Bahrain sees Gulf business licences soar by 524%
Bahrain ranked second in the Gulf for issuing business licences to GCC citizens, recording a 524 per cent increase since 2007.
Saudis accounted for three-quarters of these permits. Meanwhile, property ownership by Gulf nationals in Bahrain reached 2,407 cases in 2023, with Emiratis making up the largest share at 33.7 per cent.
The figures come from the GCC Common Market report, published by the GCC Statistical Centre, which tracks economic ties across the bloc.
Bahrain issued 27,300 business licences, making it the second most active country in the region after the UAE, which granted 30,600.
Across the Gulf, the total number of licences surged to 81,200, compared to 14,600 in 2007, an increase of 455.6 per cent.
The report also sheds light on intra-GCC trade, where Bahrain recorded $9.9 billion in exports, placing it behind the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
Private sector
Meanwhile, Gulf citizens working in other member states numbered 32,400, with twothirds employed in the private sector, which saw a rise of 18.6 per cent compared to 2007.
Gulf citizens' property purchases in other member states grew by 25.7 per cent in 2023, with Bahrain and the UAE seeing the most deals.
In Bahrain, Emiratis made up 33.7 per cent of buyers, followed by Saudis (29.9 per cent), Kuwaitis (27.3 per cent), Qataris (7.8 per cent), and Omanis (1.4 per cent).
Bahrainis topped the list of Gulf investors in Qatar, accounting for 37.6 per cent of all purchases. In Saudi Arabia, they were the second largest group, making up 10.3 per cent of 1,996 transactions, while Kuwaitis accounted for 74.4 per cent.
In Kuwait, Bahrainis ranked behind Saudis, who dominated 89.3 per cent of 214 transactions, while Bahrainis held a 7.5 per cent share.
Bahrain remains a hub for regional investors, with 40 publicly listed companies open to Gulf nationals.
These firms hold a combined capital of $17.5 billion, with 52,700 Gulf shareholders.
Saudi investors made up 51.4 per cent of foreign shareholders in Bahrain's stock market, followed by Kuwaitis at 26.2 per cent. Across the GCC, 737 public companies are open to Gulf investors, holding $520.4 billion in capital, with 522,200 shareholders. Saudi Arabia had the largest share, with 226 companies and $210.9 billion in capital, drawing 11,400 Gulf investors.
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