China puts Philippines on hypersonic nuke alert
China's beef with the Philippines for positioning US Typhon missiles on its territory appears to have entered a threatening new phase amid reports China is developing a new submarine capable of carrying nuclear-tipped hypersonic missiles specifically to neutralize the missile threat.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that a semi-official military magazine suggested that a Chinese attack submarine currently under development at a shipyard in Wuhan might be designed to target medium-range missile defense systems in the Philippines.
The report indicates that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has not yet confirmed if the submarine class is under development.
However, SCMP notes that a publication from Naval & Merchant Ships, owned by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), a PLA Navy (PLA-N) supplier, mentions details about its design and features, thus validating its existence and reasons for its development.
According to SCMP, the publication mentions that the US Typhon launchers, which have been stationed in the Philippines since April 2024, can hit targets in mainland China from the northern Philippine island of Luzon.
It states that China's latest submarine is capable of carrying hypersonic missiles, enabling the PLA to execute attacks from outside enemy defenses and with the option of using nuclear warheads if deemed necessary.
The new submarine would likely be armed with the YJ-21, which is deployed on its Type 093 nuclear attack submarines (SSN). The YJ-21 has also been deployed on China's Type 055 cruisers, and its estimated range is 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers with an estimated speed of Mach 10.
The submarine, first spotted in mid-2024, appears to have VLS and an X-shaped tail fin for better agility and stability, according to SCMP. The report also mentions that the submarine is expected to have air-independent propulsion (AIP) technology.
The US Typhon missile system's presence in the Philippines has heightened tensions with China. In September 2024, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi mentioned that the deployment of the Typhon 'undermines regional peace and stability,' stating that the deployment 'is not in the interests of regional countries.'
However, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro hit back at the remarks, stating that China is using 'reverse psychology' to stop the Philippines from building its defense capabilities.
Teodoro challenged China to 'lead by example,' saying that it should destroy its nuclear arsenal, remove its ballistic missile capabilities, 'get out of the West Philippine Sea,' and get out of Mischief Reef, a contested feature in the South China Sea.
But in a thinly veiled signal of displeasure that same month, China held its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test since 1980, launching an ICBM from Hainan that impacted 11,500 kilometers away, just outside of France's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around French Polynesia.
Undeterred, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr highlighted in January 2025 that China's missile technology greatly exceeds the Philippines. He proposed a quid pro quo: removing the US Typhon missile system in return for halting aggression in the South China Sea.
Despite strong words from Philippine leaders, China seems determined to pursue a hardline stance. Chinese Foreign Minister Spokesperson Guo Jiakun stressed in February 2025 that China 'will not stand idly by when its interests are threatened,' adding that the Philippines is 'placing its security in the hands of others.'
If China's claim that its new submarine carries hypersonic missiles is confirmed, the Philippines lacks credible air and missile defense capabilities to defend against such a threat.
As of 2022, the SM-6 missile is the only weapon in the US arsenal that can intercept hypersonic missiles, and even that capability is described as 'nascent.' The US Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), designed to destroy hypersonic missiles in their glide phase, is still under development.
Should the Philippines reinforce its extended deterrence posture with the US with the Typhon as the foundation, it may acquire military assets supporting the Typhon missile system in its territories.
While the Philippines operates SPYDER surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, they are not designed to engage hypersonic threats. In addition to SPYDER, the Philippines plans to buy additional short-range SAMs, possibly India's Akash missile system. But, as with SPYDER, Akash is not designed to engage or neutralize hypersonic threats.
Given the Philippines' capability shortcomings, it may be up to the US to defend its Typhon batteries against China's hypersonic arsenal. In May 2024, the US deployed Patriot missile launchers in the Philippines, with the Patriot successfully intercepting a Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missile over Kyiv in May 2023.
However, Russia's propaganda may have overhyped the Kinzhal's capability, and China, having much more resources than the former, can likely afford more sophisticated hypersonic missiles.
Aside from attempting to intercept China's hypersonics, US submarines in the South China Sea could try to track and hunt their Chinese hypersonic-armed counterparts.
