Major rice producers have world's worst heavy metal pollution, Chinese scientists warn
Some of the world's leading rice-producing countries are sitting on a vast belt of pollution caused by heavy metal, according to a new study that has raised urgent concerns about global food safety.
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Some of the world's leading rice-producing countries are sitting on a vast belt of pollution caused by heavy metal, according to a new study that has raised urgent concerns about global food safety.
The Chinese team behind the research used machine learning to analyse hundreds of studies based on soil samples taken from around the world and concluded South and Southeast Asia's most fertile rice regions were suffering from severe cadmium contamination.
Up to 1.4 billion people worldwide are affected by toxic heavy metal pollution and 17 per cent of arable land is contaminated, according to the study led by Hou Deyi, a professor at the School of Environment at Tsinghua University.
The findings, published in Science this week, suggest regions crucial to global food security are also hotspots for pollution linked to kidney damage, bone disorders and respiratory diseases.
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Cadmium is a carcinogen and is most prevalent in the world's major rice-producing regions, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, China and Thailand.
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Asia Times
20 hours ago
- Asia Times
China cracks a code on invisible battlefield surveillance
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Chinese radar scientists have demonstrated a breakthrough system enabling aircraft to detect moving ground targets with high clarity while remaining completely radio-silent. Led by Li Zhongyu of the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, the team used two Cessna 208 planes in formation, with one actively transmitting radar signals and the other passively receiving echoes, to test their 'space-time decoupling two-channel clutter cancellation method.' As reported in the Journal of Radars, the test tracked three vehicles across terrain previously inaccessible to traditional radar due to clutter, range migration and Doppler noise. Through advanced motion correction, spectrum compression and a novel matrix-based clutter suppression technique, the system isolated targets with over 20 decibels more clarity than current technologies. The passive aircraft never transmitted signals, making it nearly impossible to detect or jam, ideal for low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) missions, according to the Journal of Radars report. Instead of relying on artificial intelligence, the method utilizes efficient mathematical models specifically designed for real-world applications. The development could allow Chinese aircraft and missiles to silently scan battlefields, oceans or skies, identifying mobile threats without alerting adversaries. Li called the system a world first, positioning China at the cutting edge of stealth radar capabilities amid growing global electronic warfare competition. Explaining the complementary nature of passive and active radars, Eric Hundman mentions in a March 2025 report for the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) that passive radars can often detect stealth aircraft, as they're hard for anti-radiation weapons to target because they emit no signals. However, Hundman says the applications of passive radar remain relatively limited due to its reliance on unpredictable external signals, narrow usable frequencies and relatively unsophisticated processing algorithms. As for active radars, Hundman says they offer high-resolution, multi-function capabilities, combining stealth detection, surveillance, tracking and fire control in increasingly mobile and networked platforms. However, he points out that since active radars emit signals, they are vulnerable to detection by passive sensors and anti-radiation missiles. In view of each system's limitations, Hundman states that Chinese researchers are working to complement active radars with passive systems and pursue network integration, aiming to fuse data across platforms for a more resilient and comprehensive radar network capable of withstanding electronic and kinetic threats. Discussing the potential operational application of the technology, the US Department of Defense's (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) states that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues to make progress in the development and integration of unmanned systems, including drone swarm tactics and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) concepts. According to the report, these efforts include employing drones for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as electronic warfare, decoys and potentially precision strike missions in coordination with stealth aircraft. In an April 2025 report for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), Travis Sharp highlights the strategic pairing of manned stealth fighters and collaborative combat aircraft (CCAs), emphasizing their complementary roles in air dominance. Sharp says CCAs, acting as loyal wingmen, would use active radar to detect and track enemy aircraft, transmitting targeting data to stealth fighters that remain electronically silent to avoid detection. He notes that this setup enhances survivability while extending the fighter's engagement range, allowing long-range missile strikes before the enemy is aware. Sharp adds that CCAs can also jam enemy radars, further