emerging with advanced ecological engineering capabilities, has stepped into the fray.
At a seminar in Beijing, Lei Jiaqiang, a leading desertification expert with the Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, unveiled China's behind-the-scenes role in Africa's fight against desertification.
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Great wall of Taklamakan: China surrounds its largest desert with green belt
Great wall of Taklamakan: China surrounds its largest desert with green belt
His remarks have offered a rare and detailed look at how Chinese technology, funding and strategic pragmatism are reshaping one of the world's most ambitious ecological projects – and why Beijing views this as a diplomatic and economic opportunity.
The Sahel, a semi-arid belt stretching from Senegal to Djibouti, has long been ground zero for climate-driven human catastrophe. Decades of drought, deforestation and overgrazing have turned vast stretches into barren wasteland, displacing millions of people and fuelling cycles of poverty and conflict.
The African Union's Great Green Wall initiative was launched in 2007 and aimed to restore 100 million hectares of degraded land by 2030, sequester 250 million tonnes of carbon and create 10 million jobs.
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Yet by 2020, around just 4 per cent of the target had been met, according to Lei.
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Asia Times
9 hours ago
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Hedging ways out of troubled waters in South China Sea
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What the three Southeast Asian nations of Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia have in common is that they, along with others in the region, are trying to navigate a more assertive China at a time when the US policy intentions under the second Trump administration are fluid and hard to read. And in lieu of a coordinated response from the regional body Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, each member nation has been busy charting its course in these choppy waters. Why is China trying to assert control in the South China Sea? In a 2023 speech, President Xi Jinping noted that 'Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-around containment, encirclement and suppression of China.' This fear has been long held in Beijing and was reinforced by a US Indo-Pacific policy announced in 2011 of rebalancing military forces away from Europe and toward Asia to confront China. In response, China has in recent years embarked on an ambitious policy of attempting to outmuscle US naval power in the South China Sea. China is now the world's leading builder of naval vessels and is estimated to have 440 battleships by 2030, compared with the United States' 300. And it comes at a time when US naval power is spread around the world. China's, meanwhile, is concentrated around the South China Sea, where, since 2013, Chinese vessels have pumped sand onto reefs, turning them into islands and then weaponizing them. Satellite imagery shows the Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea, part of the Spratly Islands group, being built by Chinese dredges. Image: Maxar via Getty Images / The Conversation Then there is the activity of China's maritime militia of approximately 300 nominally fishing boats equipped with water cannons and reinforced hulls for ramming. This so-called gray zone fleet is increasingly active in confronting Southeast Asia nations at sea. The US response to China's militarization in the sea has been through so-called 'freedom of navigation' exercises that often deploy carrier groups in a show of force. But these episodic displays are more performative than effective, doing little to deter China's claims. The US has also strengthened military alliances with Australia, India, Japan and the Philippines, and has increased coast guard cooperation with the Philippines and Japan. A fleet from the U.S. Navy patrolling the Pacific Ocean. Photo: Sean M. Castellano / US Navy via Getty Images / The Conversation Yet the battle over control of the South China Seas is more than just geopolitical posturing between the two superpowers. For adjoining countries, the sea is a valuable biological resource with rich fishing grounds that provide a staple of fish protein for close to 2 billion people. There are estimates of 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil. 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In lieu of a coordinated response, Southeast Asian nations have instead turned to hedging — that is, maintaining good relationships with both China and the US without fully committing to one or other. Malaysia's approach sees its government partition off the South China Sea dispute from its overall bilateral ties with China while continuing to promote an ASEAN code of conduct. Until recently, Malaysia's oil and gas activities were well within Malaysia's EEZ and not far enough out to fall into China's nine-dash claim. But as these close-to-shore fields become exhausted, subsequent exploration will need to extend outward and into China's nine-dash claim, putting Malaysia's dealings with China under pressure. China's nine-dash line claims a significant amount of Vietnam's EEZ, and the contested maritime area is a source of friction between the two countries; China's maritime militia regularly harasses Vietnamese fishermen and disrupts drilling operations in Vietnam's EEZ. 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HKFP
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- HKFP
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Taiwan said Thursday a British Navy patrol vessel sailed through the Taiwan Strait, a move that challenges China's claim to the sensitive waterway. Beijing views Taiwan as part of its territory and claims jurisdiction over the body of water that separates the self-ruled island from the Chinese mainland. The United States and other countries view the 180-kilometre (112-mile) Taiwan Strait as international waters that should be open to all vessels. 'The British Royal Navy patrol vessel HMS Spey sailed through the Taiwan Strait on June 18,' Taiwan's foreign ministry said in a statement. 'The UK has once again taken concrete action to uphold freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait and demonstrate the firm position that the Taiwan Strait is international waters.' The last time a British Navy ship transited the Taiwan Strait was in 2021, when the HMS Richmond, a frigate deployed with Britain's aircraft carrier strike group, sailed through from Japan to Vietnam. China strongly condemned Britain at the time and deployed its military to follow the vessel. A Canadian warship passed through the strait in February this year, days after a US destroyer and a US ocean survey ship made the passage. Taiwan's military has been reporting near-daily sightings of Chinese warships around its waters, as well as sorties by drones and fighter jets around the island. Taiwan's defence ministry said Thursday it had detected 25 Chinese military aircraft and 7 navy vessels in the 24 hours to 6:00 am.
