Kremlin says Estonia's readiness to host nuclear-capable NATO jets threatens Russia
MOSCOW, June 27 (Reuters) - The Kremlin said on Friday that Estonia's stated readiness to host NATO allies' U.S.-made F-35A stealth jets, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, posed a direct threat to Moscow.
Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur told the Postimees news outlet on Thursday that Estonia - which borders Russia and is a rotating base for NATO jets tasked with protecting Baltic airspace - was ready to host nuclear-capable jets if necessary.
"If some of them, regardless of their country of origin, have a dual-use capability to carry nuclear weapons it doesn't affect our position on hosting F-35s in any way," the outlet cited him as saying.
"Of course we are ready to host our allies."
Pevkur was speaking after Britain, a NATO member, announced it would buy at least 12 F-35A jets capable of carrying nuclear warheads and that they would join NATO's airborne nuclear mission.
Asked about Pevkur's comments, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said such a move would be an obvious threat to Russia.
"Of course it would be an immediate danger," Peskov told a journalist from Russia's Life news outlet. He said the statement was one of many "absurd thoughts" voiced by politicians in the Baltic region, which comprises Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
"We have practically no relations with the Baltic republics because it is very difficult to make them worse," he said.
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The Guardian
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US attacks on Iran redraw calculus of use of force for allies and rivals around globe
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Reuters
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Telegraph
an hour ago
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This passage from the 1982 Nato declaration could stand for the alliance's whole doctrine and its key American dimension: 'The security and sovereignty of the European members of the Alliance remain guaranteed by their own defence, by the presence of North American forces on European territory and by the United States strategic nuclear commitment to Europe. The United States and Canada likewise depend for their own security upon the contribution of the European partners to the defence of the Alliance.' The reason the doctrine is not repeated today is, presumably, that it would not be believed. That 'credibility of deterrence' has weakened. Nato communiques often talk of member states' commitments being 'ironclad'. That adjective is repeated this year, but the iron looks rusty now. There is an additional reason: the current occupant of the White House may not believe it himself. Those anxious leaders in The Hague probably thought, 'Best not to ask'. 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President Trump's bombing of Iran's nuclear sites – though in no sense a Nato action – shows he is on the side of the West against the maniacs. But it could be that 'Daddy' regards Israel as a sort of Prodigal Son whom he will indulge, while for Nato he is more like an absent father who resents having to see his kids. We confront the contradiction that the man who tells us to contribute much more money and acts as if he is the boss may be the one least likely to stick around. He is also the friendliest towards our greatest immediate foe. Mr Trump has been absolutely consistent in refusing the underlying Nato approach, which is that Putin is completely in the wrong because he is trying to change the borders of Europe by force. Trump will criticise Putin sometimes. Yes, he has gone too far ('What the hell happened to him?'), he will say. That he should not have attacked at all, he will never, ever say. So it becomes very hard to imagine circumstances in which Trump's finger would press the button to save Europe – or even Britain, for whom he has a soft spot – from Putin. Hence our inglorious but not completely foolish playing for time in The Hague. Perhaps Mr Trump will eventually see more sense, or just calm down – and anyway power will have drained away from him in not much more than three years' time, or even, perhaps, after the mid-terms next year. In these trying circumstances, we should feel sympathetic to Sir Keir Starmer's efforts to take the defence and security of Britain more seriously. So it was marginally good news this week that we shall buy 12 dual-capable F-35A bombers from the United States, thus improving our nuclear capacity. When you consider, however, that they will be American and under American custody and command, and that we are not buying more bombers than before, but simply different ones (switching from B models to A models), you – and Vladimir Putin - may be underwhelmed. On VE Day 1945, Churchill said, 'Our enemy lies prostrate before us.' Eighty years on, we risk it being the other way round.