complicating adversary targeting efforts. He points out that such tactics are key to improving loss-exchange ratios in potential conflicts, including in the Taiwan Strait between the US and China. The advent of China's purportedly sixth-generation fighters adds impetus to the development of such technology. Malcolm Davis mentions in an SCMP article this month that China's J-36, which appears to be optimized for air-to-air combat with very long-range missiles, could achieve advanced stealth and teaming with collaborative combat aircraft (CCA). Further, Timothy Heath mentions in the same article that sixth-generation fighters are unlikely to be involved in maneuvering dogfights but instead focus on command and control, enabling unmanned aircraft to conduct strikes against air, marine and ground targets. Ditching manned fighters altogether, the SCMP reported in May 2025 that China's Jiu Tan drone carrier, a super-high-altitude, long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), could carry up to 100 kamikaze drones or six tons of ammunition with a maximum range of 7,000 kilometers and an altitude of 15,000 meters. SCMP notes that, if deployed, the Jiu Tan could contribute to the PLA's swarming capabilities, wherein large groups of drones are released to overwhelm an adversary's defenses. Stacie Pettyjohn and other writers mention in a June 2024 report for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) that China could utilize its diverse drone fleet, ranging from kamikaze to reconnaissance and loyal wingman-type systems, to saturate air defenses, rapidly close kill chains, and complicate Taiwan and US countermeasures in a conflict over the island. Pettyjohn and others say that China holds an initial advantage due to its large, inexpensive and varied drone arsenal, which could be used to locate and strike US and Taiwanese forces with speed and scale. They also warn that drone mass and rapid adaptation, not just innovation, is critical, citing Ukraine as a cautionary example, with China's production capacity giving it a dangerous edge in the opening phases of a Taiwan war. As for the US's capability to counter drone swarms, Wilson Beaver and Ka'Von Johnson mention in a Heritage Foundation report this month that the US faces growing challenges in countering drone swarms due to fragmented capabilities, underdeveloped training and an overreliance on costly systems. Beaver and Johnson say that while kinetic interceptors and electronic warfare tools offer layered defenses, gaps persist in small-drone detection, real-time threat identification and swarm neutralization. They point out that directed-energy weapons, such as lasers and high-powered microwaves (HPMs), remain impractical due to issues with range, power and target discrimination. In addition, they say most counter-drone systems are not widely fielded, few troops are trained to operate them and base commanders often lack the authority to engage drones, compounding vulnerabilities. While the US races to patch gaps in drone defenses, China is methodically assembling a sensor-strike network designed to operate silently, resiliently and at scale.
HKFP
04-06-2025
- HKFP
Water Supplies Department ‘concerned' after reports of residents experiencing diarrhoea amid water quality complaints
The Water Supplies Department has expressed concerns about some residents reportedly suffering from diarrhoea after unknown black particles were found in drinking water at two government housing estates in Fanling. The department said on its Facebook page on Tuesday evening that it has been closely following the water quality issue at Queen's Hill Estate and the adjacent Shan Lai Court, which shares the same water supply system. 'Today, there were reports that some residents have experienced diarrhoea,' the department's post in Chinese read. 'The Water Supplies Department is extremely concerned.' Drinking water samples at both estates have already been tested and found to meet drinking water standards in Hong Kong, it said. But given complaints from some residents suffering diarrhoea, assessment reports for those water samples have been sent to the Department of Health for evaluation, the department said. At least 11 residents in Shan Lai Court suffered from diarrhoea over the past few days, the Oriental Daily News reported on Tuesday. Water in a supermarket in Queen's Hill Estate was out of stock as residents bought bottled water due to concerns about the quality of tap water, according to the media outlet. The Water Supplies Department received reports starting from last Friday that residents at Queen's Hill Estate, a public housing estate, discovered unidentified black particles in their drinking water. And since last Saturday, the department has also been receiving similar reports from residents at Shan Lai Court, a government subsidised sale estate, the department said in response to local media outlets. 'Won't cause any harm' Roger Wong, the director of water supplies, said on RTHK on Monday that the department found that pipes leading to Queen's Hill Estate were in good condition, with no black particles detected. But black particles were found in the estate's water tank filters, he said. The department has collected water samples for testing and ordered the estate to clean and flush the water tanks, Wong added. 'After days of cleaning and flushing the water tanks, the black particles should have been removed,' Wong said, adding that black particles have also been found in some other public housing estates as well. 'Those are usually inert substances and won't cause any harm to people,' Wong has said.
