Ukraine's Op Spider's Web is fantastically futuristic–‘not applicable' to Indian setting

The Print

2 days ago

Even at this early stage, specific information on Operation Spider's Web is available, not least because of the address by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
The scale, audacity, novelty, and effectiveness of Ukraine's Operation Spider's Web—where it attacked Russian airfields by launching 117 drones—show how archaic India's conceptions of modern warfare are. If Operation Sindoor was all about the '80s–style stand-off, involving precision weaponry and Beyond Visual Range aerial combat between multi-million dollar fighter planes, Ukraine's drone attack seems fantastically futuristic, almost enough to be considered 'not applicable' to the Indian setting.
The technical vector
Kamikaze Quadcopters were the attack vector: Open-source intelligence reports suggest that a multiplicity of entirely unimpressive-looking, small quadcopters were used by the Ukrainian military. These would clearly be capable of operating within a limited range. And therein lies the rub – the sophistication of the attack doesn't lie in the nature of the weapon used, but in its conception, scale, and focus.
117 drones: With the attack spread across five locations, and across five time zones, one would imagine that the number of drones assigned to each target would have been relatively modest. The (limited effect) weapon to (soft skin/combustible) target match suggests that only a single hit per aim must have been attempted. Over 40 Russian aircraft are claimed to have been hit, approximating to a 33 per cent success rate, thus indicating that a significant number of drones either failed to find targets or were swatted down.
FPV-style operations: Explicit mention of a 'corresponding number of drone operators' in Zelenskyy's post on X and the manoeuvring discernible from released videos clearly imply employment of a first person view (FPV)-style control methodology. The modest number of drones per target zone and the dispersed and easily recognised character of the strategic bomber targets would certainly permit individual drone operators to manage the attack without interfering with each other. Apart from some colloquial chirpings on X, the term 'swarms' is distinctly missing from any descriptions of the assault released so far.
Delivery mechanism: Clear images have been released showing a commercial container-type transportation mechanism to deliver the short-range drones into the vicinity of the targets in Russia. They do, however, display some non-standard fittings on the upper surfaces—possibly linked to the lid removal mechanisms—differentiating them from standard shipping containers. Simultaneous positioning of a number of these containers proximate to multiple target locations, however, does indicate some level of subversion/complicity rather than only masterful disguise as the secret of success. All future Hollywood scripts, instead of obsessing over weapons of mass destruction being delivered by innocuous containers, will now surely be hijacked by these 'aircraft carriers'. See if you can spot the tongue-in-cheek pet theory plug here.
Communications: Very few details are available regarding the communications framework utilised. The transportation containers do not display any obvious high-gain radio antennae, without which it would not be possible to guarantee the high-bandwidth video links vital to the mission. Some unsubstantiated musings refer to Starlink usage. This is supported by the pixellated censoring of the drones' upper surfaces in some released photographs. However, the small size of the drones used indicates that to be unlikely, at least at individual drone level. There are also mentions of fibre optic last-mile connectivity. While the images of the packed drones seem to preclude this, videos showing staggered launches continuing even after some kills have already taken place in the backdrop, could support this claim since simultaneous launches would be problematic with fibre optic lines. All this, plus the vast ranges at which the strikes were conducted, point instead toward a judo-esque employment of the Russians' own cellular networks as the core of the communications infrastructure of this attack.
Also read: Ukraine's Operation Spider's Web is a breakthrough in asymmetric warfare. What India can learn
Operational art
18-month-long effort: The duration of the overall operational scheme and the logistical scale of the deployment as also the Ukrainian president's tongue-in-cheek comments regarding location of the control stations inside Russia and adjacent to FSB installations clearly define this as a 'Sabotage'-style operation. Although the mechanisms used were significantly different, this attack was clearly from the same mould as the Israeli exploding pagers attack.
Run by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU): This was a grand sabotage campaign, not merely an aerial attack. Hence one can see a clear-headed focus on the operational concept in the selection of which agency ran it, avoiding dogmatic fixation on the aerial delivery vector.
Swarming: Notwithstanding the absence of classical style swarming and its associated collaborative robotics infrastructure, one can still see the basic ingredients of massed attacks and 'proto-swarming' at play.
– The need for wide-area ISR was clearly rendered unnecessary by the relatively fixed nature of the airfield targets and the FPV-style final targeting.
– The soft nature of the targets enabling even a single hit to achieve success may have obviated the need for massed and coordinated simultaneous attacks on individual aim points. There are also no signs to indicate embedding of any effects besides kinetic attack e.g. electronic warfare or radio relay. Nevertheless, the 25-drone scale of the attacks at each airfield and their surprise nature are likely to have created effective 'pulsing' of attacks.
– The third, key characteristic of swarming viz. 'parallel attack', is visible only in the form of simultaneity across a wide swathe of territory. However, the target types in all cases were similar, thus failing the more literal swarming criterion requiring attack across multiple levels of the enemy infrastructure.
