‘Deeply concerning': UK voices worries after MP denied entry to Hong Kong
The UK government has voiced worries after a member of parliament was
denied entry to Hong Kong last week, saying the move will further undermine the city's international reputation.
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British authorities said any decision to deny entry to an MP who was 'simply expressing their views' was 'unacceptable'.
'It is deeply concerning that a UK MP was refused permission to enter Hong Kong last week,' a British government spokesman said.
Wera Hobhouse, the MP for Bath and a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, which has been critical of Beijing's handling of human rights issues, earlier said she was detained and questioned upon her arrival in Hong Kong before being sent back to the UK without an explanation last Thursday.
The spokesman added: 'Unjustified restrictions on the freedom of movement for UK citizens into Hong Kong only serves to further undermine Hong Kong's international reputation and the important people-people connections between the UK and Hong Kong.'
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Britain's trade minister, Douglas Alexander, met Hong Kong Chief Secretary Eric Chan Kwok-ki on Monday as part of his visit to the city and mainland China.
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In an era of intensifying geopolitical rifts, the foreign policy positions of Europe's political parties are gaining renewed global attention. In Germany, the nationalist right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has emerged as a significant player challenging the consensus positions of the country's traditional parties. In this exclusive interview, Markus Frohnmaier—foreign policy spokesperson for the AfD—shares his perspectives on the German government's stance towards the Ukraine conflict, the attempts of the established parties to and the urgent economic challenges facing German industry. The timing of this conversation is especially relevant. Amid persistent calls for increased military support for Ukraine, Germany's mainstream parties remain committed to an all-out confrontational stance towards Russia. Yet Germany's economy is simultaneously grappling with the costs of energy transformation and strategic realignments that are reshaping industrial competitiveness. The AfD, critical of both the military engagement and Berlin's energy policy, is gaining traction in the polls and now commands double-digit national support. Uwe von Parpart, publisher of Asia Times, and correspondent Diego Faßnacht spoke with Markus Frohnmaier. Parpart: A few days ago, Chancellor Friedrich Merz spoke out and said that the restrictions on the range of weapons now in Ukraine's possession have been lifted. This would be necessary to enable the Ukrainians to defend themselves against the Russian attack. As far as I know, all range limits on British, French and American weapon systems were lifted no later than 17 November last year when the US first eliminated range restrictions on ATACMS missiles, which have a maximum range of 300 kilometers. So, that's quite some time ago. Why do you think Merz made a big deal about this again right now? Frohnmaier: Long before he became chancellor, Mr Merz was an ardent advocate of giving the 500-km range Taurus missiles to Ukraine. But recently, he has avoided the subject. He has to be considerate of his coalition partner, the Social Democrats (SPD), who oppose Taurus delivery, and is trying to use smoke and mirrors such as the lifting of range restrictions to distract from that. You will have watched his May 28 press conference. In it, he did not say anything about supplying Taurus, but that he wants Germany to help Ukraine to develop new weapons with long-range capabilities. With such talk, he is trying to distract from the fact that the CDU/CSU promised the delivery of Taurus for many months during the recent parliamentary election campaign. From our perspective, from the perspective of the AfD, these are completely the wrong approaches to the Ukraine situation. We now need diplomatic efforts. We must ensure that the Ukrainians and the Russians sit down at the same table and continue negotiations. We fail to see that Mr Merz is pursuing any strategy here that goes beyond what has been attempted in recent years: throwing crumbs to a state that would actually no longer exist without foreign support – it has to be said that harshly – and keeping it on a drip. This is not our idea of a solution. Instead, we need to support the steps that US President Trump has taken to persuade the two parties to talk in Turkey. And I believe that discussions about range restrictions or providing an alibi-like surrogate for Taurus are completely the wrong signal at the moment. Parpart: What do you think? How seriously should we take Russia's threat that if Taurus is fired at Russia, this will be interpreted as German combatant status in the war? Frohnmaier: In my opinion, Russia has long regarded Germany as an active participant in this war. But I find the debate difficult. It is pointless to discuss whether the deployment of Taurus would mean German involvement or not. I believe that in real terms, Germany has been involved in this war for a long time. It has