According to a March 2024 report by the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI), a Chinese think tank, 11 US SSNs and two nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) appeared in the South China Sea in 2023.
However, as China may be using the South China Sea as a protected bastion for its SSBNs, it may mount a nuclear response if it thinks its underwater nuclear deterrent is threatened. With nuclear-armed submarines from opposing sides patrolling nearby, the Philippines risks getting caught in a nuclear exchange between the US and China.
However, in a May 2024 National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) report, Herman Kraft argues that the Philippines does not view China's nuclear arsenal as a direct threat but rather as a factor in US-China competition. Kraft says that while China's assertiveness in the South China Sea has put the Philippines on edge, it has not to date involved the threat of nuclear weapons.
While the Philippines acknowledges that US facilities and forces in its territory may become targets for China, Manila is also building relations with other partners such as Japan and Australia. Such an approach, he says, allows the Philippines to develop its defense capabilities without getting involved in US-China nuclear dynamics.
Kraft says that while the Philippines pushes for a normative, diplomatic approach against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons, it is constrained by its longstanding dependence on the US.
While the US Typhon missile system does make the Philippines a potential target for China in case of a conflict over Taiwan, it is doubtful whether any Philippine president will allow US offensive strikes from the Philippines' territory, except in the unlikely situation when its main islands are attacked.
If any Philippine leader authorizes such strikes, it risks turning the Philippines into a long-term enemy of China, which will always be situated nearby.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
RTHK
3 hours ago
- RTHK
LA protests spark HK and Chinese consulate warnings
LA protests spark HK and Chinese consulate warnings A Waymo vehicle burns after being set on fire in Los Angeles. Photo: AFP The Hong Kong government has reminded residents who are already in the United States or intend to visit the country to pay attention to personal safety in view of the ongoing protests and riots there. "The government reminds residents who intend to visit the United Stated or are already there to monitor the local situation, exercise caution, attend to personal safety, avoid large gatherings of people, and pay attention to local announcements on the latest situation," a spokesman said. The Security Bureau will continue to closely monitor the situation there. Meanwhile, the Chinese consulate in Los Angeles told the country's citizens in the area to strengthen personal security amid unrest in America's second-biggest city. "Chinese citizens in the region [should] strengthen personal security measures, stay away from gatherings, crowded areas, or places with poor public security, and avoid going out at night or travelling alone," the consulate said in a statement. They should also closely monitor official announcements and raise their safety awareness, it added. The warning came as Los Angeles police ordered the public to disperse from the downtown area after further unrest, with cars torched and security forces firing tear gas at protesters, in the wake of US President Donald Trump's deployment of National Guard troops to the city. (Additional reporting by AFP)
HKFP
4 hours ago
- HKFP
Chinese aircraft carrier enters Japan's economic waters, Tokyo says
A Chinese aircraft carrier group entered Japan's economic waters over the weekend, before exiting to conduct drills involving fighter jets, Tokyo's defence ministry said Monday. The Liaoning carrier, two missile destroyers and one fast combat supply ship sailed around 300 kilometres (190 miles) southwest of Japan's easternmost island of Minamitori on Saturday, a ministry statement said. It was the first time a Chinese aircraft carrier had entered that part of Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), a Japanese defence ministry spokesman told AFP. 'We think the Chinese military is trying to improve its operational capability and ability to conduct operations in distant areas,' the spokesman said. China's growing military clout and use of naval and air assets to press disputed territorial claims have rattled the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Tokyo's chief cabinet secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi told reporters on Monday that the government had 'conveyed an appropriate message to the Chinese side' without saying it had lodged a formal protest. After the Liaoning and its accompanying vessels exited Japan's EEZ, fighter jets and helicopters conducted take-offs and landings on Sunday, the ministry statement said. Japan deployed its warship Haguro to the area to monitor the situation, it added. Last month, the Liaoning sailed between two southern Japanese islands within the EEZ, from the East China Sea into the Pacific while conducting take-offs and landings on deck, the ministry said. The carrier in September last year sailed between two Japanese islands near Taiwan and entered Japan's contiguous waters, an area up to 24 nautical miles from its coast. At the time Tokyo called the move 'unacceptable' and expressed 'serious concerns' to Beijing. Under international law, a state has rights to the management of natural resources and other economic activities within its EEZ, which is within 200 nautical miles (370 kilometres) of its coastline. Late last month, Tokyo accused Beijing of conducting unnotified maritime scientific research within its EEZ, near the remote Pacific atoll of Okinotori.
