Slovak PM accuses EU country of trying to thwart his Moscow visit
Slovak Prime Minister Rober Fico has accused the government of fellow EU member-state Estonia of trying to thwart his visit to Moscow for the Victory Day parade on May 9. The event marks the 80th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany by the Soviet Union.
Estonia closed its airspace to Fico's plane on Wednesday. The Baltic state's foreign minister, Margus Tsahkna, claimed that 'Russia is a country that launched and continues a war in Europe' and 'participation in propaganda events organized by them should be ruled out' for EU representatives.
'Estonia informed us that it will not allow us to fly over its territory despite the fact that Slovakia has a year-round permit to use Estonian airspace for our government wing,' Fico said in a video-message on Facebook later in the day.
He described the actions by the Estonian government as 'a deliberate attempt to thwart my visit to Moscow on the occasion of the official celebrations of the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War.'
The airspace closure is 'extremely disruptive,' Fico said, adding that it could prevent him from taking part in the celebratory events in Moscow scheduled for Thursday evening.
According to the prime minister, the government in Bratislava is looking for an 'alternative route' for him to be able to arrive in the Russian capital before the wreath-laying ceremony and the parade on Friday.
The vice speaker of the Russian parliament's upper chamber, Konstantin Kosachev, told Argumenty I Fakty newspaper on Thursday that the closure of the Estonian airspace for Fico was a 'hostile' move by Tallinn aimed against Russia and its partners.
According to Kosachev, the Baltic nations have not come to terms with the results of the Second World War, and for them, 'May 9 is not a day of victory, but a day of defeat.'
Earlier, Latvia and Lithuania denied their airspace to the plane of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, who was also among the world leaders heading to the Victory Day parade. Vucic was forced to fly through Bulgaria, Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Georgia in order to make it to Moscow on Wednesday.
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