Tactical cunning: All the previous attacks with long-range drones into its heartland would have led Russia to create multi-layered CUAS belts, which would have effectively defeated any Ukrainian attack of a modest scale seeking to run their gauntlet over such long ranges. However, the choice of a delivery mechanism which enabled the attack vector breaking cover very close to the target was a very creative way of avoiding most of the multi-layered Russian counter-UAS umbrella.
Attack v/s Defence: Facing repeated, massed UAV/cruise missile attacks from the Russian forces with an ever-reducing stockpile and uncertain resupply of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) was clearly assessed by the Ukrainians as an inadequate solution to their air defence problem. Hence, one can see the classic recourse of the 'mathematically literate' underdog in rephrasing the 'defence' problem as an 'attack' problem instead. This is clearly indicated by the exclusive Ukrainian focus on Russian cruise missile delivery platforms as its target.
Also read: Russia-Ukraine conflict is a masterclass in 21st-century warfare
Strategic context
Notwithstanding the MacGyver-esque nature of the actual weapon system used, this was no tactical scale action. All the hallmarks of a well-thought-out, composite, strategic plan are clearly visible as the operation's multiple layers are revealed.
Timing: The timing of the actual attack was clearly synchronised with the resumption of ceasefire negotiations at Istanbul on Monday. The Russians sought to put the squeeze by a massive upsurge in their attacks in the last few weeks leading up to these negotiations. However, the effect of these on morale would have been almost completely blunted by this singular 'last-word'-style Ukrainian attack, at least so far as to boost Ukrainian confidence and gain psychological ascendancy over the Russians.
Even so, the attack was 18 months in the making and hence only the actual D-day selection would have been subject to these ephemeral criteria. The conception of the attack itself was clearly in service of a much greater strategic goal. The ability to orchestrate such slow-gestation ventures to obtain highly time-critical effects clearly indicates exceptional strategic clarity.
Strategic continuity: The Ukrainians seem to clearly understand the resource mismatch they face vis-à-vis the Russians. Coupled with US vacillation/unreliability, they clearly see a strategic necessity for undertaking high-visibility, audacious operations designed to gain psychological ascendancy rather than just objectives on the ground. This is clearly visible in the long sequence of such operations intended to convey either 'technological innovation' superiority or 'tactical audacity', even if the results achieved are relatively short-lived. Ergo, the Magura V5 USV attack near Sevastopol, the R-73 AAM installation on USVs or the Kursk offensive and the Neptune SSM attack on the Russian cruiser Moskva. These and many more such examples were not the result of providential opportunity, but clearly point to a strategic continuity underpinning these actions.
Strategic Messaging: The overall effect of the Ukrainian tactical actions were further enhanced by a masterful televised address by none other than their president. It was a masterclass in strategic communication, especially how rich details of the operation were delivered, resulting in a clear sense of the Ukrainians being in control of their circumstances. And by purposely highlighting the 'subversive' aspects of the operation, they probably hope to inflict further damage by provoking the counter-intelligence paroxysms and excesses of the Russian internal security apparatus. A clear acknowledgement of Ukrainian losses in other theatres also lent a patina of credibility to these claims of having conducted the operations control centre right under the nose of the FSB.
Also read: Lessons for airpower from Operation Sindoor—unified command to tech advancements
Lessons for India
Swarms: The outrageously disproportionate effects of even a proto-swarm were demonstrated most convincingly. Especially evident was their exceptional potential as 'Day-1 Can Openers', besides allowing telescoping of SEAD and follow-on conventional manned aircraft strike. So, as long as we lack fifth-generation fighters for this can-opener role, or even if we acquire them for this role, the sheer cost and tactical effectiveness of such swarms is unmistakable. We must launch an anti-HQ9 swarm development as a national priority programme. While this doesn't square with the apparent incompetence of Pakistani drone attack waves on 8-9 May, complacency could be lethal.
Mission Engineering: The actual technological complexity of the Ukrainian attack was relatively modest – definitely in the realm of applied engineering rather than exotic or experimental technologies. The reason for their success lay instead in superb mission engineering and systems engineering within a very clear strategic conceptual framework. Consequently, focusing on the mission and system goals rather than the aerial vector hijacking all attention is the lesson to be drawn, at least so far as drones are concerned.
Innovation: We must also correspondingly evolve our understanding of innovation and its different manifestations depending upon the stage of the crisis facing us. It is nearly impossible to conjure and envision such a system as the Ukrainians put together in peacetime due to the absence of a specific scenario. Nevertheless, a strong focus on innovative concepts of operation and corresponding mission/systems engineering are vital, as opposed to our continuing obsession with 'non-negotiable requirements'.
Silos: The conduct of a long-range strategic air attack by an intelligence service clearly points to the obsolescence of institutional silos in this next-gen warfare realm. We clearly need to untangle our feet in this regard as evident from the plethora of drone RFPs working at cross-purposes.
Commodore JA Maolankar is a retired naval test pilot, currently working in the field of swarm drones development. He tweets @JA_Maolankar. Views are personal.
(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)