Syria President Rejects Algeria's Request to Release Polisario War Criminals
Rabat – Syria President Ahmed al-Sharaa has rejected a request made by Algeria's regime seeking the release of Polisario Front militias who fought under Bashar al-Assad's rule.
A Monte Carlo Doualiya (MCD) correspondent in Damascus reported that Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf traveled to Syria recently to request the Polisario members' release.
The Polisario militia members were caught by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham during an attack launched in November of 2024, the MCD radio detailed.
The Syrian president informed the Algerian regime that around 500 members from the Algerian army and the Polisario militias would be under trial along with the remaining Assad forces who were arrested.
The new revelation confirms yet another scandal, showcasing how Algeria's regime interferes in the domestic affairs of Syria.
According to the radio-affiliated website, the Syrian president said that all detainees would be treated according to international standards.
'The decision caused confusion in the Algerian foreign minister's statements, highlighting the sensitivity of ties between the two countries,' MCD Radio added.
The news outlet further recalled the collusion between Iran's proxy Hezbollah and Polisario, which led to Morocco's decision to cut ties with Tehran in May of 2018.
Earlier this month, the Syrian National Salvation Front called on Interim President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, to sever ties with the Polisario Front.
The opposition group added that they appreciate Morocco's position of extending support for al-Sharaa's presidency.
'We take this good opportunity to renew our deep appreciation to the Sharifian Kingdom of Morocco and its brotherly people,' the Front said in a statement, calling on the new Syrian president to 'correct all the grave mistakes committed by the defunct regime against the historical relations between Syria and Morocco.'
Notably, they also called on the Syrian president to officially recognize Morocco's sovereignty over its southern provinces in Western Sahara and to open a consular office in the city of Laayoune.
In December 2024, a confidential circular leaked citing that Bashar al-Assad's regime collaborated with separatist factions, including the Polisario Front.
The document showed a secret alliance between the Syrian regime and the separatist group claiming independence in southern Morocco.
The confidential circular appears to be an official correspondence from the Syrian government dating back to January 2012 about currency exchange rates in Morocco.
Polisario members sent militias to undergo military training with the Syrian Arab army, the revelation further showed. Tags: Algeria and Western SaharaMorocco
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