also clearly taken sides, which I find regrettable. I believe we would have had the chance to act as a kind of broker, an honest broker, in this conflict. Germany has built good relationships with the Ukrainian and Russian sides over the last few decades. This potential was squandered. But now, Mr Trump has definitely succeeded in forcing the two parties to the negotiating table. And I believe that a decisive component was this: that Donald Trump has made it clear that Ukrainian and US interests are different. This is something that we have not seen in European politics for many months, actually for years. European government representatives no longer make or formulate a distinction between their own national interests and the interests of Ukraine. It was only this new way of thinking on the part of Trump that ultimately forced the Ukrainians and Russians to enter into dialogue with each other. We will have to wait and see how this develops. However, I cannot see that the German government under Friedrich Merz is currently making any positive contribution to making peace in Ukraine as quickly as possible. Faßnacht: Friedrich Merz would now reply that the last few weeks have shown that more diplomacy has achieved nothing. What he did say is that the current government would do everything in its power to ensure that the Nord Stream pipelines are not put back into operation. This raises the question of what the real German interest is in these negotiations. Frohnmaier: Well, to Mr Merz's question, what's the use of diplomacy, I would pose a counter-question: We have seen in the last two years that the supply of weapons of the most diverse categories has not brought us one meter closer to peace. On the contrary, the situation may even have deteriorated. You will no doubt remember the first negotiations that were held relatively soon after the start of the war in Istanbul. Since then, there have been no more negotiations for a long time. But Trump's negotiations have already led to the largest prisoner exchange since the start of the war. Everyone involved would probably like to see more. But peace also sometimes takes time, which must also be recognized by the Russian side at this point. There is a fear that if a 30-day ceasefire is agreed, but at the same time arms deliveries and the strengthening of the Ukrainian armed forces continue, this could work to Russia's disadvantage. I believe that an attempt should be made to find a solution on this point, for example by freezing the front line and stopping the supply of weapons. This will probably not happen for the time being, but it is certainly an aspect that will be raised time and again. So far, I have not heard any convincing argument to dispel these concerns. The second point you mentioned is Nord Stream. I think you have addressed a very important point that has been given far too little attention in the press and in the media coverage following the press conference. In the debates in the German Bundestag over the last few days – there was a debate on Nord Stream – the CDU/CSU has made every effort to avoid a clear statement on how it intends to proceed with Nord Stream. That's why I was surprised that Friedrich Merz declared yesterday that he would do everything in his power to ensure that Nord Stream is not put back into operation. From a German perspective, I think that is completely negligent and wrong. Why? It is in our national interest to ensure a broad energy supply range for Germany. Friedrich Merz's CDU/CSU has shut down the nuclear power plants in Germany. The CDU/CSU decided to phase out coal-fired power. In other words, thanks to the CDU/CSU, Germany has said goodbye to all conventional energy sources and has virtually been forced to rely entirely on expensive American liquefied natural gas and alternative, i.e. renewable, energies. This is not sustainable for a major industrial nation like Germany. It has always been essential for Germany to be able to procure cheap energy. That made us strong for many years, but we have lost that. If you like, Germany had three pillars. One of them was always the cheap energy that could be obtained from Russia. However, the previous government made us too dependent on Russia because it took away our energy sovereignty and ability to compensate for the energy supply from Russia. You don't simply shut down well-functioning and amortizing nuclear power plants. Nor do you simply blow up Europe's most modern coal-fired power plant. But all of this took place in Germany. The second pillar was and still is, of course, the embedding in the Atlantic alliance. The third pillar was access to the Chinese market. Now one pillar, namely affordable energy, has been lost. If Friedrich Merz really wants to find a solution to this war, he must also give the Russian side motivation to do so, as hard as that sounds. You can't keep imposing new sanctions and supplying new weapons and at the same time expect Russia to end the war. When the war is over, will we continue to deny Russia access to our markets and not trade with it? I don't think that is a motivation for a peace agreement. That's why I can't understand the chancellor's strategy. Faßnacht: When you talk about a solution, how do you see the future of a possible European security