US strike on Iran would bring peril at every turn

Sydney Morning Herald

6 hours ago

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a defiant response to Trump's call for 'unconditional surrender', but Trump said there were indications that the Iranians wanted to talk. There were also reports of an official Iranian plane landing in Oman, where many of the negotiations with Steve Witkoff, the president's special envoy, had taken place before Israel's attack.
If Trump is taking a pause, it may be because the list of things that could go wrong is long, and probably incomplete. There's the obvious: It's possible that a B-2 could get shot down, despite Israel's success in taking out so many of Iran's air defences.
It's possible the calculations are wrong, and even America's biggest conventional bomb can't get down that deep.
'I've been there, it's half a mile underground,' Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said last week, as the Israeli operation began.
But assuming that the operation itself is successful, the largest perils may lie in the aftermath, many experts say, just as they did in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are many lessons from that ugly era of misbegotten American foreign policy, but the most vital may be that it's the unknown unknowns that can come back to bite.
Iran has vowed that if attacked by US forces, it would strike back, presumably against the US bases spread around the Middle East and the growing number of assets gathering in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. All are within missile range, assuming Iran has missiles and launchers left after the Israelis are done with their systematic targeting.
Of course, that could start a cycle of escalation: If Americans are killed, or even injured, Trump will be under pressure to exact revenge.
'Subcontracting the Fordow job would put the United States in Iran's sights,' Daniel Kurtzer, a former US ambassador to Israel, and Steven Simon, a veteran of the National Security Council, wrote in Foreign Affairs this week.
'Iran would almost certainly retaliate by killing American civilians. That, in turn, would compel the United States to reciprocate.
'Soon enough, the only targets left for Washington to hit would be the Iranian regime's leaders, and the United States would again go into the regime-change business – a business in which exceedingly few Americans want to be involved any longer.'
The reaction could take other forms. Iran is skilled at terrorism, and reacted to the US-Israeli cyberattack on its nuclear program 15 years ago by building a fearsome cyber corps – not as stealthy as China's or as bold as Russia's, but capable of considerable damage. And it has plenty of short-range missiles left to attack oil tankers, making transit in the Persian Gulf too risky.
The last thing the White House wants to do is air these risks in public. Democrats are calling for a congressional role, but they have no power to compel it.
'Given the potential for escalation, we must be brought into this decision,' Senator Adam Schiff of California, one of Trump's political rivals, said on CNN on Wednesday. 'Bombing Fordow would be an offensive activity.'
And like most offensive activities, there are longer-term perils, beyond the cycle of attack and retaliation. Already the message of these past five days, as interpreted by Iranian leaders or others with nuclear skill, may well be that they should have raced for a bomb earlier, and more stealthily.
That was what North Korea did, and it has now ended up with 60 or more nuclear weapons, despite years of American diplomacy and sabotage. It is a big enough arsenal to assure that its adversaries, South Korea and the US, would think twice about conducting the kind of operation that Israel executed against Iran.
And history suggests that nuclear programs can be bombed, but not eliminated.
'Nuclear weapons can be stopped through force – the Syrian program is a good example,' said Gary Samore, who was the Obama administration's co-ordinator for weapons of mass destruction when the existence of the Fordow plant was made public.
And in Iraq, after the Israelis bombed the Osirak reactor in 1981, to keep Saddam Hussein from getting the fuel for a bomb, the Iraqis 'reacted by building a huge, secret program' that went undetected until after the Gulf War in 1991, Samore said.
That was such an embarrassment to American intelligence agencies that more than a decade later they wildly overestimated his ability to do it again, contributing to the second failure – and leading the US into the Iraq War.
But Samore added: 'I can't think of a case where air power alone was sufficient to end a program.'
That is an important consideration for Trump. He must decide in the next few days whether Israel's attacks on Iran's Natanz enrichment facility, and its bombing of workshops where new centrifuges are made and laboratories where weapons research may have been taking place, are sufficient to set back the Iranian program.
In short, he must decide whether it is worth the huge risk of direct US involvement for whatever gain would come from destroying Fordow with American pilots, American warplanes and American weapons.
But he also doesn't want to be accused of missing the chance to set the Iranians back by years. 'If this war ends and this Fordow is left intact, then it wouldn't take long to get this going again,' said Samore, now a professor at Brandeis University.
Trump has not weighed these questions in public, and it is always hard to know how he is assessing the evidence.
He bristled the other day when a reporter noted to him that his own director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, had testified in Congress just a few months ago that Iran had made no decision to produce a bomb.
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Trump insisted that there wasn't much time left – though he cited no evidence to contradict his own intelligence chief.
'Don't forget, we haven't been fighting,' Trump said on Wednesday in the Oval Office. 'We add a certain amount of genius to everything, but we haven't been fighting at all. Israel's done a very good job today.'
Then, muddying the waters anew, he turned to his signature phrase: 'But we'll see what happens.'