MTI board dismissals declared illegal
PESHAWAR:
The Peshawar High Court has declared the dismissal of members of the boards of governors (BoGs) of various medical teaching institutions (MTIs) in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa during the caretaker government and the appointment of new members as illegal.
The court has issued a detailed 41-page verdict. The decision was made by a bench comprising Justice Ijaz Anwar and Justice Syed Arshad Ali.
According to the court ruling, the caretaker chief minister and government did not have the authority to remove BoG chairpersons or members without following legal procedures.
The dismissed members were neither issued show-cause notices nor given an opportunity to be heard.
Additionally, the court rejected petitions from individuals appointed as BoG chairpersons or members by the caretaker government, who were later removed by the current government on June 11.
The ruling stated that the caretaker government does not have the authority to make policy decisions or long-term appointments.
The petitioners included Dr. Umar Ayub, Chairman of the BoG of Khyber Teaching Hospital Peshawar, along with other members.
The court also held that under the Election Act of 2017, the caretaker government cannot intervene in such matters and had exceeded its authority.
According to the two-member bench's decision, certain petitioners should be allowed to complete their three-year term, which lasts from April 2024 to August 2025.
Other petitioners who filed writ petitions included Sahibzada Saeed, Dr. Rubina Gilani (Hayatabad Medical Complex), Dr. Saeedullah Shah (MTI Khalifa Gul Nawaz Bannu), Muhammad Salahuddin Qasim, and members from Bacha Khan Medical Complex (Swabi), MTI Mardan, and Qazi Hussain Ahmad Complex (Nowshera).
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