architecture? Does it need to be fundamentally rethought? What are the AfD's thoughts on this? Frohnmaier: I believe that, first and foremost, we need to strengthen our own armed forces … in our own national interest. The Bundeswehr is in a desolate state. It has been cut to the bone over several years. At the moment, we are not even in a position to ensure minimal national defense. This has nothing to do with our brave soldiers, but we have to be honest. There are studies that have come to the conclusion that Germany would not even be able to wage war for a week in the event of an attack on the Federal Republic due to a lack of ammunition and equipment. That shows, as a first step, we must strengthen our own armed forces. As a second step, we must then discuss what a European security architecture could look like. Part of the hard unpopular truth is this: The Americans have co-financed our security for many decades. It is therefore only logical that the American side is now saying: 'You have to contribute more if you want to continue to enjoy our protection.' We are currently experiencing something similar with the customs debate. The German media are acting outraged. But here, too, the truth is that the European Union initially imposed tariffs on American goods. In this debate, I think we also need to start being honest. Parpart: Yes, it is very important to be honest about Germany's own military capabilities. I served in the Bundeswehr, in the Navy, for many years. First on active duty, then as a reserve officer. I looked at what it looks like today and what it looked like back then. There is no comparison at all: there are not even 100,000 deployable soldiers in Germany now. That's just the way it is. In England there are maybe 25,000 and in France I don't know, but let's say 50,000. What's the point? To pontificate in this grandiose way that we will have to do it ourselves if the Americans no longer want to. Europe won't be able to do that in the next five years. That's it. That is a very clear, realistic assessment, which was made by a leading German institute, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, and was confirmed a fortnight ago by the Institute of International Studies in London. Perhaps a debate on this should also be organized in the Bundestag. How does the AfD see this? How do you want to proceed in the Bundestag in order to set something in motion? Frohnmaier: We are working on it. We have introduced several legislative initiatives. We have also raised several questions in the Bundestag regarding the delivery and construction of long-range missiles for Ukraine. But we are facing major hurdles. The established parties have erected what they call a 'Brandmauer' (fire wall) preventing their members from collaborating with us. We are the second largest party in parliament, but find it nearly impossible to push through any of our policies. Parpart: At the February Munich Security Conference, US Vice President J.D. Vance didn't speak about security. Instead, he spoke about the truncated understanding of democracy in Germany, the fear of established politicians of the will of the voters and of free speech. Could you please comment on that and tell us how democracy is being practiced in the new Bundestag? Frohnmaier: I have just come from a panel discussion in which Dr. Weidel [the AfD co-chair] also took part. It was a hot topic there. If I may, I would like to go a little further: Germany is the only developed Western country in which a domestic intelligence service has started to monitor and categorize political parties. This involves checking whether a party meets democratic requirements or not. In the process, those democratic standards are determined by the governing parties. This means that in Germany, a domestic intelligence service does not work on the defense against Islamism or the threat of terrorism, for example, but observes rival political parties to the ruling parties. In Germany, such observation currently only applies to the AfD. Various categories were invented for this purpose. First, there was the so-called test case phase, examining whether the AfD is a democratic party or not. There was no such thing in case law before. From the test case, which was invented especially for the AfD because it had become too strong, we then moved on to the observation case. A third category was then introduced: We are now to be categorized as extremist. In Germany, you are extremist if you say that freedom of expression is under threat, if you say you want to live in a world in which you earn your money with your labor, if you say you don't want mass migration that jeopardizes internal security and, for example, if you say you don't think that all decisions about our nation state should be made in Brussels. If you make these points today, you run the risk of being categorized as extremist. The AfD will continue to be dealt with in an unparliamentary manner. Here's what just happened: There are committees in the German Bundestag, similar to the congressional committees in the US. There are over 20 committees, and each party is entitled to chair several committees in proportion to its number of seats in parliament. The AfD, as the strongest opposition party, is entitled to several committee chairs. However, contrary