Fisheries and groundwater: A tale of two resources

Yahoo

19-03-2025

Similar approaches can be used to protect both ocean fisheries and dwindling groundwater on land, an OSU professor says. (Photo by Vicki Smith/ Getty Images)
Among renewable natural resources, ocean fisheries and groundwater aquifers are arguably the most difficult to manage. They are also very similar: both are hidden below the surface; both are highly variable and uncertain; both are typically exploited by many users in different locations; and both support people's livelihoods directly and indirectly, and benefit other stakeholders, species, and ecosystems.
Both resources also have a history of failures. As fishery exploitation around the world exceeded sustainable levels, fish populations crashed. The North Atlantic cod fishery and UK groundfish fisheries collapsed in the 1970s and '80s, and Pacific salmon, South American whitefish, and others experienced comparable fates.
Similarly, groundwater has declined around the world for decades, including in the U.S. high plains, southern coastal plain, and parts of Oregon. Overextraction of groundwater has led to high pumping costs, seawater intrusion, land subsidence, streamflow depletion, dry wells, and degradation of groundwater-dependent ecosystems.
Studies and experiences from many countries identify three key design principles for managing these resources: 1) cap total resource use; 2) allocate the total among resource users; and 3) allow managers to adjust the cap as needed. These design principles have been effective, particularly in fisheries using Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems or 'catch shares.'
In the U.S. southeast, an ITQ fishery has seen profits equaling 34% of revenues versus a nearby traditionally-regulated fishery barely breaking even. Iceland and New Zealand have seen similar results. And after the U.S. west coast groundfish fishery was declared a disaster in 2002, an ITQ system was adopted, leading to a 37% increase in profits per vessel in a decade.
Unfortunately, these three design principles have rarely been effectively applied to groundwater resources. Beginning in 1927, Oregon applied the 'prior appropriation doctrine' to groundwater. This system, previously established for surface water in many western states, adjusts to shortages by allocating water based on seniority (i.e., historical first use). Junior water rights may not interfere with senior water rights' access to their allotted water.
For surface water, interference is easily detected by examining streamflows above and below diversion points. For groundwater, interference is not directly observable, can involve many wells across large areas, and can occur gradually over decades. Thus, proving interference to a legal standard has been unachievable. The bottom line is that Oregon's groundwater laws do not include the third design principle: managers cannot adjust the cap.
So, although the law, which requires protecting senior groundwater rights from interference, exists 'on the books,' it is inoperable and routinely ignored. In its place, ad hoc and cumbersome administrative procedures have been activated where large groundwater declines occurred.
In 1959, eastern Oregon's Cow Valley was the first basin to be designated a 'critical groundwater area.' However, there, as in many other designated basins in Oregon, groundwater levels have continued to decline.
In Oregon's Harney Basin, widespread groundwater declines have been evident for many years, with groundwater levels declining more than 60 feet in some areas. Many senior wells, including residential and livestock wells, have gone dry due to interference – including from more junior wells [10].
The un-enforceability of the seniority system has created a crisis for the community and water resource managers: both senior and junior permit holders view their permitted water allotments as inviolable, even as groundwater levels decline. Thus, unsurprisingly, ongoing negotiations between Harney Basin irrigators and Oregon Water Resources Department (OWRD) appear headed toward deferring groundwater stabilization until at least 2060.
Meanwhile, environmental flows feeding the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, already lowered by more than one-third, will continue to decline.
OWRD staff have been given an impossible task, akin to driving down a winding road with bad brakes, no reverse gear, and a view mainly out the rear window. Oregon's groundfish fisheries might have faced a similar crisis, except that ITQs provide a kind of 'GPS' to navigate resource uncertainty and variability.
An even better model to point to, however, is the 'riparian surface water rights' system used in the eastern U.S.
Landowners adjacent to water sources have individual rights to 'reasonable use' of water, and shortages are accommodated by imposing equal proportional reductions.
Were such an approach adopted in Oregon, the state's guiding principle of 'reasonably stable groundwater levels' could be accomplished with similar equal proportional reductions until groundwater levels are stabilized across hydrologically-connected areas.
Changes of this magnitude would require considerable political fortitude and use of the governor's statutory authority, but in the long run it would provide OWRD with the three design principles needed to effectively manage groundwater.
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