Reassessing nuclear deterrence in South Asia

Express Tribune

13-05-2025

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In the wake of the Pahalgam incident on 22 April that killed 26 Indian tourists, the tension between Pakistan and India intensified. On 7 May, India attacked some 6 sites of Pakistan, primarily villages in Punjab and Azad Kashmir, which reportedly killed 31 and injured more than 50 noncombatants.
It is reported by many credible national and international sources that Pakistan in retaliation shot down at least 5 Indian jets that included 3 state-of-the-art Rafale aircraft. Neither side crossed each other's airspace while attacking each other despite the border contingency.
However, India continued to hit Pakistan, sending more than 70 Israeli-made Harop drones. Pakistan claimed to have shot all of them down. The question is: why has India under the pretext of terrorism been looking for preventive strikes below the nuclear threshold and what does it mean for broader South Asian strategic stability?
Although the two South Asian nuclear rivals are not aiming for a large-scale war after going nuclear, many argue that India, which is many times stronger than Pakistan in terms of conventional force, has aggressively been looking for space to wage a limited war under the nuclear overhang.
India is undertaking a dangerous shift in the South Asian deterrence dynamics, thereby practising coercive strategy against Pakistan. Out of frustration, it has crossed such a dangerous threshold many times with expected retaliation. Primarily, there are multiple reasons:
One, India has been modernising both its conventional and nuclear force capabilities by having a growing strategic partnership with several international players such as the US, Israel, France and Russia.
Two, India with its growing strategic partnership with the US especially being in the QUAD for containment of China has developed a hubris which can be blind, dangerous and short-lived particularly against a nuclear rival. Therefore, India in dangerous confidence is cashing out on this opportunity against Pakistan for preventive strike without producing credible evidence and/or without even caring much about international norms and values. It is also dangerously replicating Israeli policies in South Asia.
Three, India while following the Chanakian principles poses to be the hegemon of the broader South Asian region. It aspires to have escalation dominance, and would continue to undermine the nuclear threshold. In a dangerous precedent, it could opt for more preventive strikes against Pakistan for any inevitable crisis largely orchestrated by India.
Four, it is always tempted to undermine Pakistan's policy of credible minimum deterrence and its doctrinal posture of full spectrum deterrence falling within the ambit of minimum deterrence.
Pakistan's nuclear policy is largely misperceived by many Indian analysts, including Happymon Jacob in his recent piece in The Hindustan Times. Either Jacob badly lacks a conceptual understanding on nuclear strategy or misreads the evolving events between India and Pakistan, as follow:
a) Amidst the escalatory conflict between the South Asian nuclear rivals, India targeted a few Pakistani airbases and hit and damaged the Neelum Jhelum hydropower project, prompting Pakistan to retaliate in somewhat similar pattern to restore deterrence. Nevertheless, India became cautious not to further escalate given the fear of escalation to a nuclear level.
b) Exercising greater restraint being a responsible nuclear state, Pakistan continues to keep its conventional and nuclear deterrence intact against its potential adversary. Pakistan's nuclear forces bolstered with sophisticated delivery systems along with production of effective strategic countermeasures have become a reality that the adversary cannot escape away. Given such reality, the Indian security leadership may think many times before escalating the crisis up the ladder.
On the one hand, Pakistan should have the following imperatives:
1) It should continue to demonstrate being a confident and responsible state, practising a full spectrum deterrence falling within the ambit of credible minimum deterrence specific to India.
2) It should continue to modernise its retaliatory capabilities as part of effective countermeasures largely supported by emerging technologies. This is for restoring deterrence and broader strategic stability in South Asia.
3) It should continue to develop strategies by plugging the gaps that India has been exploiting to the best of its tactical and strategic advantages.
4) It needs to engage with leading international and regional players for crisis management and ultimately conflict resolution of all outstanding issues including the core issue of Kashmir. The unresolved Kashmir issue has been a nuclear flashpoint. Unless it is resolved, crises in South Asia are inevitable.
5) Despite India's hubris and rejection of the proposed strategic restraint regime in South Asia, Pakistan needs to urge India on such an imperative through both diplomatic and political channels.
On the other hand, the international community, especially the US, needs to: i) practice a balancing strategy in South Asia, as siding with one against the other is not a viable strategy which may not only harm their own geopolitical and geo-economic interests, but also threatens more serious crises in South Asia; ii) exercise its influence over India to potentially avoid its hubris and temptation for preventive strikes that accidently could escalate to dangerous level, as it is not in the best interest of India itself; c) convince India that in the absence of direct talks with Pakistan and without producing credible evidence to any undesirable episode, it cannot simply make terrorism a pretext to preempt Pakistan; and, d) be itself unequivocally clear that two nuclear powers should never fight given the danger and wider implications of the use of nuclear forces.
Unfortunately, Indian security leadership appears to be crossing such thresholds, undermining the broader South Asian strategic stability.