to decades of parliamentary tradition, we have not been granted a single committee, [not] one. There has never been anything like it in Germany. [We're] ahead of the ruling CDU/CSU bloc in weekly opinion polls. However, the party is treated like an outcast. The votes of over 20% of German voters are cast aside. This is absolutely absurd and it needs to be pursued and discussed more widely internationally in the future. Faßnacht: The AfD is the only party in Germany that consistently has taken a very strict approach to the migration issue. Nevertheless, demographic change will certainly be an issue in the coming decades, as the number of people working in Germany is declining. Is there a position on migration that goes beyond simple rejection of the current migration policy? Frohnmaier: Yes, thank you for the opportunity to address that because in the German media such a differentiation often is not made. The AfD makes a very clear distinction between needs-based immigration and illegal immigration, or regular and irregular migration. We are not fundamentally against migration. Anyone who is a legal resident in Germany and has the appropriate qualifications to be integrated into the labor market, is very welcome in Germany. This has been the case in the past and will remain so in the future. Following the Canadian example, we are in favor of needs-based immigration that is geared towards the requirements of the German economy. On the other hand, we say quite clearly that we no longer want people who are not legal residents of Germany, who commit criminal offences here and who despise and disrespect our culture. In the last 10 to 15 years, we have seen masses of such illegal immigrants coming to Germany. If you look at the crime statistics, the results are truly frightening. The 15% of non-German residents are responsible for almost 45% of all crimes. That's why we, as the AfD, say: 'anyone who is in Germany legally, who works here and contributes to the community, is welcome, especially if they want to learn our language and respect our culture.' However, we do not want people in Germany who commit crimes or stay here illegally. This is completely normal in every healthy and normal country in the world. But in Germany, we have experienced a very different situation in the last 10 to 15 years. We want to return to normality. We can see that far too many highly qualified people are now emigrating. We have a brain drain problem and need to counteract this. The taxes people pay are far too high, in numerous places domestic security can no longer be guaranteed. And we need to promote an active family policy in order to make Germany attractive again. Unfortunately, today it is often the case that the question of whether you can start a family is also a question of your wallet, because children are considered too expensive. That's a shame, because I believe that children should experience a welcoming culture and that it shouldn't be a question of how much money you have. Faßnacht: What specific ideas does the AfD have to change this? Particularly in view of the incentives that make Germany so attractive for low- or unskilled migrants? Frohnmaier: Firstly, when it comes to illegal migration, we need a no-way policy. We must make it clear that people who cannot stay in Germany legally will be turned back directly at Germany's external borders. Refoulement must take place without compromise. We also must consistently deport and return those who are in Germany illegally. If we do not do this, we will not come to grips with the problems here. These are essential building blocks. If I may: before I became the foreign policy spokesperson for the AfD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, I was the spokesperson for development policy for a long time and would also like to say a few things about that. A study by the United Nations, which is certainly not suspected of playing AfD politics, has shown that Germany has become a magnet for immigration with its so-called incentive structure. This is about remittances. We have a situation where many people, particularly from Africa, come to us to feed their families back home through remittances. In some countries, remittances now make up a not inconsiderable proportion of national wealth. This must be stopped. This system of incentivizing remittances must be reduced and only benefits in kind should be granted. Scaling Fences has shown that people migrate to Germany in an organized manner in order for them to provide support in the form of remittances to home countries. We know that this amounts to almost 20 billion euros a year, which is not consumed in the German domestic market, but is predominantly transferred back to developing countries. German social benefits must not be misappropriated and used for development co-operation. We already have a situation where Germany is the leader in Official Development Assistance per capita and number two in absolute terms. Only the Americans pay more for development services. However, there is no strategy behind this, nor any consideration of what is in the German interest. It includes completely absurd projects. For example, we pay for LED lamps in Moroccan mosques. We pay for so-called e-rickshaw driving licences for transsexual people