Asia Times
5 hours ago
- Asia Times
Taiwan's de-sinicization drive as geostrategic leverage
In an era where US-China tensions run high but full decoupling is unfeasible, Washington must seek new low-cost diplomatic tools. One such tool may lie in an unexpected domain: Taiwan's internal cultural policies. Specifically, the island's ongoing de-sinicization campaign—while locally motivated—has inadvertently become a geopolitical irritant, escalating Beijing's threat perception. This article proposes that the US quietly explore the recalibration of Taiwan's de-Sinicization policies as a symbolic, non-security concession in broader negotiations with Beijing. Such a move could provide a controlled way to reduce tensions while preserving America's core commitments to Taiwan's security and democracy. Since the early 2000s, Taiwan has taken deliberate steps to shift its cultural identity away from China. Curriculum changes, altered national symbols, and linguistic prioritization form part of a longer campaign to assert a distinct Taiwanese identity. While understandable domestically, these measures have consistently provoked sharp reactions from Beijing, feeding its narrative of Taiwan's irreversible drift toward independence. For the United States, de-Sinicization poses a strategic paradox. On the one hand, it reflects democratic agency. On the other, it may undercut regional stability by giving Beijing a perceived justification to escalate. Importantly, Taiwan's cultural trajectory does not directly impact US national security priorities such as freedom of navigation, semiconductor supply chains or military deterrence. Therefore, Washington could — discreetly — signal to Taipei that a soft pause or reframing of the de-Sinicization drive could serve broader strategic goals. This could manifest as a period of 'consolidation' rather than reversal, buying time to focus on national resilience, defense and external alignment. Such a move would not require a formal public endorsement. Instead, it could surface through Track II dialogues, think tank publications or behind-the-scenes diplomatic conversations. Allies like Japan or South Korea could reinforce this approach by advocating for cultural moderation as a path to regional confidence-building. This approach offers several advantages. It provides the US a symbolic concession to offer in potential high-level US-China discussions without undermining core deterrence postures. It demonstrates to Beijing that the US-Taiwan relationship is not driven by ideological maximalism. And it reinforces Washington's image as a responsible power seeking balance, not confrontation, in the Indo-Pacific. Public emotion variable While most Western observers tend to focus on the Chinese government's calculated use of nationalism, what is often overlooked is that the Chinese state itself is restrained by popular nationalist sentiment, especially on issues like Taiwan. On matters of cultural sovereignty and national unity, it is often the Chinese public—not the leadership—that demands hardline responses. This dynamic creates a powerful incentive for Beijing to avoid appearing 'weak' in the face of perceived provocations, even when the government itself may prefer strategic patience. In this context, Taiwan's highly visible cultural distancing from China—through language reforms, educational shifts, and symbolic removals—acts as a flashpoint that fuels public anger more than elite strategic concern. Therefore, if Taiwan were to partially moderate or reframe its de-Sinicization policies—emphasizing cultural heritage, continuity or mutual historical roots—it could significantly lower emotional hostility among the Chinese populace. Such a change would reduce the pressure on Beijing to escalate or retaliate and empower more flexible policy responses. For Washington, this presents a critical window: by encouraging symbolic de-escalation in the cultural sphere, the US can indirectly calm Chinese domestic sentiment, giving the central leadership more room to maneuver diplomatically without being seen as capitulating. In short, strategic signaling toward Beijing doesn't only happen through naval deployments or economic tools—it can also take shape in how narratives of culture and identity are modulated. By understanding and leveraging the emotional logic of Chinese public nationalism, Washington may gain more influence in managing the Taiwan issue than through deterrence alone. L. Y. Chu is a retired engineer and independent analyst focused on cross-strait relations, US-China strategy and the role of cultural signaling in geopolitical competition.