Asia Times
01-06-2025
- Asia Times
Marco Rubio's and Miles Yu's war on Chinese students is misguided
In an age of escalating geopolitical rivalry, democracy's strongest foundations — press freedom, civic trust and public accountability — are being eroded by a perfect storm of surveillance, suspicion, and systemic misinformation. This is especially visible in US-China relations, where bipartisan hawkishness has led to sweeping proposals like Senator Marco Rubio's latest effort to revoke visas from Chinese students and researchers — treating them as national security risks by default. Joining the chorus is Miles Yu, a former Chinese international student who became a top China policy adviser in the first Trump administration. In his widely cited essay, 'Enabling the Dragon,' published in November 2024 the week after Donald Trump had won the election, Yu argues that US universities have become naive enablers of the Chinese Communist Party, serving as academic outposts vulnerable to intellectual theft and ideological infiltration. Yu urges that the United States should sharply restrict academic engagement with China, calling such cooperation a national security threat. His claim is sweeping: that China has 'outsourced' its academic system to exploit American openness, and that the US must respond by severing intellectual ties. Both Rubio and Yu are also ignoring the data: Chinese nationals make up the largest share of foreign students in STEM fields — computer science, engineering, math and the physical sciences. According to the National Science Foundation, more than 80% of Chinese PhD recipients in these fields stay and work in the US after graduation, contributing directly to American innovation, entrepreneurship, and research leadership. Many have founded startups, filed patents and worked in cutting-edge labs at US universities and tech companies. The idea that they are 'outsourcing' American prosperity to China is not only false — it's self-destructive. If these students are forced out, the US will not only lose a competitive advantage in global talent — it will damage its innovation ecosystem at its roots. Immigration-driven innovation has been one of the few consistent engines of American prosperity in a polarized and gridlocked political climate. Treating every foreign-born talent as a potential spy will only drive them into the arms of competitors. Moreover, this zero-sum framing misrepresents how education actually works. American universities are not ideological weaklings — they are spaces where critical thinking, civic inquiry and pluralistic values are cultivated. Chinese students are not arriving with monolithic loyalties — they are shaped by their experiences here, often becoming some of the most perceptive critics of authoritarianism and some of the strongest defenders of democratic ideals. Diaspora students and scholars, such as the founders of China Labor Watch and Human Rights in China, have often been at the forefront of documenting abuses, challenging both Chinese state narratives and the overreach of US suspicion. They are not security liabilities — they are civic actors. And yet, they are increasingly caught in the middle. Media outlets rush to publish stories about alleged espionage long before there's due process. Federal task forces pressure universities to cut off collaborations without context. On social media, platforms like X — once Twitter — amplify xenophobic paranoia while silencing legitimate voices. The result is a digital public sphere poisoned by fear and disinformation, where nuance disappears and policy becomes a blunt instrument of exclusion. In my research — China's Emerging Inter-network Society — I explore how diaspora communities and digital platforms are reshaping political consciousness. Platforms like WeChat and TikTok are indeed double-edged: they can be used for surveillance, but also for storytelling, mutual aid, and grassroots advocacy. What Yu fails to mention is this: He was once 'the dragon' he now seeks to shut out. To presume otherwise is to vastly underestimate the power of American education — something Yu himself should know firsthand. Yet there's a glaring irony: Yu himself is living proof that American education works — not just as a system of knowledge transmission, but as a transformative force of values, perspective and civic engagement. Yu came to the US in the 1980s as an international student from China. He benefited from the very system he now decries — one that welcomed global talent, nurtured individual potential and allowed a Chinese-born scholar to rise to the highest levels of US policymaking. If America had treated him then the way he now proposes treating others, Miles Yu might still be teaching Maoist doctrine in Anhui, not advising presidents in Washington. If Miles Yu truly believed Chinese students couldn't be trusted, one wonders why he chose to stay and serve in the US government rather than return to China after pursuing his PhD degree. Doesn't his own life prove the power of American education to transform, inspire, and integrate? If we now assume every Chinese student is a CCP foot soldier, does that include him too? Or is he the exception who proves the value — not the danger — of keeping the door open? He chose to stay in the United States not because he was coerced but because the openness and meritocracy of American institutions resonated with him. If we now claim that every Chinese student is a sleeper agent for Beijing, then Yu's own journey becomes an inconvenient contradiction. Isn't he the evidence that America's democratic model can win hearts and minds? That contradiction isn't just ironic. It's emblematic of a dangerous drift in US national security thinking in which suspicion has replaced strategy and identity has replaced evidence. If the US blocks Chinese students while maintaining that it wants to 'compete' with China, Beijing will likely frame the move as hypocritical — claiming it reveals American insecurity rather than confidence in its democratic model. The retaliatory measures may not just hurt bilateral relations but also signal to other countries the risks of aligning too closely with US policy on China. Yu's central claim is that Chinese students and scholars serve as covert extensions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), sent not to learn but to spy, steal, and subvert. This argument has gained traction in parts of Washington, where fears of intellectual property theft and technological competition are real and justified. But let's be clear: there is a vast difference between targeted counterintelligence and collective suspicion. To reduce an entire population of students — numbering over 270,000 annually — to latent threats is both empirically unfounded and strategically foolish. Chinese students are not a monolith. Many come precisely because they seek an alternative to the CCP's control. Some