in India. Or we pay 30 million euros for climate-neutral cookware in Kenya. I could go on and on with this list. We have to set priorities here in our national interest. And what sums up the inefficiency of it all is that 70 cents of every euro we spend on development cooperation ends up in project administration and only 30% actually reaches the projects. Parpart: Ten years ago, China mainly exported to the United States and Europe. Now, however, things are very different. The main customer countries for Chinese products are in the Global South. Are there any thoughts on this in Germany? It looks like German exporters are still very much focused on the US, other European countries and China. Does the AfD have a concept of increased trade and investment in the Global South? Frohnmaier: I wrote a book about it called 'Die Verwohltätigung' ['charitibilization']. It describes German development cooperation. You're not even allowed to use the word 'aid' anymore, out of political correctness, because the official Germany has recently come to the conclusion that there are no longer any donor and recipient countries. I'm not being politically correct when I say that this is now done on an equal footing. I always have to smile and think: Imagine you go to your bank and say: 'When the next repayment is due, we'll decide on an equal footing, I'll have my say. That simply wouldn't work. The decoupling of conditions from development services has led to development cooperation becoming even more inefficient. We need a German strategy that goes beyond playing benefactor and altruism. The Global South is very important for us. We are talking about new markets here. The African market is largely untapped, at least from a European perspective. The Chinese are far ahead of us there when it comes to raw materials, partnerships and infrastructure projects. There is hardly any of this from a German perspective. That is why I am in favor of development cooperation having at least three focal points. One focus should be on raw materials and economic partnerships, another on preventing migration. These are sensible priorities that we should set in development cooperation. The Chinese are doing well in these areas. In 2017, at the very beginning of my time in the German Bundestag, I said that learning from China means learning to win – in the context of development cooperation. That caused great indignation, but it is simply true. Of course, they organize development cooperation differently. The Chinese are very business-like in some areas, which is perhaps not always compatible with the German mindset. However, I would also like to argue that we should once again allow our own interests to play a much greater role in development cooperation and develop strategies from that perspective. Parpart: I just came back from Shanghai. Germany's BASF, the world's largest chemical company, has established a major research center there and is building a $10 billion Verbund site (an integrated chemical complex linking production, energy flows and infrastructure) in Guangdong province. One engineer told me: 'We need cheap Russian natural gas to make our chemicals, but we can't do that in Germany anymore.' That's the backdrop of your argument, isn't it? Frohnmaier: It is not in Germany's interest to rule out the possibility of Russian gas being sourced again after the end of the war. It is not in Germany's interest to say 'nuclear power is no longer for us' out of some hippie and do-gooder ideals, while nuclear power plants are still being built all over the world. It is not in Germany's interest to phase out coal power and so on. How Germany positions itself in terms of energy policy is a critical issue. The prosperity of our country, the standard of living and the future of our citizens and families stand and fall with it. Trump would probably organize the framework conditions for American companies in such a way that they can produce in the USA. And in my opinion, that is a major difference to our federal government. These people have made the location so unattractive through their policies that it is hardly possible for companies to produce here, so they go abroad. That is regrettable. I am very worried. The southwest of Germany where I'm from is one of the centers of the automotive industry, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche, Bosch. If these companies, on whose creative economic power every second job in my region depends, are forced to leave, then we will experience a change like the one that once took place in the Ruhr region and turned it into a rust belt as described in US Vice President Vance's book about his home state of Ohio. Affordable energy is an absolute necessity. Parpart: Yes, definitely. A final question: Will you become Minister President of Baden-Württemberg one day, Mr Frohnmaier? Frohnmaier: I am working on it … for our citizens. Parpart: When is the election? Next year, right? Frohnmaier: Exactly, in March 2026. Parpart: And what is the current situation? If there were elections next Sunday, you would still lag behind the CDU, wouldn't you? Frohnmaier: We are the second strongest force in Baden-Württemberg, but the CDU actually still leads by around 5-6%. We are now starting the election campaign and I expect to win.
