Ramaphosa to establish Judicial Commission of Inquiry into prosecution of apartheid-era crimes
JOHANNESBURG - President Cyril Ramaphosa will be establishing a Judicial Commission of Inquiry (JCI) to investigate allegations of 'improper influence' to prevent the prosecution of apartheid-era crimes.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) made more than 400 referrals to the National Prosecuting Authority, however, there has been criticism that the NPA has not followed through on the cases.
Earlier in 2025, some families of victims of apartheid-era crimes brought an application against Ramaphosa and five other heads of departments seeking R167 million in damages for allegedly "suppressing" investigations into cases referred to the NPA by the TRC.
In a statement, Ramaphosa said the establishment of an inquiry is due to an out-of-court settlement reached with the families.
Presidency spokesperson, Vincent Magwenya, said, 'Allegations of improper influence in delaying or hindering the investigation and prosecution of apartheid-era crimes have persisted from previous administrations. Through this commission, President Ramaphosa is determined that the true facts be established and the matter brought to finality.'
ALSO READ: NPA says reopening inquests into apartheid-era crimes a complex process
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Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. 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