become critics of the regime. Others stay, contribute to US innovation, or build bridges that serve American interests abroad. Treating them as presumed agents of espionage doesn't protect US security — it undercuts America's greatest soft power asset: its openness. We are now witnessing the consequences of this worldview hardening into law. In May 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, citing security risks, announced that his department would move to revoke or block Chinese student visas in 'sensitive' research fields outright, citing national security risks. The proposal would give broad authority to federal agencies to deny or cancel visas without due process, based not on individual conduct, but on nationality and field of study. This is not strategic caution — it's blanket exclusion. And it mirrors the logic of Yu's essay: that anyone Chinese by origin or association is inherently suspect. Such policies are dangerously close to the racialized fearmongering of the Chinese Exclusion Act era, now dressed in tech-sector clothing. They undermine US universities, punish innocent scholars, and hand the CCP a propaganda victory. If carried out, this policy won't stop espionage — it will cripple American research labs, isolate Chinese dissidents, and accelerate talent flight to competitor nations like Canada, the UK, and Australia. The Trump administration's aggressive stance on Chinese espionage is haunted by the very intelligence failures it now seeks to prevent. As Sue Miller, the CIA's former chief mole hunter, has pointed out, the collapse of US spy networks in China more than a decade ago — a debacle that saw scores of informants arrested or executed — remains unresolved. That strategic humiliation not only decimated on-the-ground intelligence, it also created a culture of institutional paranoia in Washington. Now, instead of rebuilding trust and refining intelligence practices, the Trump-era approach has leaned heavily on suspicion and overreach — particularly targeting ethnic Chinese scientists, scholars, and students. But blunt tools don't fix complex failures. The overcorrection has led to high-profile wrongful prosecutions, deteriorating academic collaboration and growing mistrust within diaspora communities. The United States' inability to root out past internal breaches has fueled a form of policy scapegoating — one that risks trading precision for profiling. Without credible reform of intelligence capabilities and transparent accountability for past missteps, the crackdown will remain reactive, politically charged and ultimately self-defeating. Yu frames UA-China academic collaboration as 'outsourcing,' suggesting the US has ceded control of its intellectual infrastructure to a hostile power. But this misunderstands both how American academia works and why it thrives. Academic exchange is not a one-way transaction. It's a competitive ecosystem, where ideas are tested, refined and challenged through global participation. Chinese students and researchers don't dilute US education — they elevate it. They help fill STEM classrooms, contribute to breakthroughs in AI and biomedical research, and keep US universities globally dominant. Cutting them off would hurt America far more than it would hurt China. Yes, vigilance is necessary. Research security protocols should be strong. Federal funding should come with guardrails. But throwing out the entire system of engagement, as Yu and now Rubio suggest, would be self-sabotage. If enforced, Rubio's proposal to ban Chinese students will not only undercut America's higher education system — it could also trigger swift retaliation from Beijing. China may impose reciprocal visa restrictions on US students, scholars and education programs, halt joint research initiatives or tighten controls on American academic access to Chinese data and field sites. More strategically, it could restrict elite talent from going to the US, incentivize a reverse brain drain or escalate a global narrative campaign accusing the US of racial discrimination. Such moves wouldn't just harm bilateral ties — they would damage America's soft power, alienate diaspora communities and send a troubling signal to other nations about the risks of engaging with US institutions. Ironically, by closing the door on Chinese students, Rubio and his allies may be doing more to weaken America's global leadership than to defend The U.S.-China contest is not just about chips, jets, and rare earths. It's about the future of global norms — openness versus control, pluralism versus authoritarianism. In this battle, academic freedom is not a vulnerability. It's a weapon. It is what makes the US different from — and stronger than — the system the CCP promotes. If we start mimicking Beijing's paranoia, walling off knowledge, and excluding people based on their passport, we risk becoming what we claim to oppose. Yu himself is living proof of that freedom's power. He came to the US seeking truth, found it in an open society and used it to shape national strategy. That's a success story, not a turn around now and advocate for closing the gates behind him is not only short-sighted — it's a betrayal of the very ideals that made his own story possible. A call for strategic openness Miles Yu transferred himself from Chinese student to gatekeeper by pulling up the ladder behind him. What we need is not blanket restriction but smart engagement, clearer funding rules, targeted export controls and honest dialogue with university leaders – and, yes, a robust national security posture. But we must resist fear-driven policies that punish potential allies and weaken our intellectual base. The best way to 'outcompete' China is not to become more like it — but to double down on what made the US the envy of the world. If we follow Yu's and Rubio's advice, we may win a battle of suspicion — but lose the war for global leadership. If the US wants to outcompete authoritarian regimes, it must stop mimicking their logic. Surveillance, guilt by association and ideological profiling are not strategies for innovation — they are symptoms of decline. Democracy's strength lies in openness, in attracting talent, and in offering a system that can inspire — not coerce — loyalty. Rather than banning students, the US should reinvest in the institutions that make it a magnet for global minds: its universities, its press, and its civic infrastructure. Journalists must be more careful not to amplify racialized suspicion. Lawmakers must recognize that brainpower, not fear, drives prosperity. Scholars like Miles Yu must reckon with the contradiction between their personal journeys and the policies they now advocate. Democracy does not win by closing its doors. It wins by proving it is worth entering. Yujing Shentu, PhD, is an independent scholar and writer on digital politics, international political economy and US-China strategic competition.
