Cracks appear in myth of Israel's ‘brave' armed forces
https://arab.news/ry9tq
One morning in early June 1967, when I was 14, I took the bus to school having read in the newspaper over breakfast that Egypt, Syria and Jordan were at war with Israel.
The first class of the day was history. Our history teacher, Mr. Ferry (teachers in those days did not have first names), was a fervent supporter of the still nascent state of Israel, which had existed for less than 20 years. Enterprisingly, he decided to scrap the lesson he had planned and instead devote the time to his favorite subject.
Jews, he told us, having endured discrimination and persecution in Europe for centuries, now had their own country, in which they could enjoy security and safety, thanks largely to their own indefatigable campaign for a Jewish state, but also due in part to the wisdom and munificence of the UN, based on an original proposal in 1917 by Britain's own Lord Balfour. Warming to his theme, Mr. Ferry waxed lyrical about fit, bronzed and athletic young kibbutznikim, toiling daily under a hot sun to turn the dry and unforgiving desert green. It was all terribly inspiring.
Mr. Ferry omitted to mention that the territory then comprising the state of Israel had been obtained by means of driving, at gunpoint, about 750,000 Palestinians off the land they had inhabited for centuries, and sending into exile those who were not killed. Or that the 'indefatigable campaign for a Jewish state' had been conducted by homicidal thugs from Irgun and the Stern Gang, who nowadays would be referred to as 'terrorists' but who nevertheless went on to hold key ministerial roles in successive Israeli governments. Or that much of the 'dry and unforgiving desert' was already green, thanks to generations of farming by Palestinian families who were now homeless and stateless.
It is easy to be brave when you are armed to the teeth and your 'dangerous enemy' is a 12-year-old boy throwing rocks
Ross Anderson
To be fair, he only had 35 minutes, and it is possible that Mr. Ferry intended all this for a future lesson that somehow slipped his mind: he was, in many ways, an excellent teacher and I am inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt. Anyway, the peroration of his discourse was that Israelis were inherently brave people who were not about to be deprived of their birthright by Arabs, who had a propensity for fighting among themselves, and the war would be over in a week.
We boys were skeptical. After all, as young children we had played among the bombed-out ruins of a conflict that had lasted for six long years: the idea of a brief one seemed unlikely. But hey, we were 14, what did we know? Six days later, Mr. Ferry was proved right.
It was about this time that a myth took hold, a fiction held as incontrovertible truth by many in Israel and by its cheerleaders in the West: that the Israeli armed forces are strong, determined and fearless, battle-hardened veterans who can never be defeated in a conflict — and are, above all, brave.
But it is easy to be brave in the occupied West Bank when you are armed to the teeth and protected by body armor and your 'dangerous enemy' is a 12-year-old boy throwing rocks. It is easy to be brave when you are operating an armed Elbit Hermes 900 drone above southern Lebanon from the safety and comfort of a control room 50 km away. It is easy to be brave in an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter or an F-161 Sufa fighter jet in the skies above Gaza, aiming your weapons at a Hamas enemy without air defenses — or, more probably, innocent Palestinian women and children with no defenses of any kind. And it is easy to be brave inside your heavily armored Merkava Mk4 battle tank on the outskirts of Rafah, firing your 120mm cannon at those few innocent Palestinian civilians who have survived the attack helicopters and the fighter jets.
For a fighting force, the Israeli forces do precious little fighting. And when they are required to do so, they turn out not to be very good at it. When Hamas attacked southern Israel in October 2023, the troops on the unit whose job it was to protect civilians — the 77th Battalion, 7th Armored Brigade (Gaza Division) — appear to have been mostly asleep. Their Re'im base was quickly overrun and reinforcements delayed entering the combat zone even though civilians were under attack (limited enthusiasm there for a fight, evidently). A military investigation described the attack as the 'biggest security failure in Israel's history,' the army admitted it had 'failed in its mission to protect Israeli civilians,' and Chief of the General Staff Herzi Halevi had the decency to resign.
The Israeli forces do precious little fighting. And when they are required to do so, they turn out not to be very good at it
Ross Anderson
You will find no defense of Hamas' cowardly attack here, but there are other signs that cracks are appearing in the fragile carapace of Israel's military invincibility, including shameless mendacity in how it defends its actions. There is by now a clearly defined three-stage process: 1. It definitely wasn't us. 2. Well, it may have been us. 3. OK, it was us.
This has always reminded me of the wild west days of the British tabloid press, before legislation on privacy and other restrictions reined in the worst excesses of Fleet Street. At that time, there was a mantra for newspapers dealing with any difficulties: never apologize, never explain and, when cornered, lie.
There are countless examples of Israel putting this into practice. When an Israeli sniper assassinated the Palestinian American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh in Jenin in May 2022, the Israeli military lied through its teeth. When Israeli soldiers deliberately killed 15 paramedics and aid workers after opening fire on a clearly identified rescue convoy in Gaza in March this year, the military lied through its teeth. Most recently, Israeli gunfire has killed at least 160 Palestinians as they desperately scrambled for food at shambolic aid 'distribution sites' set up by the deeply suspect Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. Since the first such incident, on May 27, when they killed 10 Palestinians, the Israeli military has been lying through their teeth.
The armed forces of Ukraine, currently fighting in the trenches of Donbas to defend their country against an unprovoked invasion by a militarily more powerful and numerically superior aggressor — now that's brave. Israel's army, not so much.
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